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APOLLO SPACECRAft 
Th~ spac~crafl (SIC) consisls of a launch ~sca~ sysl~m (LES) ass~m· 
bly. command modul~ (C/M). s~r\'ic~ modul~ (S/M). and Ih~ spac~craftl 
lunar modul~ adapl~r (SLA). Th~ LES ass~mbly providu Ih~ lMans few 
rapidlv st'paratin~ Ih~ C/ ~f from Ih~ S/M durin~ pad ew suborbilal aborls. 
Th~ C/~f forms th~ spac~crafl control c~nl~r, contains n~c~ssary aUlo­
matic and manual ~quipm~nt to conlrol and monilor Ih~ spac~craft 
svsI~ms, and contains th~ r~quir~d ~quipm~nt for saf~ly and comforl of 
Ih~ cr~w. Tht" S/~I is a cylindrical strurtUH' local~d ~Iw~~n Ih~ C/ M 
and Iht" SLA. It conlains Iht' propulsion syslt"ms for allilud~ and v.loc· 
ity chan~t" man~u\'~rs. ~fost of tht" ronsumahlt"s us~d in Ih~ mission ar~ 
slor~d in Iht" S/M. Th~ SLA is a truncatt"d con~ which conn~cls Ih~ 
S/M 10 Iht" launch \,t"hicl~. II also prm'idt"s Ih~ spac~ wh~r~in Ih~ lunar 
modul~ (L/~I) is carri~d on lunar missions. 
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT 
Spac~crafl 012 ,,'as und~rgoin!l a "Plugs OUI In1~gral~d T~sl" OIl Ih~ 
lim~ of Ih~ accid~nt on January :1.7. 1967. O~rational Ch~ckoul Proc~· 
dur~. d~siJl;nat~d OCP .'0-)(.-0021-1 appli~d to this Irsl. Within this 
r~porl this proc~dur~ is ofl~n rd~rr~d to as OCP·OO21. 
TESTS AND ANAL YSES 
R~sults of It"SIS and analys~s ,nol cornpl~lt" OIl Ih~ li_ of publicalion 
of Ihis r~porl will b~ conlain~d , in Ap~ndi" G. Add~nda and Corrig~nda. 
CONVERSION OF TIME 
Throughoul Ihis r~port. lim~ is slal~a in Gr~~nwich Mun Ti_ (G~). 
To com'ert G~ 10 Easl~rn Slandard Ti_ (EST). subtracl 17 hours. 
For e"ampl~. 2~:~1 G~ conv~rted is 6:~1 p.m. EST. 
For sale by tbe Superintendent or Documents, U.S. Government PrInting Office 
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A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Historical Data Panel 6. The task assigned for accom­
plished by Panel 6 was prescribed as follows: 
Assemble, review, and summarize historical data on Spacecraft and associated systems as perti­
nent to the fire incident. Data to be analyzed shall include records such as included in Space­
craft log, failure reports, other quality engineering and inspection documents .' Make interpretation 
on data as to applicability to subject problem . 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Historical Data Panel: 
Mr. T.J . Adams, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. J .H . Dickinson, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. J .L. Hansel, North American Avis tion, Inc . , (NAA), KSC 
Mr. D. Buffington, North American Aviation, Inc., (NAA), KSC 
2. 	COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. G.C. White, Jr., NASA, Washington, D.C. , Board Member, was assigned to monitor the His­
torical Data Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. GENERAL 
a. Panel 6, Historical Data, was established to assemble and review records on Spacecraft (SIC) 
and associated systems in o(der' to determine the applicability of these records to the Apollo 204 
accident. In addition, historical narratives (Enclosures 6-6 and 6-7) were prepared to reflect the 
relationship and flow of significant review and acceptance points, highlight documentation perti­
nent thereto, and to present a brief history of the prelaunch operational performed on SIC 012 
at Kennedy Space Center. 
b. Enclosure 6-2 lists the records reviewed by Panel 6, with an explanation of these records, and 
the criteria used for judgement of applicability. 
c. Throughout the Panel's activities, contact was maintained with MSC-Houston and NAA-Downey 
and several requests for records review were placed on both organizations, 
2. 	IMPOUNDING AND INVENTORY 
a . Impound Procedure - Action was begun within an hour of the Apollo 204 accident to impound 
all SIC 012 quality documents in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Apollo Mission 
Failure Contingency Plan dated May 15, 1966. (Reference 6-1.) The impounded records from 
Launch Complex 34, Flight Crew Systems Laboratory, and Acceptance Checkout Equipment Con­
trol Room No. 1 were collected and delivered to the Quality Records Center. A NASA Secu­
rity guard was posted, with access permitted only to personnel approved in writing by the Board. 
NAA Downey Quality and Reliability Assurance was notified and immediately impounded all quality 
pertinent to SI C 012 concurrent with notification to applicable vendors to impound same. . 
b. Inventory Procedure - The impounded records were inventoried and all documents applicable 
to the Apollo 204 accident were segregated. 
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Approximately 42,500 pages of records were catalogued, representing 12,000 documents. Three 
documents were not accounted for adequately. These documents were Test Preparation Sheet (TPS) 
SIC 012-SLA-004. Temporary Installation and Removal Record (TIRR) SIC 012-CME-42 and 
Parts Installation and Removal Record (PIRR) SIC 012-PIRR-(010) No. 132. An evaluation 01 
the type documents concerned discounted any relevance to the accident. 
As the documents were catalogued, significant information was recorded on special review forms 
prepared to enhance accountability and evaluation. 
3. REVIEW TEAMS 
a. The review teams consisted of Quality and Reliability Engineering Personnel drawn from gov­
ernment, NAA, and the General Electric Company (Apollo Support Division). All review personnel 
had previously been associated with SIC 012 operations and were familiar with the test history. 
The review was conducted on a continuous basis in order to make pertinent information avail­
able to Panel 6 and other Panels for consideration as rapidly as possible. 
4. REVIEW PROCEDURE 
a. Data review consisted of determining which Command Module (C/M) records were considered 
significant (in consonance with criteria delineated in Enclosure 6-2) so as to warrant consideration 
by other Panels, e.g., the Materials Review Panel 8 was provided with all records pertaining to 
use of nonmetallic materials. Dissemination of significant records was conducted in accordance with 
the following criteria: 
(1) Relevant Items and Their Disposition: 
(a) Chemicals: 
All records documenting the use of chemicals, such as cleaning solvents, paints, and 
other chemicals were forwarded to the Materials Review Panel 8. This category included 
any reports of leakage in fluid systems. 
(b) Nonmetallics: 
All records documenting the use of nonmetallic materials III the crew compart­
ment were forwarded to the Materials Review Panel 8. 
(c) Electrical: 
All pertinent records documenting problems with electrical systems were forwarded 
to the Integration Analysis Panel 18. 
b. Panel 7 activities continued in support of the other Panels. Mainly, this consisted of research­
ing the records to provide data requested other Panels. One example of this is the use ofthe methyl­
ethyl-ketone, ( MEK), as a cleaning agent. Since this is a flammable material, and be­
cause a partially filled bottle of MEK was found in the White Room after the fire, there 
was concern over the use of this material. The records search, combined with the interrogation 
of personnel who were known to have used MEK in the SIC in the three days immediately pre­
ceding the accident, enabled Panel 6 to supply information to Panel 8 for their evaluation. 
c. Panel 6 also conducted a review of Problem Action Records (PAR's) and Unsatisfactory Reports 
(UR's). These records are defined in Enclosure 6-2, and the results of the review are given below: 
(1) Problem Action Records - Failure Category: 
All problem reports in the failure category were reviewed by support personnel at MSC. 
The reports covered failure-type problems from inception of the Apollo Program through de­
velopment, qualification tests, manufacturing-vendor tests, field tests, checkout, and flight testing 
of all Command Modules and Command Modules Syst~ms,subsystems and components through 
out the country. Any previous conditions that could be related in some manner to the Apollo 
204. accident were reviewed and evaluated. Upon completion of the Panel 6 review of these 
reports, a total of 39 were identified as requiring further evaluation for applicability by Panel 
18 (Enclosure 6-2). In cases where conclusions drawn by an original failure analysis seemed 
questionable, the results were re-examined. No new conclusions relevant to the Apollo 204 acci­
dent were found in the review. 
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(2) 	Problem Action Record - Unsatisfactory Condition (PAR- UC): 
A review of PAR-UC's was conducted and yielded no. new significant information. 
(3) Unsatisfactory Reports (UR's): 
All UR's written at KSC prior to the accident were reviewed, and only one was consid­
ered applicable, i.e., bent electrical connector pins. This problem was identified to Panel 18 
as a result of the Discrepancy Record Review (Enclosure 6-4). 
5. DISCUSSION 
a. Ingress-Egress Log 
(l) In reviewing the Ingress-Egress Log, pertinent discrepancies were noted. An Ingress-Egress 
Log is maintained in accordance with Apollo Preflight Operations Procedures (APOP) No. 0-201, 
"Access Control of Test and Work Areas" (Reference 6-2). Personnel entering the CIM are re­
quired to record on log sheets all tools and other items carried into the C/M . The log sheets 
for SIC 012 were reviewed and in several cases showed that tools were recorded as having been 
carried into the CIM, but no record of removal of these items was made. Considering that tools 
could come in contact with electrical equipment and cause an arc, Panel 6 initiated an investi­
gation of the SIC to look for these specific tools. 
b. Shakedown Inspection 
(1) Shakedown inspection is defined as a pre-scheduled period when all other operations are 
discontinued while inspection personnel conduct a visual inspection. This is in accordance with es­
tablished and approved criteria to detect and record hardware discrepancies. 
(2) Panel 6 conducted an investigation to determine how shakedown inspections were scheduled 
and performed on the SIC . From this investigation, it was learned that there were shakedown in­
spections performed prior to major test and milestones. However, these inspections were performed 
without definitive inspection criteria, but were conducted using the inspector's knowledge of pre­
vious SIC practices. In addition, the SI C 012 Master Flow Plan was reviewed (Reference 6 - 5 and 
it was found that shakedown inspections while not shown in the SI C test flow plan at KSC, are 
scheduled in bi - weekly and in daily work schedules. 
c. Inspection Procedures During Test Operations 
At the request of Panel 18, inspection procedures just prior to CIM hatch installation were 
reviewed. This review disclosed that Inspection monitored this phase of the test operations over the 
communications network because the White Room space and weight loading limitations prevented 
having an Inspector witness these functions in the White Room. Procedure APOP-0-202, "Opera­
tional Checkout Procedure", (Reference 6-3), states that Inspection will stamp each line item in 
the procedure requiring Inspection verification. Spacecraft Operations Letter SCO-2-104-65 (Re­
ference 6-11) defines the verification requirements and the functions being performed prior to hatch 
installation that would have normally required I nspection physical verification. 
d. Constraints List 
(1) As a result of investigation of open work items, questions arose regarding conduct of tests. 
• 	 The investigation revealed that prior to the start of any test, an .open-item review meeting is held 
by NASA/NAA, in accordance with APOP-0-202, "Operational Checkout Procedure". From this 
meeting, a list of those items which must be worked prior to the start of test is prepared, and 
approved by NASA/NAA engineers. The constraints list for Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP)
• 
FO-K-0021-1 was examined for content (Reference 6-6) to see if previoUs tests were listed as con­
straints. Research disclosed that OCP FO-K-0034 and OCP FO-K-0005 summarysheets (Reference 
6-7) had not been signed off as accepted prior to OCP FO-K-0021-1, but were not listed on the 
constraints list for OCP- FO-K-0021-1. It should be noted that OCP numbers are not related to 
the sequence oEtest accomplishment. APOP-O -202 does not contain a requirement to list open 
tests as constraints to subsequent tests, although there is a requirement to review the open items. 
Individual open items from previous tests are listed on the constraint list for subsequent tests if 
they are constraints to that test. 
Analysis revealed that constraints lists are signed only by NASA/NAA Operations and 
Engineering with no NASA or NAA Quality control signature indicating approval of the con­
straints lists. 
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e. Mandatory Inspection Points 
(1) As a result of questions which arose regarding Inspection coverage, APOP-0-202, "Opera­
tional Checkout Procedure", was examined to determine if there were any requirements for Man­
datory Inspection Points (MIP's). The requirement is not clearly defined in the APOP, although 
many OCPs do contain MIP's. 
MIP's are defined as inspection of actual hardware status. 

Normally, Inspection monitors the test to insure adherence to the procedure. 

£. Review of Engineering Changes 

(1) As a result of review of open work, it was found that a large number of engineering chan­
ges were incorporated into the SIC at KSC. Many of these changes resulted from non-fit or non­
function problems . 
Some of the changes were due to the fact that SIC 012 was the first manned Apollo Space­
craft. Some of the changes were requested by the crew members. The large number of changes 
made it difficult to establish the vehicle configuration. An example of a major change is shown in 
Reference 6-8. 
g. Retest Requirements 
(1) As a result of the review of Discrepancy Records to determine open work, it was discovered 
that the requirement for retest may in some cases be deferred to a later test, (Reference 6-10) . 
The records covering the work were closed out prior to the retest. 
(2) Panel 6 · investigated the requirements for retesting of components or subsystems after re­
work. APOP-T-502, "Discrepancy Recording System", (Reference 6-9) covers the retest require­
ment, but there is no requirement to keep the discrepancy records open until the retest has been 
verified. The records are closed out with a statement that the retest will be done in a subsequent 
test. This can then be deleted by on-the-spot deviations to the subsequent test. 
h. Subsystem History 
(1) In an attempt to obtain a complete subsystem history from the records, considerable dif­
ficulty was experienced. This was due to the fact that the records are not maintained by sub­
system. Records are presently filed by category of document (Discrepancy Record, Test Prepara­
tion Sheet, etc .). In the event of subsystem problems, it is often necessary to develop the history 
of the subsystem, including failures, reworks, test results, etc. The present system required a great 
deal of effort to retrieve the necessary records to provide this history. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING: 
The Ingress-Egress Log (Reference 6-4) discloses several instances where tools and equipment were 
carried into the SIC, but the log does not show these tools as removed. 
DETERMINATION: 

The maintenance of the Ingress-Egress Log is inadequate. 

2 . FINDING: 
a. Shakedown inspection periods are not shown in the Master Flow Plan. (Reference 6-6). 
•b. There are no definitive inspection criteria to perform shakedown inspections for the Apollo Program. 
DETERMINATION: 
a. Hardware condition prigr to major tests and milestones is difficult to establish. 
b. Inspection personnel are not able to assess the condition of the SIC for compliance with definitive 
criteria, but rather assess it in accordance with their knowledge of standard practjces~ 
3. FINDING: 
Inspection personnel do not perform a pre-scheduled inspection with a checklist prior to hatch 
closing. 
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DETERMINATION: 
Inspection personnel could not verify these functions during this period. 
4. FINDING: 
Formal approval by NASA or NAA Quality Control of the constraints list is not required (Re­
ference 6-6) . 
DETERMINATION: 
NASAINAA Quality Control cannot discharge their responsibilities without approving the constra­
ints list. 
5 . FINDING: 
The requirements for Mandatory Inspection Points (MIP's) are not clearly defined in the Apollo 
Preflight Operations Procedures. 
DETERMINATION: 
Proper Inspection coverage is not assured without clearly defined MIP'S) . 
6. 	FINDING: 
At the time of shipment of the .SIC to KSC, the contractor submitted an incomplete list of open 
items. A revision of the said list significantly and substantially enlarged the list of open items. 
DETERMINATION: 
The 	true status of the SI C was not identified by the contractor. 
7. FINDING: 
There is no efficient system which readily identifies that results accomplished by rework are veri­
fied by retest. 
DETERMINATION: 
The present system of verification of rework by retest is cumbersome. 
8. FINDING : 
There is no requirement to maintain records by subsystem classification, nor does the system pre­
sent status in this fashion. 
DETERMINATION: 
The recovery of pertinent historical information is extremely difficult. 
Enclosures 	 E. SUPPORTING DATA 
6-1 	 Not Used 
6-2 	 List of documents reviewed by Panel 6, including criteria for determining applicability 
to the AS-204 accident. 
6-3 	 List of Problem Action Records submitted to other Panels. 
6-4 Unsatisfactory Report on Bent Pins 
6-5 List of References 
6-6 Historical Narrative 
6-7 Historical Narrative of Prelaunch Operations at Kennedv Space Center 
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 
The following are the types of documents reviewed by Panel 6, including a description of each 
type of document, and the criteria used in judging the applicability of these documents to the Apollo 
204 accident. 
I. TEST PREPARATION SHEET (TPS): 
A document which authorizes work , provides engineering instructions, establishes a method of work 
control, furnishes historical records, and facilitates inspection under the two categories defined below: 
a . Type "A" TPS: Required to authorize work involving a change of configuration (design change) . 
b . Type "8" TPS: Required to authorize all other planned work and tests . 
Crite'ria for review 
a . Agreement between Engineering Order ( EO) and TPS. 
b. Unworked, or partially worked, EO/TPS's which are considered significant. 
c. Any configuration changes by TPS wi thout EO coverage'. 
d . All non-metallics. 
e. Questionable design changes. 

£. All electrical items. 

g. All solvents or cleaning agents . 
2 . DISCREPANCY RECORD (DR): 
A document utilized to record significant and / or test discrepancies. This document provides for 
engineering instructions and dispositions, authorizes work of disposition, authorizes facilities inspection, 
and furnishes historical records under the two categories listed below: 
a. Significant Discrepancy: A discrepancy that (a) cannot be returned to specified configuration, 
or (b) requires' engineering disposition, i.e., (1) functional failure, (2) defective component, (3) 
discrepancy affecting test schedule, (4) action which could invalidate previously accepted tests, or 
(5) a discrepancy which could have an adverse effect on mission objectives or be a safety hazard. 
b . Test discrepancy: Any anomaly encountered during integrated testing (testing which unites two or 
more space systems, e.g., Acceptance Checkout Equipment, Spacecraft Systems or components, 
etc.) except an obvious deviation or human factor which is immediately recognized and corrected 
without disturbing the normal progress of the test. 
3. DISCREPANCY RECORD SQUAWK SHEET (DRSS): A document used to record minor dis­
crepancies, provide technician supervision instructions, authorize work of the disposition, authorize facili­
ties inspection, and furnish historical records under the category of discrepancy listed below: 
Minor Discrepancy: Any deficiency which can be returned to drawing configuration without engineer­
ing disposition, e.g., workmanship items, string ties, oversize clamps, unclean areas, past-due calibra­
tion, etc. 
Criteria for review 
a. All solvents or cleaning age\.lts . 
b. Unapproved non-metallics . 
c . Questionable deviations to drawings. 
d . Any dispositions and/or conclusions not clearly defined . 
e. Dispositions without retest. 
4 . OPERATIONAL CHECKOUT PROCEDURE (OCP): An engineering document which provides 
ENCLOSURE 6 ·2 
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detailed instructions to personnel for operational ch",ckout and verification of equipment performance . 
OCP's are based on NAA Process Specifications and those applicable are referenced in the OCP by 
document number. OCP's: (l) provide technical steP by step delineation of required personnel activity 
for the operation, assembly, handling or test of the equipment and for system(s) involved, (2) provide 
for insertion of program requirement record data, (3) provide NASA/NAA Engineering and Inspection 
Acceptance, (4) provide for safety of personnel and equipment. 
5. DE VIA TI 0:'11 S: A change to a published OCp, such 'as changt's in t'quipm<,nl I iSIS, It'SI paramett'rs, se­
quences add('d or delet(,d or modifit'd by order of occurrt'nce or contt'nl 10 permil accomplishmenl of the 
test. Obvious errors, such as typographical ('rrors, wrong page numb( 'rs, ('tc .. art' not considered de­
viations. 
Criteria for review 
a. Open Interim Discrepancy Records (lDR's). 
b. Unsatisfactory Closed IDR's (vague). 
c. Parameter' Deviations. 
d . Unexplained Deviations. 
e . Deviations not satisfactorily documented. 
f. Other suspected deviations . 
6 . PARTS INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL RECORD (PIRR): A document utilized to record 
selected new installations and all removals and reinstallations of previously installed pans. Removals 
and installations are those components of the end item configuration which are removed or installed, 
connected or disconnect~ . This document by itself does not authorize any work. 
Criteria for review 
a. Open installations or removals . 
b. Unsatisfactory closeouts. 
c. Unsatisfactory transfers (recapped PIRR or TIR) . 
d. Unauthorized installations or removals. 
e. Installations of non-metallics. 
f. Installations without retest. 
g. Part number/serial number changes. 
7. TEMPORARY INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL RECORD (TIRR): A document utilized ex­
tensively to record Spacecraft installations. It must be removed prior to flight and selVes as a historical 
record . Temporary installations are non-flight Command and SeIVice Module hardware and temporarily 
installed flight hardware (e.g ., fit-check installations), which must be removed prior to flight. 
CRITERIA for review 
a . Open installations or removals . 
b. Unsatisfactory closeouts . 
c. Unsatisfactory transfers (recapped PIRR or TIR). 
d. Unauthorized installations or removals. 
e. Installations of non-metallics . 
f. Installations without retest. 
g. Pan number/serial number changes. 
• 

• 
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8. PROBLEM ACTION RECORDS (PAR's): The PAR is a :-';AA lorm on which hardware problems 
are reported for failure or cause analysis, and corrective action. There are two uses for the PAR, i.e,;' 
(a) failure Reporting, (pAR·f), and (b) Unsatisfactory Condition reporting, (PAR·UC). 
-Criteria for review 
The PAR·f's were reviewed for failure analysis to determine what caused the malfunction and 
applicability to the Apollo 204 accident. PAR·UC's were reviewed to determine if significant items had 
been reported on this record that had not appeared in other records, 
9 . UNSATISfACTORY RECORDS (UR's): The UR is a NASA document , used by the government 
to report conditions which are repetitive, or involve safety of flight. The condition reported mayor may 
not have been reported by the contractor in his paperwork system. 
Criferla for review 
UR's were reviewed to determine if any significant item was not reported through other mediums . 
ENCLOSURE 6 -2 
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PROBLEM ACTION RECORDS SENT TO OTHER PANELS 
TO 
PAR PANEL 
27094 8 

27049 

27057 

3958 

27017 18 

27056 

24201 18 

163286 18 

171589 

171612 

27204 18 

12460 

13484 

13485 

12470 

16605 

23437 

23500 

23502 

23686 

23660 

163740 

163378 

27235 

23592 

16726 

3951

• 
28637 

171560 

171578 

PROBLEM 
ECS LEAKS 
UNQUALIFIED PARTS IN GAS CHROMATOGRAPH 
LEAKS IN QUICK DISCONNECT 
INTERNAL SHORTS IN TEE ·ADAPTER 
GSE ETHYLENE/ GLYCOL FLUID· 
TRANSDUCER AND RELAY FAILURES 
CONTACT RESISTANCE OUT OF SPECIFICATION 
GSE 
CIRCUIT BREAKER OPERATION ERRATIC 
ELECTROLUMINESCENT BAR FAILED TO LIGHT 
ECS WATER / GLYCOL PUMP FAILED TO OPERATE 
CLUTCH VOLTAGE OSCI L LA TES 
TRANSISTOR FAILURE IN CONTROLLER 
ENCLOSURE 6·3 
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PROBLEM ACTION RECORDS SENT TO OTHER PANELS (CONTD) 
PAR 
12032 
12040 
14555 
16696 
23495 
23526 
23603 
15833 
164203 
TO 
PANEL PROBLEM 
18 GSE· 
WATER/GLYCOL SERVICE SET 
18 BURNT S POTS ON RELAY MODULE PINS 
18 CYCLIC ACCUMULAT OR SOLENOID VALVE HICKS IN FULL 
OPEN POSITION 
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, 17. ~'n,or :~ fO(rorv Cond,tton 
Thia Unsatisfactory Report documents a recurring problel!l concernin, bent pins in sic 
Dlect:-ical connectors, which if net corrected, could seriously 1mpa1r the checkout 
sche~ules andlor jepardize subsequent Apollo missions. The following is a .ummar.r 
o te ed at KSC during checkout of sic 012 which wre a direct.of ti:e fo.11ures enc un r 
result of this unsatisfactory condition: 
1. During Seq. ll-0401 of COtlbined Systems Test (OCP-K-003~), the RCS 
transfer "B" light was not observed. Troubleshooting isolated the 
problem to a short circuit 'J1thin clM - S/M umb1lical connector J3AJ. 
Fu:ther investigation revealed that pins II 75 and I 51 VBre bent and 
shorting against .,pins II 50 and II 52 respectively. (Ret. lOR 028 vs 
OCP-K-0035; DR SiC 012 - siC 0189; PAR#27056) 
2. On September 16, 1966, a check of sic 012 separation monitor c1rcuit. 
via PCH was made per 'l'PS-099 during Seq. 04 of OCP-K-0035, Combined 
Systems Test. During this test an out-of-tolerance (0%) iDdie&t10n 
was obtained. Subsequent troubleshooting isolated the problem to a 
blown i'use which \018.15 later found to have been caused by open jUlliper 
wires bet\leon Matr1x Terminal Boards. (Ret. ,DR sic 012 - siC 0191J 
?AR/I27096) Durir.g the repair operation of th1s problem, oonneotor 
Plll6 \las disconnected from J54 of the Vl6-764042, Event Cond1tioner 
to fac111tate the connection ot a spare fuse into the o1rcuitr,r pre­
viously protected by the blown fUse. Visual inspeotion ot the die­
oonnected plug. Plll6 .:ld J54. revealed 8 bent pw. (Ref. III sic 0l2­
sic 0258.:ld SjC '0264) 
3. Following poW'er-up for the sea level run ot the 11titude Chamber Test 
(OCP-K-0034), an 1tldication ot clM - s/H separation wa. observed. 
Troubleshooting revealed a short cirou1t 'J1tbin the clM - sIM umb1lloal 
connector, JJBJ. Further investigat10n of the conneotor disclosed that 
pin II 32 WaD bent and shorting against pin II 33. It wu ruther noted 
tha.t pins II 1, /I 18. and II 36 were also bent. (Ret. IDR 022 v. OCP­
K-0034; DR sic 012 - siC 0431; PARH27105) 
Since many dect.r1cal connectors are praotically 1tlaccessible, mating is otten a 
blind operation. As a result, the pins are often bent due to 1mproper conneotor 
o.!l~er.t. To preclude reaurrences ot this problem, we reo<llllllMDd the tollowinl: 
ENCLOSURE 6·4 
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I ----~I------------------~! NASA - Manne;! S;;.oeccraft Cc,,~cr I 
i UNSATISfACTORY REPORT - Con~ir.l! .;. bll Sheet ( PART I, II, HI) Po~. 
27. U.R. No. 1. 	 Only connuctors/rec~ptacl&s with sufficiont alignment 
features should be utilized in inaccessible areas. ego A-054 
Use of connectors with p1n guides would lessen mating difficul~--------; 
tios. 
2. 	 Circ~ " ts ""h ~ ch routs throup,h connectors and/or receptacles that have baan 
i! : t"' 7'!·upt~c. subsoquent to Integrated Testing at Nil DO\Illey shoUld be 
r':'\I<'i· ' .. ,·i0ci pr.lor to shipm~nt of tilt! cSM to KsC. Adherence to Ui1s poliCy 
wo)ul.:! tlfl'dctlUl.lly e.l.Glll.!1te the prelauncll problelllB resulting tram bent or 
brokdn pi~s incurred during connector remating operations. 
It cr.ould bo f-.n-ther noted at this time that the NAA Standard Ropair Manual repair No. 
1 ~1.4, authorizes straightening or all pins, size twenty or smaller, for all band 
angle3 up to 90 degrees. Wo feel that this is a very unreliable fix, as damage ma:y 
be dO!l8 to the pins internal to the connector which would not be detected through the 
?re.;cribed visual inspection. In addition, there is no practical me.thad of determining 
:'0'01 ~""y t1mes a particular pin has previously been straightened. Due to these tacts, 
\/s rscommend that the following changes be made to the NAA Standard Repa1r Manual: 
1. 	 Pins with bend angles of less than 20 degrees may be straightened end 
accepted tr~ough visual inspection it it can be detinitely determined 
that the pin has not been previously straightened. 
2. 	 Pins that are straightened after being bent at angle. of more than 20 
degrees should be accepted only after a satisfactory X-ray ex.mination 
has been made. 
3. 	 Pins that are bunt in excess ot 200 and are inaccessible tor X-ray should 
be replaced. If replacement is not practical, the bent pins should be 
broken-cfr and the associated circuit routed through undamaged spare pins 
it available. 
Enclosures: 1. DR S/C 012 - S/C-0189, pAR#2?056 
2. 	 DR S/C 012 - S/C-019l, pAJl/I2?CFJ6 
3. 	 DR S/C 012 - S/C-0258 
4. 	 DR S/C 012 - s/c...o264 
5. 	 DR S/C 012 - S/C-043l, PAJl/I27105 
6. 	 Standard Repair Manual, Repair No. ELl.4 
7. 	 Photos (3 ea.) 
\ 
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6-2 
6-3 
6-4 
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6-6 
6-7 
6-8 
6-9 
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REFEREI':CES 
Apollo Mission Failure Contingency Plan 
Apollo Prenight Operations Procedure Number 0-201 
"Access Control of Test and Work Areas" 
Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure Number 0-202 
"Operational Checkout Procedure'; 
Apollo Ingress-Egress Log Sheets 
Spacecraft 012 Schedule, KSC 
Constraint List, Spacecraft 012 Operational Checkout Procedure FO-K-0006/OO21-1 
OCP FO-K-OOSA-l and OCP F-K-0034A, A-I 
TPS-012-SClOO, "Modification of Quad Heater" 
Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure Number T-502, entitled, " Discrepancy Recording 
System" 
DR-SC0838 and DR-SCOI2-OBlO 
Spacecraft Operations Leller SCO-2-104-6S 
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Readiness Review (CARR) were conducted to support the acceptance and delivery from the Contrac­
tor (NAA). These reviews are discussed later. 
d . Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW) 
The Certificate of Flight Worthiness (COFW) is a requirement of NASA-Apollo Program Dir­
ective No. 6 dated 15 August 1965. NAA was directed to implement this requirement in accordance 
with the MSC-Houston procedure, "Procedure for the Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW)" 
dated 20 June 1966 (Reference 6-15). The COFW is used to certify that each flight stage and 
module is a complete and qualified item prior to shipment, and is supported by adequate supporting 
documentation, i.e., the Acceptance Data Package (ADP) and the Material Inspection and Receiving 
document (DD Form 250). The COFW informs the Apollo Program Director of any deficiencies 
prior to shipment from the manufacturing sites and from the static firing site . The COFW has 
requirements for the following documents for the following endorsements: Endorsement one is ex­
ecuted and signed at the completion of checkout at the Contractor's plant by the Contractor, MSC 
quality representative, and the MSC Program Manager's designee. Endorsement one reflects the final 
action taken at the CARR and information contained on the DD Form 250. Endorsement number 
two is executed and signed at the completion of receiving inspection at KSC and is signed by the 
KSC representative, the MSC quality representative, and the MSC Program Manager's desigriee . 
Endorsement number three is executed and signed at the time the Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft 
are mated, by the same people that signed endorsement number two . Endorsement number four is 
executed and signed at the completion of the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) by the KSC re­
presentative and the MSC Program Manager's designee. The final certification is executed at the 
time the Spacecraft is declared flight worthy and requires the signature of the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program Manager (Reference 6-15 and 6-17) . 
e. Design Certification Review (DCR) 
The purpose of the DCR is delineated In Apollo Program Directive No. 7 (Reference 61-8) 
is to examine the design of the total mission complex (spacecraft, booster, GSE, launch complex, 
communications network, etc.) for proof of development maturity and assess and certify the design 
of the Space Vehicle, Launch Complex, Mission Control Center and Manned Space Flight Network 
for manned flight safety. 
f. Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
The FRR as delineated in Apollo Program Directive No. 8 (Reference 6-19) is a two part 
review consisting of a Program Director's FRR and a Mission Director's FRR. The purpose of 
the Program Director's FRR is to determine that the space vehicle hardware and Launch comples 
are ready to commence the mission period. The purpose of the Mission Director's FRR is to make 
a judgement for initiating the mission period and committing the deployment of world wide forces 
to support the mission. 
g. Review 	Schedule 
The following bar-chart illustrates the Apollo development/ review process (See figure I). 
2. DISCUSSION OF SPACECRAFr 012 CHECKPOINTS 
This section describes the specific Spacecraft 012 checkpoints in detail. The checkpoint activities, 
locations, dates, personnel involved, and significant results are included. The checkpoints are disCUSSLG 
in chronological order and present a complete historical summary of the flow of hardware development 
and key inspection, review and certification checkpoints. 
a . Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
The PDR checkpoint was conducted during the period from November 1964 through January 
1965 for all Block I spacecraft including Spacecraft 012. As mentioned previously this was a review 
of both the requirements and the design since Spacecraft 012 had been released for manufacturing 
In reality it was both a PDR and a CDR1 
b. Delta Critical Design Review (DCDR) 
The intent of the Delta CDR for Spacecraft 012 was to insure that each level of spacecraft 
flight hardware and ground support equipment (GSE) end item was designed and built to meet all 
the requirements and was compatible with the planned mission. The review was also intended to 
determine the adequacy of the spacecraft checkout flow plans. It was held just prior to commencing 
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systems testing on SIC 012. The Delta CDR utilized the CSM 012 End HettI Specification, Part I, 
Y"'Io_-.S' __ ____ IT""'\ __! __ 'D ___ .!_..... _ ............. A_ ...... 11" ,..J;.",_..~rI <)C) ~Ah...,,'::1 __ ~ lah~ ,..l~~cifjpr1 r.nnftrlpnt;~l fRpfprp_nC"..p.. 

action items are documented in "CARR Minutes and Action Assignments" and "CARR Action 
Response" (Reference 6-26). 
The following summarizes the Downey ACTIONS AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE ABOVE REFeN 
ITEMS] Each item is identified by its respective item number in the Phase II CARR report minutes. 
1.7.1 POWER LOSS ON CSM - INVERTER 

Problem: During spacecraft testing, power loss occurred. 

Resolution: Inverter 1 was determined to be faulty and was removed and replaced. The 

replacement inverter was installed, checked and detennined to be acceptable prior to shipment. 

3.6.14 FLIGHT QUAL INSTRUMENTATION STATUS 

Problem: Four transducers were detennined to not be operating properly. 

ResOlution: The transducers were replaced and the new transducers functionally verified 

prior to spacecraft shipment. 

3.7.1 SUIT LOOP LEAKAGE 
Problem: Leakage noted during Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) 5051 was greater 

than the specification allows. 

Resolution: It was concluded from evaluations that misinterpretation of data caused the 

out-of-specification statement. Re-evaluations were made of test data and it was concluded that 

leakage of the suit loop circuit at time of shipment was within acceptable limits. It was also 

noted that nonnal test flow at KSC would verify this conclusion. 

3.7.2 DEMAND REGULATOR FAILURE (OXYGEN) 

Problem: The demand regulator was determined during spacecraft testing to be inoperative. 

Resolution: The regulator was replaced and the new regulator functionally verified prior to 

shipment. 

3.7.3 WATER CYCLIC ACCUMULATOR FAILURE 
Problem: During spacecraft testing, the water cyclic accumulator was detennined to be 

inoperative. 

inoperative. 

Resolution: Two (2) new units were installed before the water cyclic accumulator would 

pass checkout. The units were installed and checked out and the final unit was detennined 

to be acceptable prior to shipment. 

3.7.10 OPERATIONAL CHECKOUT PROCEDURE (OCP) 5051, SUIT LOOPCHECKS 
Problem: Checkout per OCP 5051 was not complete at the time of the CARR. 
Resolution: OCP was completed prior to shipment. The following problems were trans­

ferred to KSC for final resolution. Squawks 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, and 908. (See Refer­

ence 6-27, Material Inspection and Receiving, DD Form 250, CF66-51922 numbers, 1, 2, and 

3.) 
4.6.8 TV CAMERA CHECKOUT· PICTURE DISTORTION 

rro~lem: The TV ima~e wa! ~i!torte~ ~urin~ Crew Com~artment Fit and Function Te!t! 

II 
REFERENCES 
6-1 Apollo Mission Failure Contingency Plan 
6-2 Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure Number 0-201 
.. Access Control of Test and Work Areas" 
6-3 Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure Number 0-202 

"Operational Checkout Procedure'~ 

6-4 Apollo 1 ngress- Egress Log Sheets 
6-5 Spacecraft 012 Schedule, KSC 
6-6 Constraint List, Spacecraft 012 Operational Checkout Procedure FO-K-0006/0021-1 
6-7 OCP FO-K-OOSA-l and OCP F-K-0034A, A-I 
6-8 TPS-012-SClOO, "Modification of Quad Heater" 
6-9 Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure Number T -S02, entitled , " Discrepancy Recording 
System" 
6-10 DR-SC0838 and DR-SCOI2-OS10 
6-11 Spacecraft Operations Letter SCO-2-104-6S 
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SPACECRAFT 012 HISTORICAL RECORD 
1. APOLLO DEVELOPMENT/REVIEW PROCESS 
Apollo Program Directive (APD) No. 6A defines the sequence and flow of hardware development 
and key inspection, review and certification checkpoints for Apollo spacecraft and is included as reference 
6-12. This directive is the basic document that controlled the evolution of milestones for Spacecraft 012 . 
These checkpoints insure that sufficient visibility is obtained of the status of design, manufacture 
and testing to adequately determine the integrity of the spacecraft prior to mission accomplishment. 
The six key checkpoints defined by APD 6A are: 

Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 

Critical Design Review (CDR) 

First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) 

Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW) 

Design Certification Review (DCR) 

Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 

The PDR, CDR, FACI and COFW are accomplished at selected booster and spacecraft levels of 
assembly (stages and modules). The DCR aI1d FRR encompass the total mission complex. With the 
exception of the COFW, the requirements for these formal reviews were further defined by NASA, 
Houston, in the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Configuration Management Plan (Reference 6-13), 
see Appendix E), however, only the PDR, CDR, FACI and the FRR were implemented by the North 
American Aviation (NAA) in the NAA CSM Configuration Management Plan, SID 65·100 (Reference 
6-14) as approved by NASA, Houston, Paragraph 10.6 on page 10-16 was never approved by NASA, 
Houston, and therefore is not contractual. The Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW) requirements 
were established by separate Apollo Program Office direction to NAA (Reference 6-15) and the DCR 
requirements were implemented by a letter from the Program Manager to NAA, Downey, as confirmed 
by a supplemental agreement to the contract (Reference 6-16). 
These six formal reviews are scheduled jointly by NASA and North American Aviation. 
a. Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
The purpose of the PDR is to formally review the design approach of a spacecraft prior to, 
or very early in, the detail design phase. (See paragraph b. below for a further discussion.) 
b. Critical Design Review (CDR) 
The purpose of a CDR is to formally review the design of a spacecraft when the design is 
essentially complete and is intended to precede the release of engineering drawings for manufacture. 
This review for SIC 012 was in reality a PDR as well as a CDR . It was accomplished after the 
spacecraft had been released for manufactw-ing and was a review of both the design and the req· 
quirements. The negotiation of the Block I Spacecraft Technical Specification, the Block I Space­
craft Master End Item Specification accomplished the PDR for each spacecraft. This approach ",'~s 
taken because S/C 012 was the first major Block I vehicle with the second manned Spacecraft 
(S/C 014) being identical. All other Block I spacecraft were to be urunanned and, therefore, were 
not to be fully configured. The SIC 012 PDR was appropriately used to represent all Block I 
spacecraft. A Delta CDR was also conducted for SIC 012 prior to testing. The Delta CDR is 
discussed in detail later. 
c. First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI) 
The purpose of the FACI is to establish the Configuration Baseline for the spacecraft. It is 
accomplished by establishing the relationship of the spacecraft as described by released engineering 
documentation (drawings, specifications) to the spacecraft as manufactured, assembled, and tested. 
The FACI checkpoint has been implemented for Block II spacecraft only. It was not implemented 
for SIC 012 or Block I because of the differences between each spacecraft. A baseline configuration 
is not established until Block II where each spacecraft is to be of the same configuration. Two 
integrated reviews known as the Systems Assesment Review (SAR) and the Customer Acceptance 
ENCLOSURE 6-6 
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Readiness Review (CARR) were conducted to support the acceptance and delivery from the Contrac­
tor (NAA). These reviews are discussed later. 
d. Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW) 
The Certificate of Flight Worthiness (COFW) is a requirement of NASA-Apollo Program Dir­
ective No.6 dated 15 August 1965. NAA was directed to implement this requirement in accordance 
with the MSC-Houston procedure, "Procedure for the Certification of Flight Worthiness (COFW)" 
dated 20 June 1966 (Reference 6-15). The COFW is used to certify that each flight stage and 
module is a complete and qualified item prior to shipment, and is supported by adequate supporting 
documentation, i.e., the Acceptance Data Package (ADP) and the Material Inspection and Receiving 
document (DD Form 250). The COFW informs the Apollo Program Director of any deficiencies 
prior to shipment from the manufacturing sites and from the static firing site. The COFW has 
requirements for the following documents for the following endorsements: Endorsement one is ex­
ecuted and signed at the completion of checkout at the Contractor's plant by the Contractor, MSC 
quality representative, and the MSC Program Manager's designee. Endorsement one reflects the final 
action taken at the CARR and information contained on the DD Form 250. Endorsement number 
two is executed and signed at the completion of receiving inspection at KSC and is signed by the 
KSC representative, the MSC quality representative, and the MSC Program Manager's desigriee. 
Endorsement number three is executed and signed at the time the Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft 
are mated, by the same people that signed endorsement number two. Endorsement number four is 
executed and signed at the completion of the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) by the KSC re­
presentative and the MSC Program Manager's designee . The final certification is executed at the 
time the Spacecraft is declared flight worthy and requires the signature of the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program Manager (Reference 6-15 and 6-17). 
e. Design Certification Review (DCR) 
The purpose of the DCR is delineated in Apollo Program Directive No. 7 (Reference 61-8) 
is to examine the design of the total mission complex (spacecraft, booster, eSE, launch complex, 
communications network, etc.) for proof of development maturity and assess and certify the design 
of the Space Vehicle, Launch Complex, Mission Control Center and Manned Space Flight Network 
for manned flight safety. 
f. Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
The FRR as delineated in Apollo Program Directive No.8 (Reference 6-19) is a two part 
review consisting of a Program Director's FRR and a Mission Director's FRR. The purpose of 
the Program Director's FRR is to determine that the space vehicle hardware and Launch comples 
are ready to commence the mission period. The purpose of the Mission Director's FRR is to make 
a judgement for initiating the mission period and committing the deployment of world wide forces 
to support the mission. 
g. Review 	Schedule 
The following bar-chart illustrates the Apollo development/ review process (See figure 1). 
2. DISCUSSION OF SPACECRAFT 012 CHECKPOINTS 
This section describes the specific Spacecraft 012 checkpoints in detail. The checkpoint actiVities, 
locations, dates, personnel involved, and significant results are included. The checkpoints are discussl.<:: 
in chronological order and present a complete historical summary of the flow of hardware development 
and key inspection, review and certification checkpoints. 
a. Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 
The PDR checkpoint was conducted during the period from November 1964 through January 
1965 for all Block I spacecraft including Spacecraft 012. As mentioned previously this was a review 
of both the requirements and the design since Spacecraft 012 had been released for manufacturing 
In reality it was both a PDR and a CDR] 
b. Delta Critical Design Review (DCDR) 
The intent of the Delta CDR for Spacecraft 012 was to insure that each level of spacecraft 
flight hardware and ground support equipment (CSE) end item was designed and built to meet all 
the requirements and was compatible with the planned mission. The review was also intended to 
determine the adequacy of the spacecraft checkout flow plans. It was held just prior to commencing 
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systems testing on SIC 012. The Delta CDR utilized the CSM 012 End Item Specification, Part I, 
Performance/Design Requirements Apollo dated 22 February 1965, classified Confidential (Reference 
6-20). 
6-20) . 
For SIC 012 the Delta CDR was held in two phases as discussed in the following paragraphs 
and is documented in S/C 012 Delta CDR Minutes, Part I, (Reference 6-21) and Part II (Refer­
ence 6-22). 
(1) The scope of the first phase was limited to the nominal mission (Block I Design Reference 
Trajectory) and · the "as built" configuration of the spacecraft ground support equipment (GSE). 
In addition, Spacecraft 008, (the thermal/vacuum test article) was reviewed concurrently with 
Spacecraft 012 primarily to determine the "as built" configuration differences between the two 
spacecrafts and to arrive at a final determination of the acceptable differences in the SIC 008 
configuration. The testing of SIC 008 in the thermal-vacuum chamber at Houston was a con­
straint to the first Apollo manned mission SIC 012) . This Delta CDR commenced on February 
11, 1966, with the delivery of the NAA Data Package to NASA-Houston and was concluded with 
the publication of the Minutes on March 3, 1966. The data package contained 1) documents re­
lated to the Flight Mission such as AS-204A Mission Requirements and Design Analysis Report, 
SIC 012 End Item Specification, Measurement Requirements, Weight Report, Functional Integra­
ted Schematics, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and Reliability Problem Summaries for SIC 012, 
and 2) Ground Operations documents such as the Apollo Ground Operaqons Requirements Plan, 
Test and Checkout plans and Integrated Checkout Process Specifications. Additional documentation 
was available at NAA-Downey to support the Downey review. (For details see Refererice 6-23, 
Appendix I) 
After the receipt of the NAA Data Package and a technical briefing by NAA, NASA 
reviews were conducted at Houston, Texas, by five working groups, made up of NASA-MSC 
representatives . The purpose of these reviews was to identify existing and potential deficiencies, 
with respect to specific mission requirements, of the spacecraft design or the checkout philosophy 
and specifications. The Preliminary Requests for Changes (Pre-RFC's) resulting from these reviews 
were then submitted to a NASA-Houston Review Panel consisting of key management representatives 
from NASA-Houston. 
As a result of the total NASA-MSC review, 137 Pre'RFC's were submitted to North Ameri­
can Aviation (NAA) · for their consideration and then for further reviews by the same five working 
groups, with the addition of NAA representation on each group, at the NAA plant, Downey, Calif­
ornia. Duri these reviews, many Pre-RFC's were resolved or deemed inappropriate primarily 
because NAA documentation showed that either design changes were in progress or, through addi­
tional information, the Pre-RFC was not valid and no change was required. 
From the above five working group meetings, 37 Requests for Changes (RFC's) were 
submitted to the CDR Board for review. The disposition of each of these RFC's is documented 
in the Apollo Spacecraft 012 Delta CDR Minutes (Part I), dated March 3, 1966 (Reference 6-~1.). 
In summary 3 RFC's were rejected, 3 were not applicable, 19 were assigned for studies (10 NAA, 
5 NASA, 4 joint) and the remaining 12 required immediate NAA action. 
Concurrently with the working group reviews and prior to the CDR Board Review, a 
crew compartment review was conducted by crew members utilizing a mockup of the crew compart­
ment. All of the Request for Changes (RFC's) resulting from this mockup review were satisfactorily 
resolved prior to the CDR Board Review on March 3, 1966. 
(2) The Part II Delta CDR objectives were to verify compatibility of the SIC 012 design with 
the requirements of Mission AS-204A (Reference Trajectory) and to assure compatibility of the 
ground support equipment (GSE) for Launch Complex 34, at KSC, Cape Kennedy. 
ENCLOSURE 6-6 
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This actIVIty began on March 22, 1966, and was completed on April 5, 1966, with the 
publicwtion of the Minutes of the NASA/NAA Management Review, Spacecraft 012 Delta Critical 
Design Review (Phase II) Mission Review (Reference 6-22). During the period from March 22 
through March 25, 1966, a review WaS made at MSC by essentially the same five working groups 
but with primary interest by members from the APOLLO Program Office, the Flight Operations 
Directorate, and the Flight Crew Operations Directorate. On completion of the NASA Review on 
March 25, 1966, a total of 53 Review Item Dispositions (RID's) were transmitted to NAA by 
NASA letter PD2/L1501/66-319. (The Review Item Disposition forms are new NAA forms that 
have essentially updated and replaced the NAA Request for Change (RFC) forms . They accomplish 
the same purpose.) Thirteen of these RID's were identified as having significant program or mission 
impact. A NASA/NAA management review was held at NAA, Downey, on March 29, 1966, where 
agreements were reached and action items identified for each RID (Reference 6-22). 
A second NASA/NAA Management Review was held at NAA Downey on April 5, 1966, 
where agreements were reached and action items assigned for the remaining 40 RID's, which consis­
ted of requirements for data or revisions to documentation (Reference 6-22) . 
All of these action items were not closed out by July 19, 1966, for the Phase I of the 
CARR (SAR Meeting) as evidenced by the Phase I CARR report (Reference 6-24 for example, 
see page 3-65) . They were, however, closed out by the CARR which was held on August 19, 1966, 
since no RFC's or RID's are reflected as open items. (In this regard, the CARR report is by
• 
exception and, therefore, reflects only open items.) The · fact that they were closed out prior to 
the CARR has been confirmed by the NASA-Houston CSM Project Officer in his letter to Chair­
man of Panel 6, Historical Data. (Reference 6-25) 
c. Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) 
The CARR was a two phase review. Phase I was a System A ssessment Review (SAR) held 
at NAA-Downey on July 19, 1966. The SAR was a working level, informal meeting held to assess 
spacecraft systems testing (all systems functioning for checking interfaces) and enabled the participants 
to evaluate the system performance and problems . The SAR is a constraint to performing integrated 
systems testing (mission simulation tests). The systems testing was documented by NAA-Downey in 
the Phase I CARR report (Reference 6-24) which was submitted by NAA-Downey to NASA-Houston 
onJune 13,1966. 
The SAR meeting minutes and action assignments are docutnented in the Phase II CARR 
Report (Reference 6-26). As a reSult of the SAR meeting, one-hundred ninety-three (193)a action 
items were assigned. One-hundred twenty-seven (127) action items had program or mission impact 
while sixty-six (66) of the action items were requirements for data or documentation. 
The Phase II of the CARR is a formal board meeting to review the results of spacecraft 
integrated systems testing, the open action items from the SAR, and the action items from the Crew 
Compartment Fit and Functions (CCFF) review. The CCFF is a review where the spacecraft crew 
enters the spacecraft and physically verifies the stowage and proper use of crew equipment. The 
CCFF was initiated prior to the CARR, but was incomplete at the time of the CARR and was 
completed after the CARR Board Review. The CARR Board Review. The CARR Board determines 
if the spacecraft is ready for shipment to the launch facility (KSC-Cape Kennedy). 
The CSM 012 CARR Board was held in Downey on August 19, 1966. There were 66 
items brought before the Board for ~iscussion, 33 of which originated at the Phase I SAR. Six­
teen (16) items were determined to have been adequately dispositioned and were closed for future 
action. Thirty-three (33) items were deferred for resolution at a later date and were not constraints 
to the shipment of the vehicle. These items fell into the general categories of: work or tests to be 
accomplished 'at KSC; resolutions to be made pending results of studies; investigations or qualifica­
tions tests; and furnishing NASA with data requested at the CARR meeting. The remaining 17 
discussion items were required to be dispositioned at Downey prior to shipment to KSC . The CARR 
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action items are documented in "CARR Minutes and Action Assignments" and "CARR Action 
Response" (Reference 6-26). 
The following summarizes the Downey ACTIONS AND DISPOSITIONS OF THE ABOVE REFeN 
ITEMS] Each item is identified by its respective item number in the Phase II CARR report minutes. 
1.7.1 POWER LOSS ON CSM - INVERTER 

Problem: During spacecraft testing, power loss occurred. 

Resolution: Inverter 1 was determined to be faulty and was removed and replaced. The 

replacement inverter was installed, checked and determined to be acceptable prior to shipment. 

3.6 .14 FLIGHT QUAL INSTRUMENTATION STATUS 

Problem: Four transducers were determined to not be operating properly. 

Resolution: The transducers were replaced and the new transducers functionally verified 

prior to spacecraft shipment. 

3.7.1 SUIT LOOP LEAKAGE 
Problem: Leakage noted during Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) 5051 was greater 
than the specification allows. • 
Resolution: It was concluded from evaluations that misinterpretation of data caused the 

out-of-specification statement. Re-evaluations were made of test data and it was concluded that 

leakage of the suit loop circuit at time of shipment was within acceptable limits. It was also 

noted that normal test flow at KSC would verify this conclusion. 

3.7.2 DEMAND REGULATOR FAILURE (OXYGEN) 

Problem: The demand regulator was determined during spacecraft testing to be inoperative. 

Resolution: The regulator was replaced and the new regulator functionally verified prior to 

shipment. 

3.7.3 WATER CYCLIC ACCUMULATOR FAILURE 
Problem: During spacecraft testing, the water cyclic accumulator was determined to be 

inoperative . 

inoperative. 

Resolution: Two (2) new units were installed before the water cyclic accumulator would 

pass checkout. The units were installed and checked out and the final unit was determined 

to be acceptable prior to shipment. 

3.7.10 OPERATIONAL CHECKOUT PROCEDURE (OCP) 5051, SUIT LOOPCHECKS ,. 
Problem: Checkout per OCP 5051 was not complete at the time of the CARR. 
Resolution: OCP was completed prior to shipment. The following problems were trans­

ferred to KSC for final resolution. Squawks 54, 58, 59, 60, 61 , 62, 63, and 908. (See Refer­

ence 6-27, Material Inspection and Receiving, DD Form 250, CF66-51922 numbers, 1, 2, and 

3. ) 
4 .6.8 TV CAMERA CHECKOUT - PICTURE DISTORTION 
Problem: The TV image was distorted during Crew Compartment Fit and Function Tests 

(CCFF). 
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Resolution: A reverification of the TV image was performed prior to shipment and found to 
be within acceptable limits. 
5.6.17 CALIBRATION CURVES 

Problem: The Flight Crew required the Spacecraft panel meter calibration curves. 

Resolution: The calibration curves were transmitted to the crew prior to shipment. 
5.7.1 FAILURE OF ECS MEASUREMENTS 
Problem: The water-glycol pump package pressure measurements CF0025P was found 
defective . Measurements CF0484T and CF0135R were also faulty. 
Resolution: The cause was found to be defective transducers : The transducers for measure­
ments CF0484T and CF0135R were replaced and the new transducers reverified prior to 
shipment. The transducer for water-glycol pump inlet pressure measurement CF0025P was not 
replaced and NAA's request for waiver was granted (Reference 6-28) . 
12.6.3 HATCH DECALS 

Problem: Installation of torque limit decals had not been completed. 

Resolution: The decals were installed prior to vehicle shipment. 
13.6.10 C02 PARTIAL PRESSURE GAGE 
Problem: When power was turned on, the gage went to full scale deflection and triggered 
the caution and warning system. 
Resolution: Additional testing was accomplished prior to shipment and gage operation was 
determined to be satisfactory although Automatic Checkout Equipment (ACE) readouts did not 
correspond. Per CARR Board direction, calibration was to be validated at KSC. 
13.7 .1 RHEOSTAT FAILURE - FLOODLIGHTS 
Problem: The rheostat failed to provide a smooth linear resistance change with shaft 
rotation. 
Resolution: The rheostat was removed and replaced. The new rheostat was installed and 
operation verified prior to shipment. 
13.7 .2 EVAPORATOR STEAM BACKPRESSURE C&W INDICATION 
Problem: The master caution and warning light triggered with no visible indication on the 
individual display when the glycol evaporator steam backpressure was operated. 
Resolution: The problem was found to be a defective switch which was removed and 
... 	 replaced. A retest with the new switch was not performed and was transferred as open work 
to KSC . (Reference 6-27, Material Inspection and Receiving Document, DD Form 250, Squawk 
62, CM Number 1, 2 and 3.) 
14.7.1 PARTIAL CREW COMPARTMENT FIT AND FUNCTION CHECK (CCFF) 
SUMMARY 
Problem: CCFF was not completed at the time of the CARR and numerous items were 
open for evaluation. 
Resolution : The CCFF was completed prior to shipment. The following problems were 
transferred to KSC for final resolution: Squawks 12, 15, 20, 22, 23, 30, 33, 35, 38, 56, 925, 
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and 929 (Reference 6-27, Materials Inspection and Receiving Document, DD Form 250, . 
CF66-51922, CM numbers 1, 2, and 3) . 
14.7.2 FLAMMABLE MATERIALS IN CM 
Problem: Use of Velcro and other materials In the Command Module (CM) was not 
considered desirable and was unsatisfactory for flight. 
Resolution: Investigation of the CM crew compartment was performed with identification 
of undesirable materials listed prior to shipment of the spacecraft. NASA participated in the 
investigation and the results of the investigation are documented in N AA I L 633-300-040-66­
1009, dated 22 August 1966 (Reference 6-29). Further documentation is in the Materials Re­
view, Panel 8 Final Report, Section C .8.b. 
15.7.1 MDAS CHECKOUT 
Problem: The Medical Data Acquisition System (MDAS) was not checked out during the 
Crew Compartment Fit and Function (CCFF) review. 
Resolution: The checkout of the MDAS was performed satisfactorily during the Operational 
Checkout Procedure (OCP) 5051, prior to shipment. 
15.7.216 MM CAMERA OPERATION 

Problem: The camera Was not operable at time of CARR. 

Resolution: Camera operation was satisfcatorily demonstrated during the second run of 
OCP-P-5051 and CCFF, prior to shipment. 
(1) Description of Material Inspection and Receiving Document, DD Form 250. 
In conjunction with the CARR procedures and as a part of the CARR Board aActions, 
it is necessary to officially document the spacecraft configuration at the time · of shipment 
as well as any items of open work to be transferred to KSC-Cape Kennedy for accomplish­
ment. The DD Form 250 is utilized for this purpose and is the formal acceptance of 
the spacecraft by the government from the contractor. 
The status is defined by listing those additions to, and those unaccomplished items 
from the major module configuration definition of record at the time of shipment (i.e ., 
top level engineering drawings for the spacecraft). The DD Form 250 will normally contain 
the following information: 
- Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) installed 

- Field site installations that were installed at Downey 

-Removals (normally to support shipment) 

- Loose equipment with shipment (to support open work and removals for shipm"!rt) 

- Actual part shortages 

- Open work items (squawks, Engineering Orders, drawings) 

.. 
On Spacecraft 012, there were four (4) DD Form 250's used (Reference 4-16) since 
four (4) separate shipments were made as follows: 
- Spacecraft complete VI4-000002-21 (DD Form 250 CF66-51968, 9 September 66). 
This form confirms shipment of the total spacecraft and the spacecraft data package. 
- LES - VI5-000002-221 (DD Form 250 CF66-51886, 22 July 1966). 
- CM - VI6-000002-191 (DD Form 250, CF66-51922, 1, 19 August 66; 2, 25 August 
66; 3, 27 September 66). 

- SM - VI7-000002-131 (DD Form 250, CF66-51898, 8 August 66). 

Two revisions were made to the original Command Module (CM) DD Form 250 (Ref-
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erence 6-27). The first (original) DD 250 did not reflect the true status of the Command 
Module in that it did not include all of the actual part shortages nor did it list the equip­
ment removed to facilitate shipment. To correct the status of the Command Module, 
the second CM DD Form 250 was written. 
After shipment, additional discrepancies were discovered in the" as shipped" hardware 
configuration status. Additional shortages, Field Installation Items (FOI),. equipment re­
movals, Government Furnished Equipment installed on the CM or accompanying the 
shipment, and additional items of loose equipment were discovered. The third CM DD 250 
was written to correct the status of the Command Module. In addition, the contents of 
third DD 250 were rearranged to provide a document which was easier to read and under­
stand. 
Those CARR items requiring Downey action which were not completed at NAA-Down­
ey, were transferred to KSC, Cape Kennedy, on the DD Form 250 (Reference 6-27). 
(2) Certificate of Flight Worthiness (COFW) 
A COFW was initiated in accordance with Apollo Program Directive No. 6 for SIC 
012 on August 24, 1966, at NAA-Downey. This was endorsement one and is included as Ref­
erence 6-17. 
d. Design Certification Review (DCR) 
The · initial phase of the DCR was conducted for the Apollo 204 mission in accordance with 
the requirements of Apollo Program Directive (APD) No. 7 (Reference 6-18) during the period 
September 21-28, 1966, and concluded on, October 7, 1966. The results of this phase of the DCR 
are documented in the attachment to an Apollo Program Director's letter dated October 12, 1966 
(Reference 6-30), The Apollo Design Certification Board was chaired by the Associate Administrator 
for Manned Space Flight and the Board Members were as follows: 
Director, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center 
Director, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 
Director, NASA Kennedy Space Center 
Presentations on the spacecraft were made to the Board jointly by NASA-Houston and NAA­
Downey personnel. In addition, a memorandwn for Design Certification Board (Reference 6-31 
-sample) was submitted for the Board's consideration, certifying with contingencies the spacecraft · 
for a manned mission. These memorandums were signed by the NASA-Houston Subsystem Mana­
gers and NAA-Downey Design Engineers. 
There were a total of 89 action items resulting from the Board's review. In addition, each of 
the three Apollo Program Managers developed a Certification Contingency List and they are also 
included as Minutes. These Contingency Lists contain a total of 20 action items. 
Action items resulting from all aspects of the review are as follows: 

Launch Vehicle - 29 (No. 11 combined with No. 19) 

Launch Complex 10 (41 through 49 have no action) 

Spacecraft - 38 

Other - 12 

Launch Vehicle Program 

Manager's Contingency 

List - 5 

Spacecraft Program 

Manager's Contingency 

List - 8 

Launch Complex Program 

Manager's Contingency 

List - 7 

TOTAL - 109 
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On October 7, 1966, the Design Certification Board issued the AS-204 Design Certification 
Document (Reference 6-30, Attachment) which certified the design of the Space Vehicle for flight 
worthiness and manned safety and the capability of the Mission Support to support a manned 
mission contingent upon satisfactory resolution of the qualifications, tests, investigations and action 
items listed in att~chments to the Design Certification Document. 
The action close out processes continued from October 7 through December 20, 1966, however, 
during this period the Apollo Program Director made a decision to conduct a Recertification Re­
view to be conducted during the month of December 1966. This action was deemed necessary in 
view of the large number of action items resulting from the initial review, with many remaining 
open . The selected date of December 21, 1966, for this second review was influenced by a slippage 
in the launch schedule caused by the delay in completion of the Environmental Control Sub-system 
water boiler test at the AiResearch Corporation to correct a previously identified deficiency wherein 
the water boiler became contaminated and blocked fluid flow (Reference 6-30, Attachment II, 
item S.d.). 
The status of action items as of December 20, 1966, is contained in the Apollo Program Dir­
ector's report (Reference 6-32) on that date to the DCR Board Chairman. There were 14 items 
with incomplete responses and 9 to be closed prior to the FRR. The status as of January 27, 
1967, as reported to the Apollo 204 Review Board on March 17, 1967 (Reference 6-33, shows 
66 items closed, 4 not required for certification, 2 to be closed out at the AS-204 FRR, 4 with 
incomplete response and 13 with closure pending the Apollo Program Director's concurrence. There 
were no new action items as a result · of the December 21, 1966 meeting. The updated Action 
Item Synopsis sheets are included in the Apollo Program Director's status report (Reference 6-32) 
and appropriately marked to indicate the status as of January 27, 1967. 
e. 	Flight Readiness Review (FRR) 
The Office of Manned Space Flight, Washington, D.C., had planned to conduct a two-part 
Flight Readiness Review for SIC 012 with the purpose as: 
Part I - To determine that the space vehicle hardware and launch complex are ready to 
commence 	the mission period. 
Part II - To determine the readiness of the operational elements for a manned space flight. 
Part I would have been conducted by the Apollo Program Director; Part II by the Mission 
Director. The FRR is defined in Apollo Program Directive No.8 OReference 6-19). The FRR 
would have been held approximately two weeks prior to launch. 
MSC, Houston, in conjunction with KSC - Cape Kennedy, would have conducted a Pre­
Flight Readiness Review (Pre-FRR) at KSC - Cape Kennedy approximately 3 days prior to Part . 
I of the FRR. Upon completion of the Pre-FRR, a NAA prepared report would have been sub­
mitted to the Progr3.I11 and Mission Directors along with the Apollo Spacecraft Program Mana­
ger's report. The Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager would have orally summarized these reports 
at the FRR and provided an update of the spacecraft checkout, failure analysis and qualification 
status, implementation of Pre-FRR action items and DCR action items. 
The basic objective othe Pre-FRR is to evaluate the readiness of the spacecraft, GSE hardware 
and 	ACE hardware to achieve the specified mission as documented in the MSC, Houston FRR 
Procedure (Reference 6-34). Specifically the objectives are to: 
- Evaluate all work accomplished subsequent to the delivery of the spacecraft to KSC . 
- Determine the status of the hardware with respect to all waivers, deviations, discrepancies, 
shortages, unresolved checkout problems, generic and spacecraft failures, limited life components, 
configuration changes, uncontrolled parts, and open work . 
- Determine qualification/certification status of spacecraft hardware, including evaluation of 
test versus flight hardware differences. 
- Determine the flight readiness and degree of engineering confidence in the reliability of the 
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hardware at the point in time of the review. 

Specify action to be accomplished as a result of the review . 

- Release the hardware for final launch preparations. 

The Pre-FRR review board consists of: 
Chairman - Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager, or his designated appointee. 
Members - Representative from Engineering and Development Directorate, MSC-Houston. 
Representative from the Flight Operations Directorate, MSC - Houston. 

Representative from the Flight Crew Operations Directorate, MSC - Houston. 

Representative from the Flight Safety Office, MSC - Houston 

Representative from the Medical Research and Operations Directorate, MSC-Houston. 

Representative from the Office of the Director, Plans, Programs, and Resources, KSC ­
Cape Kennedy. 
- Representative from the Office of Assistant Director for Spacecraft Operations, KSC-Cape 
Kennedy. 
Secretary - Representative from the Reliability, Quality and Test Division, MSC - Houston. 
The Pre-FRR report (Reference 6-35) was completed by NAA on January 27, 1967, 
however fifteen (15) preliminary copies were delivered to MSC - Houston on January 25, 1967. 
The original masters were impounded on January 27, 1967, after the SIC 012 accident. With 
the Apollo 204 Review Board's approval, copies of the original masters of the Pre-FRR report 
were made and one copy delivered to the Apollo 204 Review Board Legal Counsel. 
All hardware problems in the P're-FRR report (Reference 6-35) were reviewed to deter­
mine which problems may have been related to the accident. These problems are listed in below 
along with the action taken: 
- During Downey ~nd KSC checkout of SIC 012, two inverters experienced "moly-Block" 
transistor failures, These failures cast suspicion on the conclusiveness of the "Moly-Block" tran­
sistor fix for a prior overheating problem. Analysis of the problem revealed no design inadequacies 
but did show the need for improved screening techniques of the transistors. Such techniques were 
developed and imposed on the transistors installed in SIC 012. 
Action - Inverters to be removed from SIC 012 and analyzed per Review Board Action Items 
0041, 0123, 0153, and 0182. 
- The Environmental Control System, in particular the Environmental Control Unit (ECU), 
has experienced several significant problem~ that had impact on SIC 012. The majority of these 
problems occurred in qualification testing. The most serious problem was that the water evaporator 
(water boiler) blocked and would not accept water for evaporation to cool the water/glycol. This 
problem was eliminated by redesign of the distribution plates and making a filter change. With 
these and other changes incorporated, the ECU has successfully completed qualification testing. 
All of these changes were implemented on SIC 012. 
Action - ECU to be analyzed per Review Board Action Items 0097, 0102, 0168. 
During the Combined Systems Test at Downey, several caution and warning light indications 
... 
could not be verified. Troubleshooting isolated the problem to an open circuit within terminal 
block assembly No. 1 behind the Main Display Console (MDC) C&W Panel No. 11. An x-ray 
examination of the matrix terminal block assembly (TB-l) revealed seven pins not proerly inserted. 
The pin insertions in the remaining 31 similar TB assemblies installed in the SIC were examin­
ed. This examination revealed nine additional discrepant terminal block assemblies. 
Action - Terminal Blocks to be analyzed per Review Board Action Items 0160, 0161, 0153. 
- Several spacecraft electrical wire harness assemblies were saturated with water-glycol during 
KSC Checkout Operations. Subsequent investigations have proven that this solution in spacecraft 
wiring and connectors will support electrolytic corrosion particularly in the presence of a polarizing 
electric potential. 
Action - Wire harness assemblies to be analyzed per Review Board Action Items 0160, 0161. 
- Analysis of shielded and unshielded Environmental Control Unit (ECU) electrical harnesses 
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indicated that numerous connectors were improperly potted . SIC 012 was retrofitted with cables 
using ML wire and larger backshells. All of these cables have had dielectric testing. These cables 
have been tested under a corrosive contaminant oxygen and humidity environment and have satis­
factorily passed the minimum acceptable insulation resistance requirement. The ECU with these 
new cable assemblies was installed in SIC 012. 
Action - ECU electrical harnesses to be analyzed per Review Board Action Items 0161, 0168. 
- Floodlights: Problems which occurred in SIC checkout, characterized by abrupt loss of light 
output and blowing of internal fuses, were traced to susceptibility to line transients within the flood­
light power converter circuit. Circuit design and component changes were made to improve tran­
sient susceptibility margin, and units have since been subjected to a more rigorous acceptance test. 
Action - Floodlights were analyzed per Review Board Action Item 0169 and it was determined 
the floodlights were not an initiator or propagator of the fire. 
- Bio-Med parameter CJ0002 (Respiration) decreased in level when either crew member pressed 
Push to Talk (PTT) switch. Modulation was also present when crewman spoke. 
Action - Bio-Med harness and Medical Data Acquisition System to be analyzer per Review 
Board Action Items 0155, 0156, 0165. 
- Flexible Polyurethane Foam (FPF). The FPF has failed in the flammability test per MAOI15­
008 whch requires no flame at 400°F in 02. This foam is used in Crew Systems Design and Sup­
port, ECU, ECS, and Telecommunications. 
Action - The FPF is discussed and future corrective action is outlined in the final report of 
Panel 8 - section C .8 .b. Corrective action is to use a substitute, nonflammable material in future 
spacecraft. 
The Apollo Spacecraft Program Manager's FRR report was approximately 60 percent com­
plete at the time of the \SIC 012 accident, but had not been reviewed by the Manager. The 
existing sections of the report were reviewed to determine if any .problems discussed could be re­
lated to the a~cident. The following problems were a result of this review and are in addition to 
the problems discussed from the Pre-FRR report. 
- Polyurethane foam is used as potting in the Electronic Control Assembly (ECA). This pott­
ing includes and surrounds printed circuit boards and electronic components. Polyurethane foam 
gives off a flammable gas at elevated temperatures. These units are installed in the crew compart­
ment and are therefore exposed to an oxygen environment. 
Action - The polyurethane foam is discussed in the final report of Panel 8 - Section C.8 .b. 
Corrective action is to use a substitute, nonflammable material in future spacecraft. 
- As the result of recent flammability tests, the Uralane Foam 577-1 was found to fail the 
flammability tests below 400°F. If this foam were used in close proximity to components whose 
normal or overload condition could reach excessive temperature, a fire could be started. Typical 
components falling into this category are electrical resistors, capacitors, or malfunctioning diodes. 
Action - Corrective action is to use a substitute nonflammable material in future spacecraft 
as discussed in the final report of Panel 8 - Section C .8.b. 
- Of the approximately 1300 nonmetallic materials identified as used in the Command Mod­
ule, NAA has supplied the following status information: 
300 Materials do 'not meet the criteria established by MC999-0058. 
,. 
350 Materials are acceptable by these same criteria. 
650 Materials have no status as to acceptability. 
Due to the type of information, i.e., material lists, bill of materials, etc. used by NAA to 
compile the material usage list, exact location and amount used is not available in the majority 
of the cases. Such information is obtainable only by drawing review. This activity is not planned 
by NAA. In addition, subcontractor compliance has not been either imposed or obtained in all 
cases. Due to this lack of information, an engineering decision cannot be made on whether a 
serious problem does or does not exist nor can an assessment be made on the effect on the re­
liability from a toxicity and flammability standpoint. It is estimated at this time that the identi­
fication of the nonmetallic materials is approximately 85-90 percent complete. 
Action - Corrective action is outlined in the final report of Panel 8 - Section C.8.b. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report presents a brief historical narrative 
of the prelaunch operations p~rformed on Apollo 
Spacecraft 012 at Kennedy Space Center . Each 
major test that was accomplished is briefly described 
in addition to significant problems and spacecraft 
rework required . 
For additional clarification, an " as run" bar chart 
is included . Charts are also included to portray 
the relationship of spacecraft testing to scheduled 
and non-scheduled work as a result of design mod­
ifications and discrepancies during the prelaunch 
operations. 
.. 

• 
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Apollo Spacecraft 012 prelaunch checkout at Kennedy 
Space Center was initiated on August 10, 1967, 
with arrival of the Service Module portion of the 
Spacecraft, After arr iva 1 a t the Cape Kennedy 
Skid Strip, the Service Module was transported 
'to the Kennedy Space Centl r industrial area ware­
house for painting . Servi(~(' Module painting is 
normally delayed until arrival at . Kennedy Space 
Center to preclude abrasions during shipment. The 
condition of the Service Module paint is of concern 
since it is a thermal paint and performs a mission 
function in the environmental control of the Service 
Module . 
With completion of painting, the Service Module 
was moved to the Operations & Checkout Building 
and installed in a workstand for installation of 
the Service Propulsion System engine nozzle plug. 
The nozzle plug was installed in preparation for 
accomplishing leak and functional testing of the 
Service Propulsion System. 
After installation of the nozzle plug, the Service 
Module was moved into the adjacent ~ltitude chamber 
on August 13. On August 15, the parallel tasks of 
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receiving inspection and preparations for Operations 
Checkout Procedure numbe r 4074 we re initiated. 
Receiving inspe ction is delayed until this point 
is reached since the requin ·d removal of various 
panels for testing provide s better visibility to 
perform the inspe ction. Receiving inspection con­
sists of a visual inspe ction to t: !\e ck til e "as 
rece ived" condition of the vehicle for possi ,J le 
damage incurred during shipment. Ope rations Check­
out Procedure 4074 is a leak and functional test 
of the Service Module Propulsion System to ve rify 
the pressure integrity and functional operation 
prior t o mating with the Launch Vehicl e on the 
launch complex. The actual performance of Opera­
tions Checkout Procedure 4074 was started on August 
17 and continued through August 27 . 
In parallel with Operations Checkout Procedure 
4074, a Service Module radiator r e flectivity test 
was accomplished per Operations Checkout Procedure 
5116 . This test confirms the capability of the 
radiators in the Service Module to remove the heat 
generated by the Spacecraft systems . In addition to 
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the accomplishment of these two parallel tasks , 
two design modifications were incorporated and 
five discrepant conditions ~ere repaired on the 
Service :\\odule during tl : is I ime period. 
The Command Module portion D[ Spacecraft 012 arrived 
at Kennedy Space Center on the 26th of August, 
three weeks after arrival of the Service Module. 
The Command Module was transported directly to 
the Pyrotechnic Installation Building for weight 
and balance and Launch Escape System thrust vector 
alignment checks . Command Module weight and balance 
checks are performed to determine the weight and 
center of gravity of the spacecraft. Launch Escape 
System thrust vector alignment consists of optically 
ascertaining the proper alignment of the Launch 
Escape System rocket engine nozzles with r e spect 
to the centerline of the CM after mating the Launch 
Escape System tower to the Command Module. With 
the completion of these two tasks, the Launch Escape 
System to~er was removed from the Command Module 
and returned to storage to await reinstallation 
during final preparations for launch at the launch 
complex . 
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The Command Module was removed from the Pyrotechnic 
Inst'allation Building and transported to the Opera­
tions & Checkout Building altitude chamber on August 
29 for mating witl. [ ( ! Servi<.:( ' Mod : I e , The Command 
and Service Module mating operation was started 
on the 30th of August and required 64 hours to com­
plete . Command and Service Module mating normally 
requires 16 hours, In this instance, the mechanical 
hardware utilized to attach the Command Module to 
the Service Module was of a new design and proved 
to be difficult to adjust with relation to the 
Command Module aft heat shield interface . Previous 
experience was not available since factory checkout 
plans did not require final installation of the aft 
heat shield prior to factory Command and Service 
Module mating. In addition, information (strain 
guage calibration curves) required to ascertain 
when the proper tension adjustment between the Com­
mand Module and Service Module was achieved, had 
inadvertantly not been shipped from the factory with 
the spacecraft, and was subsequently lost , Completion 
of mating was delayed until calibration curves could 
be generated locally , 
After l;')mpletion of Com.and and Service Module mating, 
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a rece iving inspect ion was performed on the Command 
Module. With completion of receiving inspectiln , 
the accumulation of required design changes, and 
repair of · discrepant conditiolls was such that a 
fifteen-day, "no test" work (Hcriod was initiated. 
The spacecraft had arr ived wi t h 113 approved, but 
unincorporated design changes (EO's). During this 
period, thirteen major system design changes (MCR's, 
Master Change Record) were incorporated, the majority 
of which were wiring modifications. 1n addition, 
various removal and repair and rework activities 
were conducted. The incorporation of known modifi­
cations and repairs at this point in time was re­
quired prior to proceeding into Operations Checkout 
Procedure 0035, Combined Systems Testing, since re­
wor~ of this nature and scope could invalidate the 
test. The objective of the combined systems test 
is to determine that all spacecraft systems perform 
properly and that no incompatibilities or inter­
ferences exist betwuen systems . 
On September 15, the Combined Systems Test was com­
menced and continued until September 17 when testing 
was stopped in order to determine the cause of two 
major malfunctions in the spacecraft Caution and 
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Warning Syst e m and Reaction Control System respectively. 
Investigation revealed that several pins within a 
~Iatrix electrical connector (TBI) on the caution and 
warning main display panel in the Command Module 
cabin had not been complet 0 1y inserted during manu­
facturing. This resulted in a lack of electrical 
continuity . As a precautionary measure, seven cabin 
display panels were removed from the spacecraft and 
x-rayed to determine if a similar discrepancy existed 
on other Matrix electrical connectors . This activity 
required two days to accomplish. The Reaction Con­
trol System malfunction was determined to be two 
badly bent pins in an electrical connector resulting 
in a short circuit to ground. On September 19, Opera­
tions Checkout Procedure 0035 was again started and 
was completed on September 23 ; however, some additional 
unresolved malfunctions had been dete cted. At this 
point, spacecraft testing was discontinued for an 
eight-day period to resolve and repair the known mal­
functions. In addition, this time period was utilized 
for various mechanical work and incorporation of two 
design changes. 
With relation to the detected malfunctions, improper 
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operation of the fuel cell water-~lycol coolant sys­

tem was determined to be blockage of fluid · flow due 

to installation of a blind (no hole) Voishan seal 

in · a system linp . After Hval replacement, the sys­
tem was purged, dried , and l'I.:serviced. 
 Other malfunc­
tions r e paire d during this pvriod included replacement 
of an oxyge n supply valve and resolution of problems 
1n the Telemetry and Guidance and Navigation systems. 
Also during this work period , a leak developed in the 
Environmental Control System water-glycol loop due to 
a faulty soldered joint behind the Display Electronic 
Control Unit. This was subsequently repaired. 
One area of considerable trouble during this time 
period was the crew couches which had been removed 
frum the spacecraft for extensive mechanical rework. 
Some twelve separate major discrepancies had been 
detected and required factory design engineering 
personnel to travel to Kennedy Space Center to assist 
in the resolution of design deficiencies. 
On October 1, spacecraft testing was reinitiated for 
a one-day peri od to demonstrate that the previous 
electrical malfunctions had been properly resolved 
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and repaired. At completion of this one-day period 
of testing, the Combined Systems Test was considered 
satisfactorily completed and was accepted. 
On October 2, a work period "as started for the purpose 
of preparing the Spacecraft f o r Operations Checkout 
Procedure 0034 , Altitude Chamber Testing . This test 
involves testing the spacecraft under simulated alt­
i tU8e cond it ions with the fl ight crew onboard. Prepara­
tion for the altitude test included a leak test to 
verify pressure integrity of the spacecraft cabin, 
various crew equipment installations, flushing and 
servicing the environmental control water system, and 
the continuedreservicing of the fuel cell water-glyCOl 
system. During reservicing of the fuel cell water-glycol 
system, additional leaks were detected and repaired . 
During the cabin leak test , improper operation of a 
cabin relief valve was detected. This unit was removed 
and replaced and the test satisfactorily completed. 
Also during this work period, a design modification was 
incorporated, which provided the flight crew with addi­
tional mechanical leverage to open the spacecraft hatch. 
With completion of a crew equipment stowage exercise 
by the flight cre w, the spacecraft was considered ready 
ENCLOSUR E 6-7 
D-6-42 
-9­
for the Altitude Chambe r Te st . 
On October 10 , the Al t i tude Chambe r Te st was started . 
This test consists of a S (,;1 I(' vel run, an unmanned 
run "at altitude" , and two manned t e sts , or runs, 
"a t a I tit u de " . The sea l e v0 1 run consists of testing 
all systems in a mission sequc ncc to asce rtain that 
systems perform properly and events occur at the correct 
point in time with relation to the planned flight. The 
flight crew participates as an integral part of the 
t est . The unmanned run "at altitude " is accomplished 
to assure the capability of the space craft life support 
systems to sustain the flight crew "at altitude" prior 
to attempting the manned runs . Finally, the manned 
altitude runs (one for the prime crew and one for the 
backup crew) are for the purpose of e valuating the 
spacecraft systems operation at altitude; compatibility 
of spacecraft and crew under altitude conditions; and 
capability of the crew to perform various tasks with 
the crew stowe d equtpment . 
During the sea level portion of the Altitude Chamber 
Test, a malfunction was detected in the spacecraft 
abort system . Investigation revealed three bent pins 
in the 0 l c ctrical umbilical connector between the Command 
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Module and Service Module. This problem was corrected 
and the sea level run wns successfully completed on 
October 13 . During the following two days, the l . : · 
manned run at altitude was satisfactorily completed . 
With completion of the unmanned run, preparation for 
the initial manned run was initiated . This preparation 
consisted of servicing the spacecraft environmental con­
trol system with potable water; liquid oxygen loading, 
and fuel Gell activation. These tasks were completed 
on October 17. On the following day the manned run 
was initiated and continued until a spacecraft electrical 
power system inverter failed during pump down of the 
altitude chamber . After replacement of the inverter, 
testing was again resumed and the run completed on 
the following day, October 19, with one equipment mal­
function, failure of a spacecraft primary oxygen regulator. 
Determination of the cause of the regulator failure 
proceeded with removal of the regulator from the space­
craft and subsequent disassembly of the unit . Disassembly 
of the unit and further investigation revealed a design 
deficiency existed in the regulator. 
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While awnitin~ a 1'!'design decision on the spacecraft 
oxygen regulator, various miscellane ous spacecraft 
work items were accomplished such as replacement of 
all spacccraft cil'cuit in1, "'I ' ters (improved design) , 
additional x-l'ays of ~Iatl'i x ( '->nnecto1's, etc. On October 
27 a decision was made to 1'C:II ,l ve the Environmental Con­
trol Unit from the spacecraft and return to the factory 
for incorporation of a design change to the water boiler, 
Meanwhile, a Spacecraft 017 Service Module propellant 
tank had ruptured during fa c tory checkout at Downey, 
California. In view of the tank failure at the factory, 
it was decided to conduct some special testing on the 
Spacecraft 012 tanks at the Kennedy Space Center. In 
order to proceed with the Service Module special tank 
test and continue work on the Command Module in parallel, 
the Command and Service Modules were demated on October 
29. The Command ~odule was moved out of the Altitude 
Chamber and installed in the adjacent integrated work 
stand and removal of the Environmental Control Unit 
was started . The Service Module remained ' in the alti­
tude Chamber and preparation for removal of the Service 
Propulsion System propellant tanks was initiated. The 
rationale behind removal of the tanks prior to t e sting 
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was to prevent d~struction of th~ Service Module in 
the event a tank rupture occurred similar to the Space­
craft 017 failure during factory checkout. 
On November 2, removal of t:" Service ~Iodule propellant 
tanks was completed and the tanks were transported to 
Launch Complex 16 ~t Cape Kennedy for special pressure 
testing. During pressure testing, the tanks were ser­
viced with liquid Freon to reduce the hazardous aspect 
of the test. Complex 16 is a remote area approved for 
hazardous testing. Tank testing was successfully com­
pleted on November 7 and on the following day .the tanks 
were returned to the Operations & Checkout Building. 
By November 11, tank installation in the Service Module 
was complete . The following two days were ·utilized 
to incorporate an engineering modification on the Ser­
vice Module propulsion fuel tank plumbing. 
On November 13 , the Service Module was transported to 
Launch Complex 16 at Cape Kennedy for Service Propul­
sion System pressure testing. This was necessary to 
reestablish overall system confidence at operational 
pressure after the tanks had been reinstalled in the 
Service Module. 
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Pressure testing on the Service Module was completed 
on November 16 and the Service Module was returned 
and reinstalled in the Operations & Che c kout Buil-ding 
altitude chambe r. Two daY" ' , f preparation and work 
followed and on November 1M. the Service Module was 
ready for mating with the Command ~Iodule. 
In parallel with the previously described Service 
Module activity, work had been progressing on the 
Command Module in the Operations & Checkout Building 
integrated workstand. The Environmental Control Unit 
h~d been remove d and returned to the factory for mod­
ification. On November 8 , a new configuration Environ­
mental Control Unit was received and installation into 
the Spacecraft was started. Installation was complete 
on November 12 arid a leak and functional test on the 
system was initiated . This was completed on November 18. 
In additional to the Environmental Control Unit activity 
described above , other testing had proceeded on the 
Command Module. A reactlon Control System leak and 
functional test had been performed per Operations 
Checkout Procedure 4070. This test would normally 
have been performed at the launch complex as a portion 
of Operations Checkout Procedure 0005. However, 
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since the capability to perform the test existed in 
the Oper-ations & Checkout I3uilding and time was avail­
able, the test was performed to alleviate testing and 
provide additioll'll contim.. Ile,- time on the launch com­
plex. It is noted that til(' ikaction Control System 
Test performed is only a smal 1 portion of the Op~rations 
Checkout Procedure0005 that was utilized, and only the 
Reaction Control System portion was performed. In 
addition to the Reaction Control System Test, a calibra­
tion test on the Guidance and Navigation System was 
performed at this time as a normal periodic requirement. 
Concurrent with preparation of the Service Module for 
mating, the Command Module was moved from the Operations 
& Checkout integrated workstand into the adjacent 
altitude chamber and mated to the Service Module on 
November 19. With completion of Command and Service 
Module mating, preparation for continuation of the 
manned altitude chamber test (second manned run for 
backup crew) was started. On November 25, a new con­
figuration spacecraft oxygen regulator was installed . 
On November 29, servicing of the Environmental 
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Control System water and water-glycol systems had been 
completed and power was applied to the spacecraft in 
preparation for the manned altitude run. During powerup 
of the spacecraft. evidenc(' (a few drops) of water­
glycol was observed on the spacecraft cabin floor 
under the aft right hand corner of the newly installed 
Environmental Control Unit. Three days of investiga­
tion failed to positively locate the source of the leakage. 
On December 3, a decision was made to remove the Environ­
mental Control Unit and return it to the factory for 
further investigation and location of the source of 
leakage. 
While awaiting return of the Environmental Control Unit 
from the factory, a reverification test was performed 
on two components (check valves) of the Reaction Con­
trol System. These units had failed during the previously 
described Reaction Control System leak and functional 
test-and had been replaced. Also during this time period 
an additional leak was detected at a supply line solder 
joint (lower equipment bay) in the Environmental Control 
System water-glycol system. 
On December 14, the Environmental Control Unit was 
returned to Kennedy Space Center from the factory. 
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Extensive testing on the unit at the factory had 
not confirmed any leakage associated with the unit. 
After Environmental Control Unit installation was 
completed , the EnvironmenL11 (")ntrol System was ser­
viced. and again an indication (a few drops) of water­
glycol leakage was observed Oil the cabin floor under 
the aft right hand corner of the Environmental Control 
Uni t. At this t'ime extensive efforts were made to 
locate the source of the leak, but were unsuccessful. 
No leakage was ever noted or observed at this same 
location apart from the serviCing operation . It was 
ass~med that the leakage condition was due to a dynamic 
action by "0" ring seals and / or other seals as a result 
of prolonged vacuum during servicing operations and 
thus would not occur except during servicing. A decision 
was made to proceed with testing and continue to observe 
this condition. 
Rev~rification testing of the Environmental Control 
System was successfully completed on December 20. The 
crew couches were installed on December 21 and the 
environmental control water system serviced the follow­
ing day. The crew couches had been removed for access 
to remove and reinstall the Environmental Control Unit. 
Preparations for continuing th{''altitude chamber test 
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were continued until December 24 when work v:as dis­
continued for the Christmas holiday . 
On December 27 and 28 , the s( 'a level and unmanned 
portions of the altitude chnmber test were successfully 
completed . Although these trsts had been previously 
completed , they were repeated to establish confidence 
for the manned run since a significant amount of space­
craft rework had been accomplished. On December 29 and 
30, the second manned altitude run with the backup 
crew participating was performed and all test objectives 
were met. It is noted that the final manned run was 
very successful with all spacecraft systems functioning 
normally . At the post test debriefing, the backup 
flight crew expressed their complete satisfaction with 
the condition and performance of the spacecraft . 
After completion of the altitude chamber test , the 
environmental control water and liquid oxygen systems 
were deserviced and the spacecraft was removed from the 
altitude chamber and placed in an adjacent workstand on 
January 3. The Service Propulsion System nozzle exten­
sion was installed and leak checked on the following day . 
On January 4, the spacecraft was mated to the spacecraft 
adapter and installation of ordnance devices was started. 
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On January 6 . the spacecraft wa!:i move d to the launch 
complex and mechanically mated to the launch vehicle. 
After mechanica 1 rna te wit I, ,'\.' launch vehicle. ground 
support equipment was cOlin"", ed in prepara t ion for 
the spacecraft Integrated Systems Test. Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0005. 
The basic objectives of this test are to verify that 
spacecraft electrical systems are compatibl~ with 
the launch complex and ground support equipment prior 
to electrically mating the spacecraft to the launch 
vehicle and performing overall sp.ce vehicle testing. 
Test preparations were completed on January 11 and the 
spacecraft was powered up for the integ'ra ted systems 
test on the following day . This test was completed on 
January 14 . The Launch Escape System tower was mated 
to the spacecraft on the following day and preparation 
for the cryogenic loading test, Operations Checkout 
Procedure 4736 was started . 
The cryogenic loading test involves servicing the space­
craft liquid oxygen' and liquid hydrogen systems. The 
basic oh.jective is to assure that servicinK can be 
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performed and that no incompatibilities exist between 
the spacecraft and ground support equipment. This 
test also prov~des early verification of the test 
procedure and provides pra l' t j c'e for the servicing 
exercise to oe repeated latl'l' during critical portions 
of the launch countdown . Thl' c ryogenic loading test 
was complet.d successfully on January 17 and the 
spacecraft was deserviced . 
With completion of the cryogenic loading test , the 
spacecraft was electrically mated to the launch 
vehicle . Verification that proper electrical connection 
had been made was verified by performing Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0004. This test was completed on 
January 18 . 
At this point the spacecraft was powered down for a 
one-day work period. Power had been applied to the 
spacecraft since the initial launch complex test was 
started (except during launch escape tower installation) ; 
as a result, various minor work items had accumulated, 
the majority of which were configuring the interior 
of the ea~in for flight . In addition, detailed study 
of test results (data) from the spacecraft Integrated 
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System Test had indicated possible malfunctioning 
equipment in the guidance and navigation inertial 
measurement unit and the stabilization and control 
system . Further investigall '" of these two possfble 
problems were continued dUI' ing this period. The 
Inertial ~Ieasuring Unit (plnttorm) was determined to 
be acceptable . The Yaw Electronic Control Assembly of 
the Stabilization and Control System was found to be 
unsatisfactory and was replaced at a later date. 
On January 20, a decision was made to proceed with a 
practice run of the Space Vehicle Overall Test number 1, 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0006. The run was a 
practice run in that it would have to be repeated 
since the required participation of the Mission Control 
Center in Houston . Texas, was not available to support 
the test until some four days later. The prime objective 
of making a practice run was to identify at the earliest 
possible time any procedural or hardware compatibility 
problems. It is noted that up to this point testing 
had involved the spacecraft and launch vehicle indLviduail y 
except for the Electrical Mate Test . TIle opportunity 
to detect overall spacecraft / launch vehicle hardware 
and procedural problems had not occurred. 
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It is noted that since initiation of the final manned 
altitude Chamber test. operations had proceeded so well 
that testing was five days ahead of schedule even after 
completion of the overa~l I'sl No.1 practice run. 
The objective of the Space V(' ilicle Overall Test Number 1 
(plugs in) is to ascertain proper operation of the 
total Space Vehicle (launch vehicle and spacecraft) 
during a simulated miSSion sequence from liftoff to 
completion of the spacecraft reentry and recovery phase. 
The practice run was completed successfully on January 20. 
On the following day Minor work items and repairs were 
accomplished with no work scheduled for January 22 
(Sunday). On January 23 minor spacecraft work items 
and repairs continued in addition to preparation for 
the Houston Mission Control Center Software Integration 
Test. 
, 
On January 24, the Houston Mission Control Center 
Software Integration Test was performed per Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0045. This test verifies that the 
Houston MiSsion Control computer programs and equipment 
performs properly with relation·to the spacecraft. 
This test was successfully completed and the following 
day the " repeat" run of the Space Vehicle Overall 
Test Number 1 was made with the Houston Mission 
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Control Center parti c ipatinK . The test was completed 
and all test obje c tives met . 
At the conclusion of. the ~pa " 1 Vehi c le Overall Test 
Number I (plugs in). SpaCel'l'aft power was left on in 
order to perform a detailed system test on the yaw 
Electronic Control Assembly and the Guidance and Navigation 
System. THese systems were suspected of malfunctioning 
due to a detailed data review of the Operations Check­
out Procedure 0005, Integrated Systems Test . It was 
determined that the yaw Electronic Control Assembly was 
defective. The unit was replaced and retested 
satisfactorily . The Guidance and Navigation System was 
found to be functioning properly . Spacecraft power 
was removed and preparation for Spa ce Vehicle Overall 
Test Number 2 , Operations Checkout Procedure 0021, was 
started . 
The prime objective of the Space Vehicle Overall Test 
Number 2 is to verify performance of the total space 
vehicle during a simulated mission sequence with the 
space vehicle as near launch and flight configuration 
as possible. This test was initiated on January 27, 1967. 
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a APOLLO SPACECRAFT 012 
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE FOR PERIOD 
OF 
SPACE VEHICLE OVERALL TEST NO. 2 PREPARATION 
EHCLOSURE 6-7 
0·6·67 
INTRODUCTION 
This report presents a brief historical narrative of 
the period encompassing final preparation for the 
Space Vehicle Overall Test No.2 (plugs out), 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0021 . 
The initial portion of the report describes the various • 
types of operational meetings and procedural methods 
used during the period of checkout described. The 
final portion of the report includes a cronological 
listing of pertinent events that occurred in preparation 
for the plugs out test . 
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DESCRIPTION OF MEETINGS 
Open Items Review 
The purpose of an Open Item Review is to examine all 
paperwork that exists at that point in time depicting 
work that must be accomplsihed to the Spacecraft and 
Ground Support Equipment. The basic documents utilized 
in an Open Item Review are the NAA Spacecraft and 
Ground Support Equipment Status Reports . At an Open 
Item Review a constraints list is developed which 
indicates the work that must be accomplished prior to 
proceeding into the next spacecraft test . A test 
constraint is defined as that open work item which if 
not accomplished would interfere with, or prohibit, 
the successful completion of a spacecraft test. 
Test constraints are normally broken un into two basic 
categories: constraints to powering up , and constraints 
to powering down . A constraint to applying power to 
the spacecraft busses normally indicates work which 
must be performed that would require modifications 
(removal and replacement) of spacecraft and / or Ground 
Support Equipment. Judgement is utilized to recognize 
hardware availability and work and retest time avail­
able in subsequent operations . A constraint to removing 
ENCLOSURE 6-7 
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,power from the spacecraft busses normally indicates 
investigation and retest that should be accomplished 
at that point in the test operation but which would 
not prohibit the conduct of that test procedure. 
Open Item Review Meetings are co-chaired by the NASA 
Spacecraft Test Conductor and the NAA Test Project 
Engineer . Functional groups represented at an Open 
Items Review are as follows: 
NAA NASA 
Test Project Engineering Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Engineering (S I C & GSE) Engineering (S I C & GSE) 
Operations Project Engineering (S I C & GSE) 
Inspection Operations 
Shop Inspection 
Service Engineering Flight Crew Representative 
Operations Integration 
Open Item Reviews are normally conducted several days 
prior to a test in order that appropriate time will 
be available to work off the identified constraining 
items . 
At the Open Item Review Meeting , the Spacecraft and 
Ground Support Equipment Status Reports are reviewed 
and those open items considered to be constraints for 
the forthcoming test are identified. The identified 
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constraints are compiled into a single "constraints 

list" and published shortly after the open item review 

meeting, usually within three hours . The constraints 

list identifies the tasks to be worked by system and 

indicates the responsible person to accomplish close­

out of the item . 

The constraints list cover sheet identifies the 
applicable spacecraft test constrained by the list 
and provides for NAA and NASA approval signatures . 
Two types of approvals are required. The initial 
approval signatures indicate that the list is official 
and are obtained prior to distribution of the list . 
The final approval signatures indicate that all constraints 
listed have been worked and closed out . This approval 
is obtained just prior to gOing "on station" to start 
the test. Constraints list approvals are provided by 
the NAA Test Project Engineer and the NASA Spacecraft 
Test Conductor . 
After completion of the Open Item Review Meeting and 
subsequent distribution of the constraints list. new 
items of work are continuously assessed by the NAA 
and NASA operations engineers. As each new item of 
work is released, the operations engineer contacts 
the applicable system engineer to discuss disposition 
ENCLOSURE 6-7 
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of the item . The system engineer mayor may not 
proceed to the spacecraft area at this time and actually 
write the disposition. The main object of the discussion 
is to maintain the operations engineer's knowledge of 
new constraints. 
Regardless of the previously described discussion 
relative to the disposition all new items are added 
to the Spacecraft and Ground Support Equipment Status 
Reports. New spacecraft work items are reflected daily 
in the form of an addendum to the basic Spacecraft 
Status Report utilized at the Open Item Review Meeting. 
New ground support equipment work items are also reflected 
in addendums to the Ground Support Equipment Status 
Report. These addendums are issued weekly or more 
frequently as required by the amount of new items. 
Utilization of these status report addendums occurs 
in real time and at the daily 0800 Status Meeting and 
1430 Scheduling Meeting described below. 
It is noted that after initial generation of the 
official constraints list, newly identified constraints 
become a part of the list in two different manners. If 
time permits, a revised constraints list is generated. 
In the absence of appropriate time for revision, the 
appropriate sheets of the Spacecraft and Ground Support 
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Equipment Status Report addendums are attached to the 
original constraints list . The attached addendum 
sheets are marked to indicate the constraining 
additional items . 
Dail y Status Review Meeting 
The daily 0800 Status Review Meeting is a general 
coordination meeting to review the work accomplished 
during the past 24 hours and to discuss new work items 
that any have been generated during that same period 
of time . The following personnel attend the 0800 meetings. 
NAA NASA 
Sr . Test Project Engineer Chief Test Conductor 
Asst . Sr. Test Project Engr. Spacecraft Project Engr . 
Engineering Representative Operations 
GSE Representative GSE Project Engr . 
Inspection Inspection
Shop RASPO Representative
Service Engineers Support Contractor RepresentativeQual ity Engineerin g 
Downey Project Engineering 
Logistics 
Sa f ety Engineering 
Following the 0800 meeting, new work items are scheduled 
on the Working Schedule Planning Sheet by NAA and NASA 
Operations personnel . This Planning Sheet is used to 
schedule all work that must be accomplished on the space 
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craft and projects three weeks into the future . The 
Planning Sheet is updated daily if required and is 
used in supplement to the overall spacecraft schedule . 
The Planning Sheet is not an official document (not 
signed by either NAA or NASA) but is given wide distri­
bution throughout the NAA / NASA Test organizations. 
In preparation for the 0800 Status Meeting, a complete 
review of the updated Spacecraft Status Report is 
conducted by the NASA and NAA operations engineers. 
This review is usually conducted at the spacecraft 
where all inspection logs are available to verify the 
status report. 
Daily Scheduling Meeting 
At 1430 each day a scheduling meeting is conducted at 
which the spacecraft work schedule for the next 24 
hours is generated . Planning Sheets are utilized at 
this meeting for reference . At the 1430 meeting . 
the Spacecraft and Ground Support E"uipment Status 
Report addendums are reviewed to determine if ~dditional 
constraining work items eXist which should be scheduled 
, 
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for work. The 1430 schedule meeting is attended by the 
following personnel: 
NAA NASA 
Representatives from Representatives from 
each system each system 
GSE Representatives GSE Representatives 
Operations Operations 
Quality Engineering NASA MSC Representative 
Safety Representatives Flight Crew Representative 
Inspection Inspection 
Downey Project Engineering NASA Headquarters Representative 
Support Contractor Representatives and other personnel 
as required also attend this meeting to support the 
ope ra t iGln. 
Note that the individual spacecraft systems are 
represented individually at the 1430 Daily Scheduling 
Meeting whereas at the 0800 meeting an engineering 
coordinator is the only engineering representative . 
Pretest Briefing 
A Pretest Briefing is a meeting conducted by the NAA 
Test Project Engineer and the NASA Spacecraft Test 
Conductor prior to each test to revip.w various aspects 
of test with other members of the test team . Each 
ENe LOSUR E 6-7 
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systems engineer presents a summary of his particular 
system status with relation to state of readiness for 
the test . Any open items (constraints) existing at that 
time are identified and anticipated problems associated 
with the closeout of same prior to the test are 
discussed. If the test is eminent, a "Go" is requested 
from each sys~m engineer indicating his complete state 
of preparedness for the test. 
All pertinent operational ground rules for the test 
are reviewed and past problems of an operational 
natu~e are discussed. Specific attention is directed 
to any hazardous aspects of the test and test discipline. 
The method of handling certain paperwork during the 
test, such as procedure deviations, is reviewed and 
the integration engineer responsible for writing 
deviations is identified. 
A Bar Chart of the test is also reviewed on a system 
by system basis to briefly review the intent of the 
test and the manner of accomplishment. The meeting 
is normally concluded with an announcement of the "on 
station" time and time for initiation of GSE setup and 
spacecraft switch list accomplishment . 
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Personnel normally attending Pretest Briefing are as 
follows: 
NAA NASA 
Sr . Test Project Engineer Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Test Project Engineer Project Engineer 
System Engineers Operations Engineer 
Operations Engineers System Engineers 
Shop Supervision GSE Engineering 
Quali ty Control Quality Control 
Safety RASPO 
Service Engineers Flight Crew Systems 
Downey Project Engineer ACE Engineering 
GSE Engineers Flight Crew Representative 
ACE Engineering 
It is noted that separate pretest briefings are held 
for the test team technicians. In this instance only 
those operational aspects of the test involving the 
technicians are discussed . 
Post Test Debriefing 
A Post Test Debriefing is a test team meeting held 
subsequent to a test for the purpose of determining if 
the test objectives were met . The Interim Discrepancy 
Record (lOR) log is reviewed on a system by system basis. 
Each system engineer explains any problems encountered 
during the test . the implication of same , and establishes 
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the post test status of his system. 
At the completion of a test, spacecraft power is 
normally left on for troubleshooting if problems have 
been encountered during the test . In this event, the 
post test debriefing is not held unt il spacecraft power 
is removed. It is also noted that a complete review of 
test data is not available at the time of the post test 
debriefing and it is not uncommon for IDRs to be 
generated at a later date when a complete data review 
is available. 
A post test debriefing concludes with the decision to 
perform additional troubleshooting, await further detail 
data review for analysis, or consider the test complete 
and proceed into the next test, as the situation warrants . 
Personnel normally attending post test debriefings are 
as follows: 
NAA NASA 
Sr. Test Project Engineer Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Test Project Engineer Project Engineer 
Systems Engineers Systems Engineers
Operations Engineer ACE Eng~neering 
Quality Control Quality Control 
GSE Engineers Operations Engineering 
Downey Project Engineer Flight Crew Systems
ACE Engineering RASPO 
Flight Crew Representative 
Flight Crew (if applicable) 
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CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING 
1. January 23, 1967, 1030. Open Item Review Meeting for 
Operations Checkout Procedures 0006 (Plugs In) and 
0021 (Plugs Out). A constraints list was developed 
with the following open items: 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0006 (Plugs In) 
Constraints to power up - 11 open items. 
Constraints to power down - 16 open items. 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0021 (Plugs Out) 
Constraints to power up - 26 open items. 
Constraints to power down - 2 open items. 
The power up constraints that were developed for 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0006 were also to apply 
to Operations Checkout Procedure 0045 (MCCH Software 
Integration Test) scheduled to be run prior to Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0006. 
2. 	 January 23, 1967, 1230. Pre-test Briefing for Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0045 and 0006. This meeting excluded 
the test team technicians. 
3. 	 January 23, 1967, 1430. Daily scheduling meeting. 
4 . 	 January 23, 1967, 1530. Pre-test Briefing, Operations 
Checkout Procedures 0045 and 0006 for first sbift test 
team technicians . 
5. 	 January 23,1967 , 2400. Pre-test Briefing, Operations 
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5. 	 Checkout Procedures 0045 and 0006 for second and third 
shift test team technicians. 
6. 	 January 24, 1967, 0400. Power on for Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0045. The constraints list for 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0006 had been signed off 
prior to start of the test. 
7. 	 January 24, 1967, 0800. Daily status meeting. 
8. 	 January 24, 1967, 1430. Daily scheduling meeting. 
9. 	 January 24, 1967, 2030. Operations Checkout Procedure 
0045 completed . Spacecraft power remained on to close 
out Operations Checkout Procedure 0006 (Plugs In) 
constraints. Those spacecraft systems which had no 
constraints were powered down. A post test debriefing 
was conducted "on station" on an individual system 
basis through review of real time recordings and all 
new Interim piscrepancy Reports (IDR). 
10. 	 January 25, 1967, 0400. Operations Checkout Procedure 
0006 wap started. 
11 . 	 January 25 , 1967, 0800. Daily status meeting. 
12. 	 January 25, 1967, 1430. Daily scheduling meeting. 
13. 	 January 26, 1967, 0300. Operations Checkout Procedure 
0006 (Plugs In) completed. A post test debriefing was 
conducted on station on an individual systems basis 
through review of all new IDR's and real time records. 
~ 
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13. 	 Spacecraft power was left on for troubleshooting 
associated with the Guidance and Navigation System and 
the Yaw Electronic Control Assembly. lOR's had been 
written on these systems as a result of detailed data 
review of the Integrated Systems Test, Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0005. lOR's were constraints to 
power up for Operations Checkout Procedure 0021 
(Plugs Out). 
14. 	 January 26, 1967, 0800. Daily status meeting. 
15 . January 26, 1967, 0900. A meeting was held at Complex 
34 to review the spacecraft readiness status for the 
Plugs Out Test with the following personnel in attendance: 
NAA NASA 
Senior Test Project Engr Chief Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Asst Senior Test Proj. Engr Spacecraft Test Conductor 
Senior Operations Engr 
This meeting was held in order to verify that the space­
craft would be ready to proceed into the Plugs Out Test 
on the following day and that the NASA Spacecraft Test 
Conductor could commit the spacecraft for that test to 
the Test Supervisor. At that time, it was determined 
that the remaining constraints to the Plugs Out Test 
(accomplishment of which were required) was the retest 
of the Yaw Electronic Control Assembly, a spacecraft 
removals review, and completion of the test checklist. 
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Based on discussions with engineering personnel, it 
was agreed that several items that appeared on the 
constraints list could be waived for the Plugs Out 
Test, but that they must be accomplished prior to the 
Flight Readiness Test (Operations Checkout Procedure 
0028). The results of this meeting were submitted to 
the NASA Spacecraft Project Engineer for evaluation . 
It is noted that a waiver is obtained when it is 
determined that a work item cannot be accomplished to 
meet a specific test schedule and that the particular 
work item is not an absolute test prerequisite, but 
rather preferential to that test. This procedure has 
been followed on each of the Apollo spacecraft operations 
at Kennedy Space Center. 
16. 	 January 26, 1967 , 1000. Space vehicle post test debriefing. 
The NASA Chief Spacecraft Test Conductor, NASA Spacecraft 
Test Conductor, and the NAA Test Project Engineer attended 
the Plugs In Debriefing held by the NASA Space Vehicle 
Test Supervisor at Complex 34. At the conclusion of that 
meeting , the spacecraft status for the Plugs Out Test was 
suromarized. A portion of this summary included the fact 
that all of the spacecraft data from the Plugs In Test 
had not been completely reviewed and that there were still 
final preparations and work items to complete before being 
ready to meet the scheduled power on time . 
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17. 	 January 26, 1967, 1430. Daily scheduling meeting . 
18. 	 January 26, 1967, 1800. Spacecraft power removed. 
Power was removed from the spacecraft busses at 1800 
on January 26 following replacement and successful 
retest of the Yaw Electronic Control Assembly. 
Additional Guidance & Navigation System testing had 
indicated that the system was operating satisfactorily . 
IDR constraint to these two systems were closed out. 
19. 	 January 26, 1967, 1900. Meeting to discuss revision to 
Operat ions Checkout Procedure 0021 (Plugs Out). On 
January 26 at 1900 a meeting was held to discuss the 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0021 to be utilized for 
the Plugs Out Test . A revision to the Plugs Out 
procedure had been issued earlier in the day at 1730. 
There was some concern with the timeliness of the 
revision and its possible affect on the time critical 
sequences of the test. It was concluded, however, that 
the revision had been properly reviewed and approved by 
the test team and a decision was made to proceed with 
the procedure and test as scheduled. 
20 . January 27, 1967, 0600 . Operations Checkout Procedure 
0021 (Plugs In) pre-test briefing. 
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21. 	 January 27, 1967, 0635. Test Team on station for 
Operations Checkout Procedure 0021 (Plugs Out). 
22. 	 January 27, 0735. Spacecraft power on for Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0021 (Plugs Out). The test team 
went on station immediately after the pre-test briefing 
and the NASA Test Conductor and NAA Test Project Engineer 
received a "Go" from each Systems Engineer and the Pad 
Leader verifying readiness .to proceed with the test. 
The Environmental Control Systems Engineer and the Pad 
Leader stated that they were running late with their 
preparations but that the remaining work could be 
completed in parallel with the power up operation. 
These preparations were required in order to establish 
the Environmental Control Systems Ground Support Equipment 
Test configuration required for gaseous oxygen servicing. 
These preparations were completed satisfactorily at 0900 
at which time the Environmental Control System Test was 
initiated. The Stabilization and Control Systems Engineer 
gave a qualified "Go" based on incomplete data review . 
At the start of the test, the NASA Test Conductor and 
the NAA Test Project Engineer requested that an Interim 
Discrepancy Record (lOR) be written to document the fact 
that there was no signed off constraints list for 
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the Plugs Out Test. The status of each item not 
signed off on the operations engineers' master constraints 
list, in addition to those open items accumulated since 
the generation of the constraints list, were to be 
provided in the disposition of the IDR at the completion 
of the test. The Test Conductors chose to request an 
IDR rather than to sign the constraints list since it was 
not complete and "up-to-date". The disposition was never 
documented on the IDR since all documentation was impounded 
at the time of the incident. It is noted that the constraint 
list and all open items that were generated between the 
time of the constraints list generation and the incident 
had been reviewed (and determined satisfactory to proceed) 
by NAA/NASA Operations and Systems Engineering personnel . 
23 . January 27, 1967, 0800. Daily status meeting 
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Summary of Operations Checkout Procedure 0021 

Unsigned Constraints List Situation 

A. 	 A constraints list was developed for Operations Checkout 
Procedure 0021, but was not signed prior to proceeding 
into the Plugs Out Test since it did not represent an 
accurate picture of all open paper work due to the 
additional work generated from January 23 to January 27, 
1967. The constraints list had not been formally updated 
due to the limited time available between tests. 
B. 	 The constraints and additional open work itemS generated 
after development of the constraints list were under 
constant review by the test team . 
C. 	 Two meetings were held daily between systems personnel 
(or 	their representatives) and operations personnel at 
t:i,me 
which/the status of spacecraft open items was discussed . 
D. 	 A number of items on the constraints list were evaluated 
and deferre~ for accomplishment until after the Plugs 
Out Test , but prior to the Flight Readiness Test (Operations 
Checkout Procedure 0028). 
E. 	 The status of the spacecraft was known at the time of 
the test by systems engineering and operations personnel . 
Re2diness reports were received from all operations and 
systems engineering personnel prior to power up and there 
were no open work items to constrain the running of . the 
Plugs Out Test . 
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TEST PROCEDURES REVIEW 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Test Procedures Review Panel, 7. The task assigned 
for accomplishment by Panel 7 was prescribed as follows: 
Document test procedures actually employed during day of incident. Indicate deviations between 
planned procedures and those actually used. Determine from review potential changes that might 
alleviate fire hazard conditions or that might provide for improved reaction or corrective conditions. 
Review these changes with respect to applicability to other test sites or test conditions. 
B. Panel organization 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Test Procedures Review Panel: 
... Mr. D. L. Nichols, Chairman Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA, 
Mr. F. G. Bryan, Kennedy Space Cepter (KSC), NASA 
Mr. j. M. Twigg, Kennedy· Space Ont~r{KS'C), NASA 
Mr. C . O. Brooks, Marshall Space Flig~t Center (MSFC), NASA 
Mr. W . Petynia, Manned Spacecfaft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. W. F. Cahill, North American Aviation (NAA), KSC 
Mr. R. H. jones, North American Aviation (NAA), KSC 
Mr. j. C. Wright, North American Aviation (NAA), KSC, Technical Assistant 
Mr. j. W. Cuzzupoli, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey 
Mr. E. E. Dale, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey 
Mr. C. C. Harshberger, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey (Alternate) 
Mr. R. L. Swanson, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey (Alternate) 
Mr. H. H. Luetjen, Mc Donnell Company KSC 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. john j. Williams, Kennedy Space Center, NASA, Board Member, was assigned to monitor 
the Test Procedures Review Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. In response to the Apollo 204 Review Board, the Panel derived detailed objectives as follows: 
a. Document test procedures actually employed during day of accident. Verify and cross-correlate 
following sources of information . 
(1) Offical Operational Checkout Procedure(OCP) FO-K-0021-1, :Plugs Out Test, With De­
viations, and associated procedures. 
(2) Voice Tape of Test 
(3) Cabin configuration as foun.d vs. OCP 
(4) GSE configuration as found vs. OCP 
(5) Test Conductor'~ log 
(6) Test Project Engineer's log 
(7) Test Supervisor's log 
(8) Pad Leader's Report 
(9) North American Aviation (NAA) Test Monitor report 
b. Research the relationship between hardware changes and retest thereof in the period between 
Altitude Chamber Test and Plugs Out Test. 
c. Compare procedural difference between the Altitude Chamber Test as run and Plugs Out Test 
as run. 
d. Document the development of the as run procedure used for the Plugs Out Test. 
(1) Chronological development of test philosophy and of the actual OCP. 
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(2) Relationship between test as developed and MSC/NAA Downey tese requirements. 
(3) Effect of philosophy changes on the test. 
(4) Assess adequacy of the technical review of the OCP prior to its use. 
(5) Assess adequacy of the safety review of the OCP prior to its use. 
(6) Review. late-change control. 
(7) Review deviation control during test. 
(8) Evaluate test discipline from voice tape. 
e. Evaluate total procedural interface wi th respect to adequacy and complexity. 
(1) OCP FO-K-0021-1 
(2) GSE checklist 
(3) Crew countdown 
(4) What procedures did crew carryon board and use? 
(5) What TPS:S if any were used to supplement OCP's? 
(6) Space Vehicle Plugs Out procedure 
(7) Support documentation 
f. Evaluate potential effect of automation upon safety of operation. 
g. Review overall control of testing requirements with regard to timeless, level of control, and tech­
nical integration. 
(1) Ground Operations Checkout Plan (GORP) 
(2) Process Specifications and Test Specifications 
(3) Vehicle Test Planning 
(a) Downey 
(b) KSC 
(c) MSC 
(d) Other test sites 
h. Evaluate potential changes to vehicle hardware and test procedures to indlude experience gained 
from Apollo and other related Programs. 
(1) Investigation areas in which minor design changes may allow significantly improved checkout 
capability and alleviate hazardous conditions. 
(a) Solicit recommendations from contractor and NASA checkout personnel. 
(b) Solicit recommendations from procedure writers . 
(2) Review testing philosophy and specific procedures utilized_ 
(a) Other Apollo test sites 
(b) Other Manned SIC programs 
(c) Manned Launch Vehicles 
2. TEST PROCEDURE EMPLOYED DURING DAY OF ACCIDENT 
. A master copy of the Space Veicle Plugs Out Integrated Test FO-K-0021-1 SIC 012/014 was 
developed documenting the procedure as run on the day of the accident. This master procedure used 
the Quality Control Record copy of the test as a st arting point. Information obtained from the test 
engineers' copies of the Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) was added. 
Voice recordings of communication channels used during time of test were reviewed. Procedural 
functions performed were checked in the master procedure as they were verified by audio reply. De­
viations from published procedures were noted and investigated. 
Two (2) intercom channels, designated Black 3 and Black 4, were recorded throughout the test. 
These two channels were superimposed upon one track of recording tape. The recording was adequate 
to reconstruct the events immediately prior to the accident. During earlier periods of the Plugs Out 
Test, Spacecraft test activity took place on approximately half of the fifteen channels assigned to Space­
craft operations. Complete reconstruction of the activity during this period was not possible due to the 
lack of recording. 
The Quality Control (QC) copy of the OCP, which Panel used as a baseline, was incomplete. 
Operating method did not require continuous· QC monitoring of each communications channel in use 
during test. 
Spacecraft switch positions specified in the OCP were compared with the as-found post accident 
positions. There were no functionally significant differences except for the main bus tie switches (2). 
Telemetry data indicates the bus tie switches were positioned by the crew subsequent to the detection 
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of the fire . The pocedural sequence in which each switch was last positioned was also identified. One 
significant circuit breaker (CB-116) position was noted. The closed circuit breake.r, as specified by the 
OCP, applied power to gas chromotograph cable although the instrument had been removed and doc­
umented by approved procedures. 
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HARDWARE CHANGES AND RETEST THEREOF 
A. Records were researched to determine relationships between hardware changes and retest ver­
ification made during the period between the Altitude Chamber Test (OCP FO-K-0034-A) and the 
OCP run on the day of the accident. Appropriate modifications, rework, and discrepancy items were 
defined for more detailed review . The review included Interim Discrepancy Records (IDR), Discrepancy 
Records (DR), Test Preparation Sheets (TPS), and Engineering Orders (EO), which were worked be­
tween the Altitude Chamber Test (OCP-K-0034-A) and the Plugs Out Test (OCP FO-K-0021-1). Both 
of these tests were run with the spacecraft hatch closed and an oxygen (02) cabin environment. Em­
phasis was placed on review of electrical changes, such as modifications to spacecraft wiring, replacement 
of electronic boxes, a nd Ground Support Equipment (GSE). The required retest was performed for all 
spacecraft changes except for those noted in Enclosure 7-2. 
Definition of retest required and the point at which it constrains subsequent testing, is determined 
by the responsible NASA and NAA System Engineers. Documentation of these requirements is defined 
by Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Procedure (APOP) Manual No. T-501, 5.1. 
b. An open item review prior to starting any test is required by Apollo Pre-Flight Operations Pro­
cedure (APOP) No_0-202. This was accomplished and a constraints ·list complied on January 23, 1967, 
four days prior to the implementation of the test. The review allowed lead time for accomplishment 
of the open items prior to the test. However, additional open items were accumulated on the daily 
Spacecraft status Report in the form of released Test Preparation Sheets (TPS), Discrepancy Records 
(DR's), Discrepancy Record Squawks Sheets (DRSS' s), and Interim Discrepancy Records (IDR's). This 
accumulation of open items was not added to the constraints list. Systems engineers were expected to 
be aware of these items which were published in the Daily Status Report. The Panel requested clarifi­
cation from the NASA Chief Spacecraft Test Conductor (CSTC). The response statement is included 
as Enclosure 7-2. According to referenced enclosure, the accumulation of open items was "under constant 
review by the test_team." The enclosure indicates that certain items were evalua.ted and deferred until 
after Plugs Out OCP FO-K-0021-1 and prior to Flight Readiness Test (FRT). 
The NASA Spacecraft Test Conductor (Organization Chart; Enclosure 7-1) normally gets a sign-off 
by each systems engineer verifying that no constraints to the test exists in his system. The Test Conductor 
can, therefore, affix his signature to the Constraints List verifying that all constraints have been resolved. 
The Test Conductor is required by APOP 0-202, paragraph 6.3.6, to sign the Constraints List prior 
to beginning the test. 
The Test Conductor and NAA Test Project Engineer agreed to proceed with the test based upon 
the reasons listed in Enclosure 7-2. The available Constraints List was not signed off since it was not 
complete list of all open items due to the additional work generated from January 23 to January 27, 
1967. Interim Discrepancy Record No. 001 was issued noting that the Spacecraft was powered up 
without the Constraints List formally signed off. 
This Panel did not evaluate whether the open items, as discussed in the referenced enclosure, con­
tributed to the indident. This item was referred to Panel No. 18 of the Review Board for analysis. 
• 
4. COMPARISON OF ALTITUDE CHAMBER TEST AND PLUGS OUT TEST 
The differences between the OCP's were evaluated in an attempt to identify functions which may 
have beenimproperJy performed in the Plugs Out Test. The procedural differences were attributable to 
required configuration differences with one exception . 
During the Altitude Chamber Test only those functions required prior to altitude simulation were 
performed with cabin pressures greather than sea level, and an 02 environment. During Plugs Out, 
all testing after hatch closeout was to be accomplished with the cabin at greater than sea level 
pressures and an 02 environment. In th e Altitude Cha mber, the cabin was pressurized with 02 four 
times (varying from 1 hour to 2 hours 30 minutes) for a total of 6 hours 15 minutes at pressures greater 
than sea level. This length of time is two and a half times as long as the cabin was pressurized with 
02 prior to the accident during Plugs Out Test. 
The analysis of differences, and methods of implementation between the Altitude Chamber Test 
and Plugs Out Test, has not provided any discrepant conditions that could contribute to the cause 
of the accident. The Test Configuration differences are covered in the report of Panel No . 1. 
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5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLUGS OUT TEST 
The Plugs Out Test procedun' was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the system used ill 
developing the OCP. 
a. The chronological development of the Plugs Out Test philosophy and OCP was documented 
(Enclosure 7-3). 
The Plugs Out Test was defined in preliminary form on July 12, 1%6. In September, the crew 
emergency egress practice was added to the test procedure, to be performed at the conclusions of the 
Plugs Out Test. The preliminary OCP was released and reviewed iii October. In November the OCP 
was modified to provide closed hatch operation during the test. The approved OCP was released on 
December 13, 1966. The revisions designated as dash' one (-1), was released on January 26. 
b. The relationship between the test as developed and MSC/Downey test requirements was reviewed. 
The MSC test requirements document is the Ground Operations Requirement Plan (GORP). It 
is primarily a flow plan through the various tcst locations used to prepare the vehicle for flight. The 
ddinit ion of tcsting to be perfonlled varies in detail from test to test. While some specific testing re­
quircmcnts are defined, emphasis is more on sequence than on specific technical rcquirements . The 
l\'AA, Downey prepared test spccification for the Plugs Out Test (Proccss Specification 1\L\O-O~Ol-
3~14, Revision B, dated August 19, 1966) is written in test procedure format. This document con­
tained outdated pretest switch lists, and a GSE listing not compatible with GSE available at KSC. 
I t lacked the dctail of engineering specifications to which systems should be tested, and was not di­
recdy relatable to overall vehicle test planning at KSC. The process specification is an internal contractor 
document used to prepare test procedurcs for NASA approval. 
NAA personnel at KSC (NAA, Fla) preparcd an overall test plan for KSC covering operations • 
from receipt of the vehicle to launch. SP G4, SIC 012 Test Outline, was published and presented to 
MSC for rcview containing the outline of the Plugs Out Test. Specific procedurcs for system opcration 
were based on the Test Outline and NAA Downey Test Procedures. They were abo extractcd from 
previously run procedurcs at KSC. The Plugs Out Test Procedure meets the intent of both the l\1SC 
GORP and the NAA Dowpey Te'st Specification. 
c. Effect of philosophy changes on the test was evaluated. 
Major changes such as closed hatch, () 2 cabin environment, and crew emergency egress practice 
were generated and implemented subsequent to the preliminary Plugs Out OCP preparation. These 
changes were made with sufficient lead time to allow timely incorporation into the procedure. 
d. The adequacy of the technical review of the OCP was assessed. 
The technical review of the OCP was as adequate for initial release of the procedure. N,\SA and 
N i\:\ engineering representatives for each system, participated in the review prior to approval of the 
Plugs Out Procedure. A detailed review of the ~ubsequent revision showed that the percentage of changes 
attributable to technical error in the original procedure was approximately one percent. 
e. The adequacy of the safety review of the OCP prior to its use was assessed. 
The KSC Safety Office did not receive or review the procedure since it was not sublllitted as a 
hazardous test. (Enclosure 7-5.) All participants in the test failed to realize the extent to which hazard 
potential existed . This is evidenced by the following : (a) a Safety Office review of the procedure was 
not made, (b) Pad Emergency Procedures were not prepared, and (c) Fire fighting and ambulance 
equipment \\'ere not on the pad during the test. This procedure was handled in accordance with normal • 
operating methods as shown in Enclosure .-4. 
f. OCP revision control was reviewed. 
The basic procedure, OCP FO-K-0021-1, was released and distributed on December 13, 1%6 and 
consisted of ~75 pages. Following the release, there were many changes in the ocr. Thcie changes 
were collected and incorporated into "Ilimsies" (preliminary copies), six (6) of which were circulated 
for systems engineering review two days prior to the test. The resulting revision, consisting of 209 re­
placement page~, was di~tributed at :>: :{O p .nl .. J anuary ~6, 1967, 14Y.! 1~')Ul"s I)C'iore start of the test. 
The technical changes to the OCP were not as great as the number of changcu P.lt;I:S would in­
dicate. The actual changed lines represented less than 25 percent of the revision with the remaining 
75 percent being required to allow full page replacement. (If one side of a page is changed, both 
sides must be reprinted.) The reasons for these changes were researched. The basic causes for change 
were defined: 
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(1) To make the OCP compatible \\"ith the updated Flight ere\, Checklist. 
(2) To make the OCP sequences similar to the Spacecraft Launch Countdown which was 
first published on January 23. 
(3) To perform the Emergency Detection System Test at a different time due to new Launch 
Vehicle requirements. 
(4) To incorporate thc experience gained from running the Plugs In Test (OCP-K-0006). 
(5) To incorporate items existing in the Space Vehicle proeedure. 
(6) To delete the Guidance Computer erasable memory updat(~ since the Mission Control 
Center Houston (MCCH) was unable to support the test. 
(7) To incorporate general operational improvement. 
(8) To correct the OCP technical and typographical errors. 
(9) To perform certain crew stowage operations tran,krrrd from the Altitude Chamber Test 
to the Plugs Out Test. 
A copy of the entire revision !'las been aunotated, with the reasons for th(' <-hange, and submitted 
as reference material. 
A number of the changes were not avoidable, considering the first-of-a-kind mission . However, 
the changes were not integrated into OCP revisions and released early enough to allow test personnel 
to become completely familiar with the test as it \,'as to be run. 
g. Review deviation control and documentation during test. 
A review of the 106 OCP deviations written during the test showed that they were handled in ac­
cordance with requirements of APOP No. 0-202. This procedure pl'l'mits performing deviations during 
the test with the documentation of the deviation to be coordinated subsequent to the test. The forms 
were not completed during the test in many cases and the impodunding of documents prevented their 
normal post-test completion. As a result, the Panel had to work from incomplete records. 
h. Evaluate test discipline from voice tape 
The overall test discipline displayed by the voice tape recordings was generally adequatl', but was 
hindered by communications difficulties. There was considerable evidence of uncoordinated switching 
during the period of communications troubleshooting which left the Spacecraft Test Conductor in doubt 
as to on-board system configuration. 
A contributing factor to this undesirable condition was the chronie difficulty which had been ex­
perienced with communications during previous tests. 
During the period of difficult communications between the . Flight Crew and Spacecraft Test Con­
ductor, the procedures to isolate the problem appeared haphazard and ullcoordinated. The trouble­
shooting did not isolate the cause of the poor communications, evell though several hours "ere spent 
in trying various links and communications configurations. Troubleshooting at times was being run 
independently from three locations; the Spacecraft, Launch Complex 34, and the Manned Spacecraft 
Operations Building (MSOB) . This occurred due to lack of a single controlling station to coordinate 
and direct the total troubleshooting effort. 
6. REVIEW QF PLUGS OUT TEST SUPPORT DOCUMENTATION 
A list of documents required in direct support of the Plugs Out Test was compiled (Enclosure 
7-18). The purpose, scope and operational interfaces of these documents were evaluated to determine 
their overall technical and/ or operational adequacy and complexity . 
a. Crew Checklist and OCP 
One potential source of confusion was the overlap between the pre·!aullc.:!l switch configur<l tion con­
tained in the OCP (prepared at KSC) and that in the Apollo Crew Abbreviated Checklist (prepared 
at MSC). It was determined that no copies of the Apollo Crew Abbreviated Checklist were taken 
into the spacecraft. The crew had copies of the OCP S\"itch Checklist but no copies of the entire 
OCP. 
b. The Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Checklist 
The GSE Checklist adequately defines required pre-test setups, The procedure refers to other doc­
uments for the step-by-step installation of equipment but effectively retains control of overall test setup 
operation. 
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c. The Space Vehicle Plugs Out Procedure 
The Space Vehicle Plugs Out Procedure was written as the overall control document for the Plugs 
Out Test. The intent of the space vehicle procedure was to provide the Test Supervisor with the inter­
terface points required to maintain overall control in the test. The space vehicle procedure also covers 
both launch vehicle and spacecraft interfaces with external organizations such as the Eastern Test Range, 
Mission Control Center, Houston, etc. The space vehicle procedure accomplished this function. Actual 
launch vehicle operations were performed from a launch vehicle procedure under the direction of Launch 
Vehicle Test Conductor. Similarly, the spacecraft team under the direction of The Spacecraft Test 
Conductor operated from the spacecraft OCP. 
Each of the procedures provides specific data for performing independent operations usually by 
different groups of personnel. To combine or modify any of these documents would possibly increase 
the confusion and complexity of the end objectives. The documentation as defined fulfills its intent and 
no significant requirements for changes are noted by the Panel. 
7. POTENTIAL EFFECT OF AUTOMATION UPON THE SAFETY OF TI1E OPERATION 
Acceptance Checkout Equipment (ACE) system capability and the ACE to spacecraft interface 
was reviewed. While some computer program changes were proposed to aid checkout and improve 
safety (Reference 7-7), no significant area was found where additional automation could substantially 
increase safety without a significant enlargement of the ACE to spacecraft interface. ACE computer 
programs neither contributed to the accident, nor could they have been used in the existing ACE 
configuration to reduce or extinguish the fire. 
Computer program and hardware design precludes the ground computer from operating the existing 
GSE and facility systems pertinent to extinguishing a fire. In addition, existing fire retardant or ex­
tinguishing systems are inadequate to cope with such an emergency. If active fire retardant or extinguish­
ing systeIlls are added in the future, a careful analysis should be made before automating these systems. 
Activating eIllergency systems such as nitrogen purge or pressure relief may present aqditional hazards 
to personnel. 
In reviewing the existing method of activating safety systems on both the Spacecraft and GSE, it 
IS evident that additional remote control capability shou Id be considered for systems such as: 
a. Service Structure Water Deluge 
b. ECS Control 
c. Electrical Power 
d. GN2 Deluge 
e. Pressure Supply and Control 
f. Cryogenic and Hypergolic Supply 
8. CONTROL OF TEST REQUIREMENTS 
A review of overall control of testing requirements with regard to tiIlleless, level of control, and 
technical integration was accoIllplished. This task was treated in two basic parts. Part a. dealt with the 
review of Apollo SIC 012 pre-launch test and checkout documentation. Part b. of the task encom­
passed the revi~w of pre-launch test and checkout documentation, planning and control as applied 
to other similar programs as related to Apollo Spacecraft. 
a. 	SIC 012 Pre-launch Test and Checkout Documentation. 

Documentation can be categorized into four major types: 

(1) Pre-launch Checkout Requirements 

(~) Test Specifications and Criteria 

(3) Checkout Plan 
(4) Checkout Procedures 
The first two categories represent the requirements imposed upon the pre-launch operations 
and the last two, methods for implementing these requirements. 
(1) Pre-launch Checkout Requirements 
Pre-launch checkout requirements are established in the Ground Operations Requirements 
Plan (GORP). This document, as currently approved, establishes the contractual baseline for the se­
quential flow of the Spacecraft and for the tests to be conducted at each test station in the flow. 
The GORP is prepared by NAA, Downey as a contractual document for MSC·Houston, requiring 
joint NAA/MSC approval (Class I). The GORP effectiveness as a test requirements document is 
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hampered by its original intent as a GSE provlslonin document. The GORP also contains con­
siderable detail not directly applicable as requirements. Because of this level of detail it is difficult 
to maintain the GORP current through formal contractual channels. 
The GORP is a Class I document between MSC and NAA but in the case of CSM 012 it was 
not formally submitted to KSC by MSC. NAA releases the requirements through its internal document 
distribution system which constitutes formal direction to its field organization. Implementation of the 
GORP by NAA, Florida results in a situation whereby the contractor may, in fact, provide direction 
to KSC. 
(2) Test Specifications and Criteria 
The Test Specifications and Criteria for Apolh'l are contained in the NAA generated process spec­
ifications MAO-201-XXXX. For CSM 012 the document was written in a procedural sequence format, 
rather than by system, makeing determination of the actual engineering hardware performance values 
and tolerances difficult. The specifications were not updated to provide the latest configuration' and 
tolerances. However, NAA, Downey personnel were assigned to florida on a temporary basis LO assist 
in interpreting the requirements. This information is made available to NASA-KSC by the NAA, Florida 
at KSC. The Process Specification documents do not require NASA, MSC approval and are not sent 
to MSC for information unless specifically requested (Class III). The requirements contained therein 
are not necessarily screened by MSC or KSC. These specifications are generated within NAA, Downey 
and forwarded to NAA, Florida to be implemented in the Operational Checkout Procedure. 
(3) Checkout Plan 
The Checkout Plan for Apollo is contained in the Florida Facility T~st Flow Plan. This document 
is prepared by NAA, Florida for NSA-KSC approval. The Test Flow Plan establishes the flow of the 
vehicle through KSC, the sequence of tests to be performed, and the activities to be accomplished in 
each OCP at each test location. The plan implements the intent of the GORP but may not implement 
the operational requirements in the precise manner stated in the GORP. There is no formal requirement 
for the plan to be submitted to either MSC or to NAA, Downey for review or approval. It is used 
extensively by pre-launch and launch operations personnel of both N ASA/KSC and NAA, Florida. 
(4) Checkout Procedures 
The pre-launch OCP's are written locally at KSC by NAA-Florida and approved by NASA-KSC. 
These procedures are forwarded to both MSC and NAA, Downey for review. However, because of 
the late release of the OCP's an acceptable before-the-fact technical review of the procedures, other 
than by local KSC personnel, has not been feasible. The OCP's provide a detailed step-by-step procedure 
for the accomplishment of an activity or task during the pre-launch and launch operations at KSC. 
The OCP's are related to a particular task or functional activity and are based on the GORP, the 
Florida Facility Test Flow Plan and the Process Specifications (Enclosure 7-4). 
b. Control of pre-launch test requirements 
A detailed review of the overall control and implementation of the pre-launch operational require­
ments and the test specifications arid criteria was accomplished. This review was centered primarily 
around the type of documentation used on programs similar to Apollo and the type that was used 
specifically for SIC 012. The review also encompassed the adequacy of content and timeliness of the 
documents to support its intended use. The Panel interviewed representatives from the following: 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center, for the Saturn IB and Saturn V Launch 
Vehicles 
North American Aviation, Manned Spacecraft Denter and Kennedy Space Center, for the 
Apollo CSM Spacecraft 
McDonnell Company Manned Spacecraft Center Resident Gemini Program Office at KSC, 
and Kennedy Space Center for the Gemini Spacecraft 
The types of documentation used by the above programs were obtained and reviewed by the Panel 
for definition of requirements and the imprementation of these requirements in pre-launch checkout 
operations at KSC (Enclosures 7-6 and 7-7). 
(1) Saturn 
Delegation of pre-launch checkout and launch implementation responsibility from MSFC to KSC 
was the significant feature of the Saturn Launch Vehicle Program. This relationship was complemented 
by the existence of detailed inter-Center agreements and by KSC controlled supplemental contracts 
with stage prime contractors to implement the delegation. The engineering pre-launch checkout require­
ments, specifications, and criteria are formally controlled by MSFC, Enclosure 7-7. This control is 
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accomplished by having the necessary documentation prepared by the respective stage contractors for 
MSFC. The documents, upon MSFC aaprovaJ, are then levied upon KSC and its stage contractors 
for implementation. A formal response is required from the KSC stage contractor to MSFC via KSC. 
This response is in the form of checkout plans and procedures. A significant characteristic of this method 
of control is that formal contractor direction is accomplished only through MSFC/KSC channels. The 
stagc prime contractor home/field relationship is one of informal technical coordination and com· 
munication. 
(2) Gemini 
The MSC Resident Gemini Program Office (RGPO) at KSC provided for rapid response to opera· 
tional changes. This was primarily accompli~h('d by after·the-fact contractual closure of open items, 
and changes on a quarterly basis. 
Pre-launch checkout requirements were prepared by the contractor's field organization at the launch 
site with parallel feedback to the home plant, MSC-RGPO, and MSC-Houston. 
(3) Apollo 
The Apollo Spacecraft pre-launch operational requirements flow is characterized by a highly cen­
tralized control exercised by the MSC-Apollo Program Office at Houston. Since MSC approval is 
required prior to implementing detailed operational changes in pre-launch planning, there is an inherent 
slow response loop which constrains normal pre-launch activity. The lack of detailed inter-Center agree· ;'1. 
ments relating to the delegation and control of spacecraft pre·launch operations at KSC is another 
factor. This lack of detailed agreement clouds the definition of MSC aI).d KSC roles and missions 
and the interface involved, leading to misunderstandings. 
The SIC Contractor at Florida is subject to technical direction from both KSC and its home plant. 
This direction may be conflicting. Clarification of SIC Contractor pre-launch direction at the field site 
would materially improve the implementation and control of pre·launch operations. 
c. Improvements Currently in Progress 
During the course of the investigation, it was determined that several significant changes are pre­
sently being made in the system of pre-launch checkout documentation and management control. 
It was determined that the sic Contractor (NAA) is in process of preparing a specification covering 
spacecraft checkout requirements applicable to factory acceptance (Contract End Item Specification, Part 
II). This document is Class I and requires approval sign·off by MSC-Houston. The SIC Contractor 
(NAA) has, since early January 1967, initiated action to develop a new type of checkout requirements 
and specification document to cover field operations. This document will represent a logical extension 
of the Contract End Item Specification, Part ll, in that it will provide requirements and specifications 
tailored to field pre-launch checkout operations. The new specification will replace a multitude of exist­
ing subsystem, interface, and integrated system level specifications. It will be system-oriented and will 
take precedence over the existing specifications. 
This type of document will satisfy the intent of the test specification and criteria document as 
required for testing at KSC. The authority for, and description of, the new format of specifications 
is s ta ted in Enclosures 7-9 and 7-1 O. 
Several major changes intended to improve the control of Apollo Spacecraft pre-launch operations 
requirements are also underway in response to the direction received from the Apollo Program Director 
in the NASA-OMSF memorandum of January 31, 1967, subject: Minutes of Meeting at KSC, Jan­
uary 26, 1967 (Enclosure 7-11). 
9. 	POTE~TIAL IMPROVEMENT IN CHECKOUT CAPABILITY 
The panel investigated areas in which minor design changes may be made ~hich \~ ill permit a 
significant improvement In checkout capability in the areas of safety and alleviation of hazard­
ous cOllditions. 
This task was treated in two basic parts. Part a. covered recommendations from contractor and 
NAS.\ test and checkout personnel in the area of hard'v\lare changes. Part b. covered recommenda­
tions for improvements in the areas of operations and procedures. 
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a . Recommendations for Design Changes to Hardware 
The Panel interviewed NASA, KSC and NAA, Florida system engineers with regard to recom­
mendations for design changes affecting either spacecraft or GSE hardware. Their comments and recom­
mendations were categorized by spacecraft subsystem with an explanation of the reason for the change 
and the advantages that will be gained if the change is incorporated. Panel 7 screened and evaluated 
the proposed changes on the basis that the change would provide increased margins of safety or that 
the improvement in the checkout operations will contribute to safer operations. The review included 
a comparison of the master measurement lists for Block I and Block II spacecraft. The system engineers 
submitted 110 recommendations for design changes. Of these changes 9~ effect the Apollo, 1 the LM 
and 17 the GSE. 
Results of this review were forwarded to Panels 9 and 18 for final review, disposition and closeout. 
b. Recommednations for Changes to Procedures 
The Panel evaluated potential changes to test procedures as a result of investigating areas in which 
such changes may allow significantly improved checkout ca pability to alleviate hazardous conditions. 
Interviews and briefings were conducted with procedure oriented engineers and management personnel 
from Apollo and other related programs . The methods and procedures are sound in concept for both 
administrative and technical direction and control of the preparation, publication, release, and revision 
of OCP . However, in post test evaluation, the content (and scope) of test deviations should be eval­
, 
uated by test management to ascertain that test objectives have been met and that procedure prepara­
tion was adequate . 
c. Review of Philosophy and Procedures 
Review testing philosophy and specific procedures utilized on other manned programs and 
launch vehicles. 
(1) This item was investigated by addressing a number of questions to the various programs and 
sites in order to understand the different test policies, operating standards, and test manage­
ment structures. 
Programs and sites considered were: 
(a) Apollo - KSC 
(b) Apollo - Houston (Space Environmental Simulation Laboratory) 
(c) Apollo - Downey 
(d) Gemini - KSC 
(e) Saturn - KSC 
(f) Titan - (Titan I, Gemini Launch Vehicle, and Titan III) 
(g) LM - KSC (Planned Approach) 

The questions asked were: 

(a) Does Safety review all test procedures? 
(b) Is there a formal work item review prior to each test? 
(c) Does Q C monitor the operation and in what capacity? 
(d) How are test deviations written and approved? 
(e) How and to what extent does the Government monitor and control tests? 
(f) Are tests run by engineers or technicians or by both? 
(g) Who (Q C, Safety, Design Engineering, Operations Engineering) may stop or scrub 
a test? 
(h) How thoroughly are procedure changes documented? 
(i) Who determines if a procedure is hazardous? 

U) Does the local operations group have design change authority? 

(2) By studying the answers to the questions provided by representatives of the sites, the Panel 
was able to compare those operations with Apollo-KSC operations to illustrate areas of possible 
improvement. These areas are listed below: 
(a) Safety Review of Procedures - Martin Titan uses the policy of having Safety review all 
all procedures for possible hazardous operations, rather than giving the operations engineers 
the responsibility for deciding which operations are hazardous. This item is also discussed 
in Paragraph 5e of this Report. I t was found tha t for Apollo operations Safety does not re­
view all procedures. 
(b) Formal Review of Work Items Prior to Tests - The three Apollo sites were all found 
to have similar procedures for reviewing open work prior to beginning major tests . 
(c) Q C Monitoring of Test Operations - At all Apollo spacecraft sites the policy pro­
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vides for Q C to monitor tests and provide an as run copy. The policy is not fully imple­
mented since not all operations are monitored full time. This item is also discussed in Para­
graph 2 of this Panel Report. 
(d) Test Deviations - In the case of the Apollo operations at KSC and Downey, and 

the LEM operations at KSC, engineering supervision (one level above the operations systems 

engineer) does not approve procedure deviations . In the case of the two launch vehicles and 

the MSC Apollo operation the supervision approval is by signature during the test. 

(e) Government Monitoring of Tests - The only significant difference noted is that the 

Saturn operation does not use NASA Q C to formally monitor test operations. The KSC 

Launch Vehicle Operations (LVO) systems engineers are required to monitor tests, and thus 

provide the required NASA surveillance. 

(f) "Procedures Not Run by Engineers Tests are run by engineers inall cases except that 

of Martin Titan where technicians are used on a regular basis to run tests. 

(g) Authority to Stop a Test - It was noted that Safety can stop a test III progress at 

all sites, either directly or through the Test Conductor depending on the type of test 

III process. 

(h) Real Time Procedure Deviation Documentation - All sites had policies requiring that 
this be done. 
(i) Determination of Hazardous Procedures - In four of the seven cases it was found that ... 
both Safety and Operations personnel made determinations as to whether a particular proce­
dure was hazardous. In the remaining three cases only Operations personnel determined such. 
In all cases Safety personnel reviewed in detail those procedures declared hazardous regard­
less of who made the declaration. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. FINDING: 

The Panel documented the Plugs Out Test Procedure (FO-K-0021-1) as it had been performed. 

DETERMINATION: 

The Test Prodecure did not contribute to the accident. There was a defect in the procedure in 

that power was applied to the uncapped gas chromatograph power cable after the gas chromato­

graph h~d been removed from the spacecraft. 

2. FINDING: 

209 pages of the 275 page OCP were revised and released on the day before the test. Less than 

25 percent of the line items, however, were changed. Approximately I percent of the change was 

due to errors in technical content in the original issue of the procedure. In addition, 106 devia­

tions were written during the test. 

DETERMINATION: 

Neither the revision . nor the deviations are known to have contributed specifically to the incident. 

The late timing of the change release, however, prevented test personnel from becoming adequately 

familiar with the test procedure prior to its use. 

3. FINDING: 

During the Altitude Chamber Tests the cabin was pressurized at pressures greater than sea level 

with an oxygen environment 2_1/2 times as long as the cabin was pressurized with oxygen prior to 

the accident during Plugs Out Test. 

DETERMINATION: 

The spacecraft had successfully operated at the same cabin conditions in the Chamber for a greater 

period of time than on the pad up to the time of the accident. 

4. FINDING: 

The Plugs Out OCP was not classified as hazardous. 

DETERMINATION: 

The hazard level was not recognized and consequently the procedure was processed through the 

review cycle as a non-hazardous procedure. 

5. FINDING: 

Only local control is provided for certain systems which may require remote control for safety 

reasons, such as service structure water and hypergolic supplysources. 
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DETERMINATION: 
The full potential of the safety systems is not utilized due to the lack of remote control capability. 
6. FINDING: 

The open item constraint list was not formalized as required by APOP No. 0-202. 

DETERMINATION: 

Pretest constraints were evaluated informally on a system-by-system basis by the · test team. 

(Enclosure 7-2) 

7 . Finding: 

Troubleshooting of the communication problem was not controlled by anyone person, and was 

at times independently run from the Spacecraft, Launch Complex 34 Blockhouse, and the Manned 

Spacecraft Operations Building. Communications switching, some of which was not called out in 

the OCP, was prformed without the control of the Test Conductor. 

DETERMINATION: 

The uncontrolled troubleshooting and switching contributed to the difficulty experienced In attempt­

ing to assess the communication problem. 

8. FINDING: 

KSC was not able to insure that the spacecraft launch operations plans and procedures adequately 

satisfied, on a timely basis, the intent of MSC . Changes to SIC testing by KSC could not be 

kept in phase with the latest requirements of MSC. Pre-launch checkout requirements (GORP) 

were not formally transmitted to KSC from MSC. 

DETERMINATION: 

Pre-launch test requirements control for the Apollo Spacecraft Program is constrained by slow 

response to changes, lack of detailed KSC-MSC inter·Center agreements, and by the lack of 

official NASA approved Test Specifications applicable to pre-launch checkout. 

9. FINDING: 

The Test Specifications for Spacecraft 012 were not written in a convenient to use format, did 

not contain field tolerances, were not NASA approved, were not maintained up-to-date, and were 

not transmitted to NASA/KSC. 

DETERMINATION: 

The lack of usefulness of the Test Specifications has been recognized by NAA, Downey and measures 

intended to correct the situation have been initiated (Enclosures 7-9 and 7-10). 

10. FINDING: 

The decision to perform the Plugs Out Test with the flight crew, closed hatch, and pure 02 

cabin environment made on October 31, 1966, was a significant change in test philosophy . 

DETERMINATION: 

There is no evidence that this change in test philosophy was made so late as to preclude timely 

incorporation into the test procedure. 
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GLOSSARY 
AC AI tern ate Cu rrent 
ACE Acceptance Checkout Equipment 
AFETR Air Force Eastern Test Range 
AGC Apollo Guidance Computer 
APOP Apollo Preflight Operations Procedure 
BMAG Body Mounted Attitude Gyro 
B/ P Boi I erp Iate 
BPC Boo ster Protecti ve Cover 
CCA Contract Change Authori zation 
COOT Count Down Demon strati on Test 
C/ M Command Module 
CMD Command 
... C/O Change Order 
COMM Communications 
CRT Cathode Ray Tube 
CSM Command Service Module 
CSTC Chief Spacecraft Test Conductor 
CX Complex 
DC Direct Current 
DR Discrepancy Record 
DRS Discrepancy Report Squawks 
DSE Data Storage Electronics 
DSE Data Storage Equipment 
DSEA Data Storage Equipment Assembly 
DSKY Data Storage Key Board 
ECA Electronic Control Assembly 
ECS Environmental Control System 
EDS Emergency Detection System 
ELS Earth Landing System 
EO Engineering Orders 
EPS Electrical Power System 
FCS Flight Control System 
FCSD Flight Crew Support Division 
FCSM Flight Combustion Stability Monitor 
FEO Field Engineering Order 
FEO/ FCA Field Engineering Order/ Field Change Analysis 
FRT Flight Readiness Test 
FS Full Scale 
G&N Guidance and Navigation 
GAEC Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GMIL Goddard Merritt Island 
GN Gaseous Nitrogen 
GORP Ground Operat ion s Requi rements Plan 
GSE Ground Support Equ ipment 
IDR Interim Discrepancy Record 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 
INSTR Instrumentation 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
L/ C Launch Complex 
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LEM 
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LVO 
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NAA-FF 
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PP 
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SI C AGC 
SCS 
SEDR 
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SLA 
S/ M 
SMJC 
SPS PU 
STC 
TAIR 
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TIRR 
TPE 
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TVC 
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WI G 
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Lower Equipment Bay 
Lunar Excursion Module 
Lunar Module 
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Launch Vehicle 
Launch Vehicle Operations 
Mission Control Center, Houston 
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Medical Data Acquisition System 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 
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Office of Manned Space Flight 
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Spacecraft 
Spacecraft Automatic Ground Control 
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Service- LM-Adapter 
Service Modu Ie 
Serv ice Modu Ie Jetti son Controller 
Service Propulsion System - Propellant Utilization 
Spacecra ft Test Conductor 
Test and Inspection Record 
Terminal Board 
Tem porary Insta lIations and Removal Record s 
Test Project Engineer 
Test Preparation Sheets 
Thrust Vector Control 
Up Data Link / Ultra High Frequency 
Water-glycol 
Waste Management System 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 
I N R f PlY "R E I [A T O 
TO: Chairman, Panel 1 & Panel 7 
FROM: Deputy Manager, Opera tions Mana~ement, KE-2 
SUBJECT: Memorandum for the Record 
1. To clarify the records and provide an explanation of 
procedures followed to insure spacecraft readiness for 
OC~X-002l-l, Plugs Out Test, the following information is 
sUbmitted. 
2. On 1/23/67 at 1030 an open item review was conducted with 
the S/C 012 NAA/NASA Test Team. Outstanding (open) items 
against the spacecraft were reviewed and a listing of 55 items 
was generated that were considered constraints in one of four 
categories. These four categories were: 
a. 	 Constraint to power up for OCP-K-0006 (Plugs In 
Test) , 11 items. 
b. 	 Constraint to power down for OCP-K-0006, 16 items. 
c. 	 Constraint to power up for OCP-K-002l, 26 items. 
d. 	 Constrai.nt to power down for OCP-K-002l, 2 items. 
Names of the responsible NAA system engineers were assigned to 

each item and the cover sheet was signed by the NAA TPE and 

the NASA STC. 

3. On 1 / 24/67 power was applied to the spacecraft at 0400 and 
OCP-K-0045, MCC-H Interface Test, was conducted. The test was 
completed at 2030 and power was maintained on the spacecraft. 
4. On 1/25/67 at 0400 the Plugs In Test was started and was 
completed at 0300 on 1/26/67. Power was not removed from the 
spacecraft. The portion of the con~traints list applicable to 
this test was signed off prior to the start of testing. 
5. A review of the new work items (i.e., the delta accumulated 
since the creation of the constraints list) was conducted in 
the daily recap/review meeting held at Complex 34 on both 
1/24/67 and 1/25/67 at 0800. 
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NOTE: Following this meeting the items are scheduled on the 
planning sheet by NAA and NASA operations personnel. These 
updated planning sheets are passed out at the 1430 daily 
scheduling meeting where the schedule for the next 24 hours is 
created. This meeting is attended by NAA/NASA S/C and GSE 
Engineering, NAA/NASA Operations, NAA/NASA Quality Control, 
plus support personnel safety representative, NASA-MSC and 
NASA-Headquarters personnel and others as required. The depth 
of engineering coverage is far greater at the daily scheduling 
meeting than it is at the 0800 meeting since the 0800 meeting 
is attended by the NAA Engineering Coordinator and the NASA 
S/C and GSE Project Engineers who represent their respective 
organizations in lieu of having all engineering disciplines 
present. At the daily 1430 meeting the S/C open items status 
report is once again reviewed for additional items that can be 
scheduled for work. 
6. On 1/26/67 the S/C open items were reviewed at the 0800 
meeting but there were so few changes since 1/25/67 that no 
new planning sheet was created. 
7. On 1/26/67, at 0900, a meeting was held at Complex 34 to 
review the general sic readiness for the Plugs Out Test. 
Participants in this meeting were: 
C. Gay, Chief Spacecraft Test Conductor, NASA 
C. Chauvin, Spacecraft Test Conductor, NASA 
E. Reyes, Senior Operations Engineer, NASA 
B. Haight, Senior Test Project Engineer, NAA 
C. Hannon, Assistant Senior Test Project Engineer, NAA 
It was the opinion of this group that the remaining open items 
from the constraints list could be accomplished prior to the 
scheduled power up time for the Flight Readiness Test. The 
remaining constraints for Plugs Out were retest of the Yaw ECA, 
review of the removals and completion of the checklist. The 
results of this meeting were passed on to Engineering for 
evaluation. 
8. At 1000 on 1/26/67, Messrs. Gay, Chauvin, and Edson (NAA TPE) 
attended the Plugs In Debriefing held by DLO-l at Complex 34 
and at the conclusion of that meeting summarized the S/C status 
for the Plugs Out Test. A portion of this summary included the • 
facts that all of the S/Cdata from Plugs In had not been 
completely reviewed and that there were still final preparations 
and work items to complete before bei~g ready to meet the 
scheduled power on time. 
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10 . COllstrailling tC1::it items. which were ol'i!~inally listed as 
open ('onstl'aillts to tlH.' te1::it. WCl'e l'elcased by till.' NAA respon­
sible systemo.; t'ngincci' for each l'c1::ipective 1::iystem by contacting 
the NAA Opcrations Engineer on duty at LC-34 , who then signed 
off thc' l'espective item on the con1::itl'aint list. In addition , 
tilOse items wl1i('h wel'e cvmpleted and sold off wel'e signed by 
the NAA Opel'ations EngineC'r on duty. 
11. Following \'eplacement and l'etest of the Yaw ECA, the SIC 
wa1::i powcred down at approximately 1800 011 1 / 26 / 67. This was 
the fil'st power down pel'iod since 0400 on 1 / 24 and power was 
()fl ullLil nppl'oximntcly 0730 011 1 / 27. 
12. On 1 / 27 / 67 at 0600. PI'e-test Briefing was held with systems 
engineers. opera tiona 1 personnel. technicians and inspectors in 
tlH' IrISOB . 
13. The tcst .team then went on statioI' and the STC and TPE 
re<.:eived a "Go" from each Systems Engineer ahd from the Pad 
Leader verifying readiness to proceed with the test. ECS 
statcd in their status report that they were running late with 
their preparations. SCS gave a qualified "Go" based on 
incomplete data review. The Pad Lcader indicated he had 
additional ECS set-ups to complete and that they could be 
accomplished in parallel with power up. 
14. An IDR requested by the STC and TPE was written at the 
stal·t of the test documenting the fact that there was no signed 
off constraints list for the Plugs Out Test. Status of each 
item not signed on the Operations Engineer's constraint list 
plus the delta was to have been provided in the disposition of 
the IDR upon completion of the test. This was not accomplished 
as all documentation was impounded at the time of the incident. 
15. On 1/27/67, the 0800 meeting was held at Complex 34 and 
the planning sheet for 1 / 25 / 67 was updated accordingly. 
Reference Enclosure #3. 
16. The constraints list and the additional si c open items 
have been reviewed since the incident and their status reverified. 
The results of this review are included as a part of this report 
as Enclosures #1 and #2. 
17. The constraints list that was beinf.{ 1::iigned off by Operations 
Engineers upon work completion and / or waiver was at the complex 
on level A8 01 the service structure. A copy of this list is 
included as Enclosure #4. 
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18. Summary 
a. A constraints list was created for OCP-K-0021 but 
was not signed off since it did not represent a true 
picture of all open paper due to the additional work 
generated from 1/23 to 1/27. 
b. The constraints and additional open items generated 
after development of the constraints list were under 
constant review by the test team. 
c. Two meetings are held daily between systems (or 
their representatives) and operations personnel where 
the status of sic open items is discussed. 
4 
d. Certain items were evaluated and deferred until after 
Plugs Out and prior to FRT. 
e. The status of the sic was known at the time of the 
test by systems and operations personnel. Readiness 
reports were received from all factions prior to power 
up and there were no open work items to constrain the 
running of the Plugs Out Test. 
/ 
C.Gay, Deputy Opns Mgmt, NASA 
Concurrence: 
NASA NAA 
STC __________________________ 
:/ "eSR OPS __~..;:.~=::..:-::....:~~. --109---­
siC Proj Engr t·(, r. c' ,c:t1Ji: ' 
/ 
ASST SR TPE ...I.tf~_-'--.:~--...::....:...:....~ 
PE { .: -C · / T i .: ' {~~ 
Elect Sys Chief.~<.:O-.:+~+_.........--"'-­~ 
Mech Sys Chief . . --6; ' 
Teleco~ Sys Chief~ 
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EVALUATION OF CONSTRAINTS LIST 
DR RECAP FROM CONSTRAINTS LIST 
DR# SYSTEM 	 DESCRIPTION 
923 RCS 	 No readout on panel 12 for SIM RCS He temp. 

Originated as IDR-035, OCP-0005, upgraded 

1/19/67. EO 477825 - Ref - TPS sic 012 

CIM 008. Panel 12 temp installed on temp 

installation for 0006, 1/23/67. Was left 

installed to support OCP-0021. Step 5 of 

DR-sic 923 specified to remove panel 12 for 

potting check. Item was left open because 

potting was not completely cured at instal­

lation. Measurement was replaced and retest 

was accomplished per OCP-0006. 

858 ECS 	 a. Crew reported eyes smarting during first 
hour at altitude and discomfort (due to heat) 
periodically during remainder of test at altitude. 
b. Originated as IDR 079, OCP-0034A-I. Trans­
ferred to DR-sic 858 1/4167. 
c. Suit hose umbilical was removed from sic 
and sent to malfunction lab for analysis of 
interior for LiOH and other eye irritants. 
Sample analysis report was attached to hose 
and sent to FCS lab. 
d. 2.5 micrograms of LiOH found in -71 
suit hose. 
e. DR-SIC 858 - conclusions were left open for 
retest and evaluation during OPC-0021. 
864 	 Communication problem that was corrected by 
working TPS sic 493 (sold) and DR was open for 
retest in OCP-0021. VHFIAM communication was 
unintelligible when the crew was in pressure 
suits. Modified cables were evaluated during 
OCP-0006. Required further evaluation during 
OCP-0021 with suited crew. 
916 	 a. When either crewman pushes PTT parameter 
CJ0002J(resp.rate) is modulated in negative 
direction approximately 20% full scale. 
b. Originated IDR-029 OCP-K-0034A-I. 
c . Was to be retested per OCP-K-0021. 
d. Problem could not be duplicated, therefore, 
was held open for evaluation during OCP-K-0021. 
932 	 a. Seq. 04-048 measurement SS-01-20X (SLA Sep. 
Monitor) reads 0% at de-com. 
b. Origina-ted as IDR-0008, during OCP-0006 
(dry run). 
c. Troubleshooting per continuation sheet 
directed to remove defective separation monitors 
upon engineering direction. 
d. Defective separation monitor was not replaced 
prior to going into OCP-K-0021. 
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932 
684 
714 
865 
878 
922 
884 
905 
915 
908 
344 
909 
(Cont'd) 
EPS 
EPS 
EPS 
EPS 
EPS 
G&N 
G&N 
G&N 
Flc 
Flc 
Page 2 
c. Portion of DR which was a constraint, i.e., 

CSM umbilical reinstallation, was accomplished. 

f. Replacement of separation monitor scheduled 

for 1/28 - required installation of SLA platforms. 

a. Wire routing to LEB XX strut lights is 

unacceptable. Wire much too loose--should be 

routed so as to lie flush on upper bulkhead. 

b. Originated as PiA SQK #9. 
c. EO release was pending and in meantime 

TPS Sic 469 was partially worked to correct 

discrepancy. 

d. DR-SIC 68~ was left open due to pending EO 

release. 

Floodlight connectors left and right couches 
are not adequately protected or supported to 
preclude damage by crew when changing couch 
position. 
b. Originated as PiA SQK #11. 
c. DR-SIC 714 was partially corrected per 

TPS Sic 469 - Ref EO 586488. 

d. DR-sic 714 was left open due to shortage 
of parts. 
Sold 1/26/67. 
Sold 1/27/67. 
Sold 1/24/67. 
Sold 1/24/67. 
Results of fine alignment test were unsatisfactory. 
Was IDR-038 of OCP-0005, Fine Alignment Test. Was 
rerun prior to OCP-K-0021. Rerun reverified 
original discrepancy. Out of spec condition 
required waiver. Waiver had not been requested 
at this time. No constraint. 
Sold 1/26/67. 
Sold 1/25/67. 
Was IDR-072 - OCP-0035-1. When AC inverter #2 to 
AC Bus lOn, a master alarm occurred. A successful 
attempt to duplicate the problem was performed prior 
to power down from OCP-K-0006. The data was returned 
to Downey for engineering evaluation. 
Electrical noise was evident on 02 tank #1 temp 
measurement SF0041. Ref IDR-018 - OCP-4736 and 
IDR-0008 - OCP-0005. 
a. Noise was 8% FS of PP superimposed on normal 
reading - Ref IDR 018. Correction of problem
(harness replac~ment) scheduled for 1/28. 
b. 02 tank #1 (SF0032) measurement cyclin~
between 23-48. Closed by OCP deviation (w1thout 
cryos measurement was not meaningful). Part a. 
required additional input. 
.' 
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918 Flc Was IDR 009 in OCP-4736. No pressure indication 
on panel 13 of H2 tank pressure. Troubleshooting 
accomplished. (EO 467267 scheduled for 1/28) 
Scientific matrix block was intermittent . EO 
changed pin location. Not accomplished 
831 FCS 	 Was IDR-OOI from OCP-8240B . Nepheolometer could 
not be removed from stowage compartment without 
excessive pull. Foam cusion was removed and 
returned to bond room. A new nepheolometer foam 
cushion was installed in spacecraft on evening of 
1/26/67 per TPS sic 547 and EO 565265. A portion 
of this task required a piece of foam to be bonded 
onto the door on the nepheolometer storage compart­
ment. This was not accomplished and was considered 
no constraint to OCP-K-0021 since nepheolometer was 
not installed. 
899 Biomed 	 Was IDR 027 of OCP 0005. Simulator voltage was 
6.8VDC, should be 16 ± 4 VDC. Troubleshooting 
revealed improper designed "T" adapter. Disposition 
was that Downey was aware of the problem and a 
redesign was required. Relay in all but two "T" 
adapters draws more current that voltage divider is 
designed for. This causes low voltage because source 
is not regulated. Part No.V16-601396, SiN 06362 
AAF 8453 of defective adapter sent to Downp.v. SiN 
3603, Part No.V16-601396 was installed in SSRP 
position on 1/24/67. (not same design SiN 06362 
above) 
126 FCS 	 TV camera mount assembly spring could not be 
installed, spring broke while installing during 
OCP-K-0034A. Disposition was to redesign spring. 
The spring was to be replaced per an EO from Downey. 
As soon as new spring was received DR could be closed. 
165 FCS 	 T-adapter, pin #2 of P3 is protruding apporx 1/4" 
above other pins. Disposition was to remove pin as 
it was a spare and not required and was suitable for 
0034A. DR held open until replacement adapter 
arrival. Above T-adapter sent back to Downey. The 
one in the siC was SiN 3603 and the SiN of DR'd one 
is 8453. 
(Sold Items on OCP-0021 Constraint List) 
0865 	 Closed 1/26/67. 
Problem: 12/27/67 OCP-0034A-l IDR #034 
Primary floodlight control rheostat causes lights 
to blink in the full on position. 
Action: Floodlights were replaced per TPS sic 485. 
Recheck completed per sic DR 0865 during OCP-0006-1. 
New floodlights did not flicker. Floodlights 
emitted a low buzzing noise. 
261- 108 0 - 67 - 8 	 D-7-25 
Hand control removal and inspection and was 
cancelled by TPS 561. 
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~ '" ~.: .J: 'l'nC'l I: c: c: 
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0878 	 Closed 1 / 27/67 
Problem: PAS #92 LMOSEA splice cable makes 
900 bend as it comes out of recorder . 
Action: Remove straight backshell and install 
900 backshell. Work complete 1/ 27/67 . Cable st owed 
in si c f o r OCP-0021 . 
0884 Closed 1/ 26 / 67 
Problem: 10 / 21 / 66 	 OCP 0034-7 lOR #116 trans to 
OCP 0034-A lOR #012 
Recorder 15 shows IMU temp CG 5006 IMU delay 
CG 5008 , comp power fail CG 5030; CRT PGll L14 
shows mark error 1. 
Ar. t ion : l'rollhle!;h.ootiIHl" d.i,:;:rlo,:;:ed orohlem was 
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545 ECS 	 a . Waste management system and si c H20 system 
cleanliness level verification. 
b. Perform EO 548578 . 
c. Flushed waste management system urine dump line. 
d. Originated lOR #1 - no sample analysis available 
for step 11 of EO 548578 . A verbal report of a 
satisfactory sample was received by R. MacDonald of 
NAA from Pan Am Lab. 
e. Purge and dry urine dump . 
f. Step 2 TPs/ 545 was not performed because it 
wasn't scheduled to be done until OCP-0021 was 
completed. Step 2 is to perform an H20 flush of potable, waste and supplemental subsystem to kill 
the bacteria present and should be done as close 
to launch as the schedule permits. 
493 COMM 	 a . Reduce noise in mike to audio center. 
b . Sold 1/ 26 / 67. 
c. Installed noise 	limiters in aduio center. 
225 EPS 	 a . Disable SPS PU sensor fail lights. 
b. EO 466789. 
c. Sold 1/23/67. 
d. Removed wire #K-348C20 from P3 and cap. 
469 EPS 	 a . Wire protection in crew compartment. 
b. Ref EO 586488, MCR-1831. 
c. Installs protective covering over sic interior 
TB's wire harnesses and connectors. 
d . Steps 5,6,7,9,10 (pending cure short stamp) 
(11,13,14,16) are sold. 
e. Not complete due to part shortage (17,15 
12,8,4,3,2,1) . 
f. Configuration considered acceptable for test. 
543 EPS 	 Installation of SMJC batteries in SIM and pyro 
batts in C/M for 0006 and remove after test. 
Installation portion completed. 
510 EPS 	 a. Circuit interrupter test. 
b. Mod #2 - retested all circuit interrupters 
because could not verify that travel limiters 
were not left installed on initial testing. 
918 F/c 
831 FCS 
899 Biomed 
126 FCS 
165 FCS 
.• (Sold Items 
0865 
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Was IDR 009 in OCP-4736. No pressure indication 
on panel 13 of H2 tank pressure. Troubleshooting 
ac c ompl ished. (EO 467267 scheduled for 1/28) 
Scientific matrix block was intermittent. EO 
changed pin location. Not a c complished 
Was IDR-OOI from OCP-8240B. Nepheolometer could 
not be removed from stowage compartment without 
excessive pull. Foam cusion was removed and 
returned to bond room. A new nepheolometer foam 
cushion was installed in spacecraft on evening of 
1/26/67 per TPS Sic 547 and EO 565265. A portion 
of this task required a piece of foam to be bonded 
onto the door on the nepheolometer storage compart­
ment. This was not accomplished and was considered 
no constraint to OCP-K-0021 since nepheolometer was 
not installed. 
Was IDR 027 of OCP 0005. Simulator voltage was 
6 . 8VDC, should be 16 ± 4 VDC . Troubleshooting 
revealed improper designed "T" adapter. Disposition 
was that Downey was aware of the problem and a 
redesign was required. Relay in all but two "T" 
adapters draws more current that voltage divider is 
designed for. This causes low voltage because source 
is not regulated. Part No.V16-601396, SiN 06362 
AAF 8453 of defective adapter sent to Downp.v. SiN 
3603, Part No.V16-601396 was installed in SSRP 
position on 1/24/67. (not same design SiN 06362 
above) 
TV camera mount assembly spring could not be 

installed, spring broke while installing during 

OCP-K-0034A. Disposition was to redesign spring . 

The spring was to be replaced per an EO from Downey. 

As soon as new spring was received DR could be closed. 

T-adapter, pin #2 of P3 is protruding apporx 1/4" 

above other pins. Disposition was to remove pin as 

it was a spare and not required and was suitable for 

0034A . DR held open until replacement adapter 

arrival. Above T-adapter sent back to Downey. The 

one in the SiC was SiN 3603 and the SI N of DR'd one 

is 8453. 

on OCP-0021 Constraint List) 

Closed 1/26/67. 

Problem: 12/27/67 OCP-0034A-l IDR #034 

Primary floodlight control rheostat causes lights 

to blink in the full on position. 
Action: Floodlights were replaced 
Recheck completed per si c DR 0865 
New floodlights did not flicker. 
emitted a low buzzing noise . 
per TPS sic 485 . 
during OCP-0006-1 . 
Floodlights 
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0878 	 Closed 1/27/67 
Pl'oblem: PAS #92 LMDSEA splice cable makes 
900 	 bend as it comes out of recorder. 
Action : Remove straight backshell and install 
900 backshell. Work complete 1 / 27/67 . Cable st lNedin SiC for OCP-0021 . 
0884 Closed 1/26/67 
Problem : 10121/66 OCP 0034-7 IDR #116 trans to 
OCP 0034-A IDR #012 
Recorder 15 shows IMU temp CG 5006 IMU delay 
CG 5008, comp power fail CG 5030; CRT PGII Ll4 
shows mark error 1. 
Action: Troubleshooting disclosed problem was 
caused by depression of check condition lamps 
push button on G&N GNIC panel with IMU operate 
power on and G&N in course align mode. No 
constraint to further testing. 
0908 	 ~losed 1/ 25/67 
Problem: OCP 4736 IDR #0008 flow FC #1O2
will not shut off when 02 purge valve is cycled. 
Action: Valve was found to leak. ValVe was 
replaced and retested per section B on continuation 
sheets this DR. Retest was acceptable. 
0915 	 Closed 1/26 / 67 
Problem: 1/17/67, dust on lens and mirror on G&N 
telescope and sextant optics. 
Action: Remove dust covers and clean lenses. 
0922 	 Closed 1/27167 
Problem: 1/18/67 
I. 	 Unable to verify liD on pyro connectors 
Ef8SQ9 (P9) and El8SQ7 (P7) per TPS 
SIC 012 - 534. 
2. 	' Connectors Al8SQl (P3) in SLA is IDed as 
AI55Ql (P3) and Al8SQ2 (PI) in SLA is 
IDed as Al5SQl (PI). 
3 . 	 The following connectors are not connected per 
TPS-534: Sl551 SQ2, Sl552 SQI, Cl9SQl4 (P480) 
and Cl9SQl2 (P77). 
.­
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0922 (Cont'd) 	 Action: 
1. 	 ID the connectors. 
2. 	 Connector ID's as called out per the TPS 
in error. TPS corrected per mod. 
3. 	 TPS modified to disconnect only those 
connectors connected. 
869 AF 	 Problem : Panel 312 is not identified as such 
and panel 313 has paint on the ID decal. 
Action: Identify panel 312 as panel 312 and 
remove paint from ID decal on panel 313. Sold. 
891 RCS/ Problem : Connector C05WBP495 in RCS roll access 
EPS has been disconnected without a PIRR being 
written and had been connected to GSE cabling. 
Action: Reverify connector and record on proper 
NAA "documentation. Sold. 
GSE-572-1-0026 	 Was IDR 070 (0005A) - could not establish two 
way communications over GSE intercomm, 1/18/67. 
Action: Repatch 572-J-box and return to original 
configuration after 	launch. 572-J-box was repatched 
and 	a satisfactory comm check was completed .. 
TPS 	RECAP FROM CONSTRAINTS LIST 
TPS 	Sic SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
534 EPS 	 Inspection of pyro connector for correct PiN 
and correct keying and insert . Sold 1/23/67. 
Ref DR sic 922 (sold) . 
537 SEQ 	 Support "Q" ball installation. TPS written to 
support activity required by IBM. Re-evaluated 
prior to test as no constraint. 
555 	 Hand control removal and inspection and was 
cancelled by TPS 561 . 
.. 561 	 TPS cancellation of TPS 555 . Sold 1/24/67. 
D-7-27 
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545 ECS 	 a . Waste management system and siC H20 system 
cleanliness level verification . 
b. Perform EO 548578. 
c. Flushed waste management system urine dump line. 
d. Originated IDR #1 - no sample analysis available 
for step 11 of EO 548578. A verbal report of a 
satisfactory sample was received by R. MacDonald of 
NAA from Pan Am Lab. 
e. Purge and dry urine dump. 
f. Step 2 TPs/ 545 was not performed because it 
wasn't scheduled to be done until OCP-0021 was 
completed. Step 2 is to perform an H2 0 flush of potable, waste and supplemental subsystem to kill 
the bacteria present and should be done as close 
to launch as the schedule permits. 
..493 COMM 	 a. Reduce noise in mike to audio center. 
b . Sold 1/26 / 67. 
c. Installed noise 	limiters in aduio center. 
225 EPS 	 a. Disable SPS PU sensor fail lights. 
b. EO 466789. 
c. Sold 1/23/67. 
d . Removed wire #K-348C20 from P3 and cap . 
469 EPS 	 a. Wire protection in crew compartment. 
b . Ref EO 586488, MCR-183l. 
c. Installs protective covering over siC interior 
TB's wire harnesses and connectors . 
d . Steps 5,6,7,9,10 (pending cure short stamp) 
(11,13,14,16) are sold. 
e . Not complete due to part shortage (17,15 
12,8,4,3,2,1) . 
f. Configuration considered acceptable for test. 
543 EPS 	 Installation of SMJC batteries in SIM and pyro 
batts in C/M for 0006 and remove after test. 
Installation portion completed. 
510 EPS 	 a. Circuit interrupter test . 
b. Mod #2 - retested all circuit interrupters 
because could not verify that travel limiters 
were not left installed on initial testing. 
c . Mod #1 - EO 602525, EO 566969-1&2, added 
connectors. 
d . Sold 1/26/67. 
536 G&N 	 a. Sextant mirror housing plug. 
b. Applied Loctite primer and finish coat to 
mirror housing plug (14 hr cure) . 
c. Sold 1/27/67. 
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400 FCS 	 a. Install temp plugs on G&N optics. 
b. Steps 1,2,3 bought off. 
c. step 4 removes after flight items are installed. 
d. No sold until item ·'c." is complete. 
511 FCS 	 Perform EO 582263, portable floodlight stowage bag 
installation. Sold 1/27/67. 
021 FCS 	 a. Installation of cushion and container crew and 
scientific "G". 
b. Work EO 501694 - Install Scientific "G". 
c. Step #1 & #2 hex stamped because flag note 4 
of V16-880168 not complied with. 
d. Intent of EO not complied with. 
e. Scheduled to be accomplished during stowage 
exercise 2/3 & 2/4. 
NOTE: Step #1 and #2 were hex stamped because 
intent of EO 501694 had not been fully accomplished 
as the GFE equipment called out in V16-880168 had 
not been installed and stowed. 
079 · FCS 	 a. Work EO 582206 
b. Adds 2 spare -51 cobra cables. 
c. Cobra cables were on temp install. 
d. Per OPC-K-IOOll deviation . This EO would be 
accomplished for launch. 
505 	 Perform OCP-K-0006. Accompl ished 1/26. No constra int.. 
506 	 Perform OCP-K-0021 . 
IDR RECAP FROM CONSTRAINTS LIST 
OCP-0005 
IDR-15 - Observed momentary LOS at time when cabin air fan, suit 
compressors•. (2) and glycol pump were switched on (individually) and off. 
Results - AC buses were monitored and voltage transients were confirmed. 
Transients were within spec for inverter operation with full mad on bus. 
IDR condition written with minimum load on bus. Additional testing to 
be ·accomplished prior to power down from OCP-K-0021 . 
IDR-48 - Problem with TV hardline from CX-34 to MSOB. 
Results - Troubleshooting disclosed patching problem at MSOB. Not 

retested prior to OCP-K-0021. Retested during OCP-K-0021. 
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IOR-61 - GMIL reported poor quality of OSE reverse dump. 
Results - Hardware design dictates that we should not dump in reverse 
direction. Evaluated as no constraint to OCP-K-0021. Test was 
performed in OCP-K-0006 and resulted in a forward dump mode only that 
was acceptable to FCS . 
IOR-12 - While manually loading K-start tape, word error 1, sync error 
3, and momentary PGNS were displayed at 01736E (just before tape 
listing stop). 
Results - Results are normal. Close per OCP deviation . 
IOR-13 - CH0413 reads - 0.1 and CH0613 reads - 2.199 and blinking, 
both should be zero. 
Results - Troubleshooting indicated that problem is in ACE carry-on 
equipment. No GSE OR number available . ACE carry-on not utilized in 
OCP-K-0021. 
IOR¥66 - Non-verify received on K-start and TL fail indication observed 
in SIC. 
Results - Troubleshooting disclosed that the SiC AGC had operated 
properly with erroneous information on uplink to the AGC. The failure 
indication was attributed to external noise, generated within the ACE 
uplink system, and responded to by the guidance computer as the first 
"one" bit into the computer. This spurious bit then caused a failure 
in the computer verification of the next legitimate data transmitted 
via the K-start. (The same problem was observed and verified on 
SIC 017 and the noise was found to originate in a R-start execution.) 
IOR-72 - SCS executed C180, 184 and 172 and did not receive a confirm 
indication. 
Results - This was transferred to GE software OR 322. The problem 
only occurred when using ACE uplink load 3. No change was made to 
software and a workaround was utilized by initiating and terminating 
from the same start. lOR was sold 1/25/67. 
IOR-77 - When R-187 was executed, noise peaks appeared on recorder 26, 
GCI022, 1032, 1502, 1512, 1522 and 1532. 
Resul ts - Problem appears to be crosstalk between SC·S and G&N systems. 
lOR still open for SCS and G&N further evaluation. Was considered no 
constraint to OCP-K-0021 . 
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lOR-SO - Me asurement CHI03S noisy when TVC power applied . 
Results - Troubleshooting indi c ated bad Yaw ECA . lOR transferred to 
Si c OR 940. ECA was removed, replaced anq retested successfully prior 
to OCP-K-0021 (with exception of fr e quency response test). Frequency 
response was scheduled for 2 / 1 / 67. 
OCP 0006 
IDR-2 - AC bus 2 phase C reads 112.4VAC on CRT and 117VAC in s i c. (within tol e rance) 
Results - No conclusion at this time. Signal conditioner appears to be 
drifting. considered a SIC problem but requires further investiga­
tion to verity . Considered no constraint. 
IOR-9 - Sold . 
OCP 0034A-l 
IOR-5 & IOR-37 - Did not receive He isolation #2 opening indication 
when thrust on was initiated. 
Results ~ Troubleshooting (KSC & Downey) disclosed present GSE 
instrumentation is marginal with respect to providing positive readout 
of SPS He and pilot valve signals . lOR ' s were transferred to GSE 
OR GC4S4-7 -0041 & -0042. No constraint to OCP-K-0021. 
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 
1. SPl13 is a test in which the meter readings in the s i C are compared 
against the PCM data. All system engineers were to compare their 
measurements and write an lOR against any reading out of tolerances 
established. Partially accomplished in OCP-K-0006 and further data 
was being obtained in OCP-K-0021 . 
2. This item was generated by OR 932 (lnstr) in which measurement 
No . SSOI20X read incorrectly. All eng ineers were advised as to what 
functions go through this connector and to write an lOR on any anomaly 
noted. Wa's monitored during OCP-K-0006 and no anomalies were noted. 
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EVALUATION OF ADDITIONAL OPEN ITEMS 
The following items represent new work tasks that were entered 
into the sic TAIR books between the completion 9f open items 
review and the start of OCP-K-0021. A status and/or explanation 
for 	each item is provided. 
1 . 	 TPS 547 - Install nepheolometer cushion MCR 1875 logged 
1/24/67. Item was partially worked third shift 1/27 but 
was not completed. It was not considered a constraint to the 
test. 
2. 	 TPS 548 - Markings on panel #23 MCR 1863 logged 1/24/67. 
Not considered a constraint. 
3. 	 TPS 553 - Remove ablator plugs; add pore seals, logged 
1/23/67. Continuing exterior task which is accomplished 
NIB. No constraint. 
4. 	 TPS 556 - Assemble soft BPC in warehouse, logged 1/23/67. 
Completed for OCP-K-0021. 
5. 	 TPS 562 - Cover rough edges on crew couch, MCR 3563, logged 
1/24/67. Scheduled for 1/31/67. No constraint. 
6. 	 TPS 563 - Change from 1 man rafts to 3 men raft, logged 
1/24/67. Scheduled for 2/1/67. No constraint. 
7. 	 TPS 568 - Install BPe parts, logged 1/25/67. Accomplished 
1/27 to support OCP-K-0021. 
8. 	 TPS 581 - Determine reflectivity of S/M coating, logged 
1/27/67. Received after planning sheet dated 1/27 was 
originated. Phnned for completion after OCP-K-0021. No 
constraint. 
'. 
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9. 	 DR 0933 - Ding in CM floor, logged 1/23/67. Completed 

1/26 - in cure - not sold . No constraint. 

10. 	 DR 934 - Valve markings on CM panel 307, 311 and 314 do not 
line up, logged 1/23/67. Scheduled for 1/31. No constraint. 
11. 	 DR 938 - Rain water in tower leg area, logged 1/24/67. 
Water dried out 1/24. No constraint. 
12. 	 DR 939 - Three dents in SM sector 6, logged 1/24. Sold 1/27. 
13. 	 DR 0944 - Washer dropped in F/C #1 sector 4, logged 1/25/67. 
Sold. 
14. 	 DR 949- Scratches on SLA, logged 1/26/67. Under evaluation. 
No constraint. 
15. 	 TPS 554 - Ball valve #3 position potentiometer change, logged 
1/24/67. Work accomplished. Required EO verification . No 
constraint . 
16 . TPS 575 - Monitor CM isolation valve temp, logged 1/26/67. 
Monitoring was being accomplished during OCP-K-0021. 
17. 	 DR 0947 - WMS blower on more than 24 hours, logged 1/26/67. 
ECS blower - not to be run during test. To be replaced 
after test. No constraint. 
18. 	 TPS 580 - Event timer checkout, logged 1/26/67. No constraint. 
Check on 8 day wind up clock. 
19. 	 DR 0936 - Panel 206 wind and set control stuck in the in 
position, logged 1/24/67. Completed 1/26. No constraint. 
20 . DR 0940 - Measurement CHI038 noisy when TVC power applied, 
logged 1/24/67. Yaw ECA replaced 1/26. Retest accomplished, 
less frequency response, 1/26. No constraint. 
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21 . TPS 552 - Wiring change EO 467267, logged 1/ 23/67 . Ref 
DR 0918 on constraints list, changed position of wire in matrix 
block. Task deferred until after Plugs Out. Scheduled for 
1/28 . 
22. TPS 565 - Transport 2 pyro batteries per OCP-K-0006, logged 
1/24/~7 . Accomplished less post test removal. 
23. TPS 569 - Install siC ordnance, logged 1/25/67. Scheduled 
for 1 / 31/67. No constraint . 
24 . TPS 577 and 579 - Transport and install battery for OCP-K-0021, 
logged 1/26/67 . Accomplished less post test removal. 
25. DR 0937 - Bonding material used not acceptable inside CM, 
logged 1/24/67. Work done per B/P. Used MAOI06-70 _ 
waiver letter #192-20-66/309 permits material usage. Area 
involved approximately 1 square inch. No constraint. 
26. DR 0948 - Connector J-54 broken, logged 1/26. DR voided. 
Problem already covered on MR #250. Signal conditioner ACE 
carry-on connector. 
27. DR 943 - Circuit breakers on panel 150 not in proper 
configuration per procedure, logged 1/24/67. Procedural 
problem circuit breakers closed in error caused draining 
of pyro batteries during OCP-K-0006 dry run. Batteries 
replaced prior to OCP-K-0006 sell run . DR sold 1/27/67. 
28. DR 0945 - Panel 200 reads out H2 regulator pressure. Should 
by 02 regulator pressure, logged 1/25/67. System not 
involved in test. No constraint. 
29. TPS 566 - Removal of hand controller, logged 1/24/67. 
Completed less post test removal of spare hand controllers. 
One spare rotational and one spare translation controller 
installed for test . 
• 
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30 . TPS 573 - Install d ecals of computer codes, logged 1/ 26/67. 
No c onstl·aint. 
31. 	 DR 941 - Locking ball retainer ring for telescope flight 
cover missing, logged 1/24/67. GSE covers installed - no 
constraint. 
32. 	 DR 946 - L0 2 tank H2 exceeded r~placement pOint by operating 
90 hOUI'S, logged 1/25/67 . No constraint - awai ting waiver. 
33. 	 TPS 528 - Determine stowage location for addi~ional food, 
logged 1/26/67. Scheduled 2/3/67 . No constraint. 
34. 	 TPS 538 - Installation of container VI6-332131, logged 1/26/67. 
Sold 1/27 . No constraint. 
35 . TPS 549 - Perform OCP-K-8240C section 2 part 2 of Crew 
System Stowage procedure, logged 1/23/67. Scheduled 2/3 
and 2/4. No constraint. 
36. 	 TPS 564 - Fit check of octopus cable, logged 1/24/ 67. 
Accomplished 1/25 and 1/26. 
37, 	 TPS 570 - Install and checkout of crewman optical alignment 
sight , logged 1/26/67. Scheduled 2/ 3 and 2/4 - no constraint. 
38. 	 TPS 583 - Installation of stowage items to support OCP-K-0021, 
logged 1/27/ 67. Accomplished prior to crew ingress. 
39. 	 DR 0942 - Grommet damaged tee adapter, logged 1/24/ 67. 
Sent to lab - no constraint. This tee adapter was the 
second of two good ones. Had unused pins missing. Not 
used in sic for OCP-K-0021. 
40. 	 DR 0950 - Cushion assembly for scientific "T" compartment 
has damage one edge of assembly, logged 1/26/67 . 
No constraint. 
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41. 	 DRS 878 - Fiberglass covers for gears (2) o n docking mechanism 
were missing . Had not yet been scheduled. No constraint. 
42. 	 DRS 880 - Fiberglass covers Pi N V16-531826-1 and -2 were 
not installed per print . Had not yet been scheduled. No 

constraint. 

43. 	 DRS 884 - Thermal shrink sleeving was not properly shrunk. 
No constraint . 
• 
44. 	 DRS 886 - Transferred to DR 0945. 
45. 	 DRS 892 - Door #9, -Y axis on the SLA had a loose washer and 
there was dirt and other foreign material inside. Scheduled 
to work on a non-interference basis. No constraint. 
46. 	 DRS 894 - CMD position had two loose cobra cable clamp 
screws. Had been dispositioned to tighten the screws and 
had not been scheduled. No constraint. 
47. 	 DRS 895 & 896 - Written against the BPe during test preps. 
No constraint to test. 
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DEVELOPMENT HISTORY 

PLUGS OUT TEST 

OCP-K-002l 

- SP-61,. " s/C 012 Test Outlines" 
published for a preliminary 
review to be completed by 
20 July 1966. 
- PURPOSE OF OCP-K-0021 
A. To verify overall siC L/V 

co.patlbility and demonstrate 

proper function of SIC systems 

with all umbilicals and GSE 

disconnected. 

B. To verify no electrical inter­

ference at time of umbilical 

disconnect . 

- SP-64, retitleu "SIC 012 - SIC 014 

Florida Facility Test Flow Plan" 

was published. 

- PURPOSE OF OCP-K-0021 - No changes 

ENCLOSURE 7 - 3 
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- Presented to Checkout Management 
Pa~e1 #24, (MSC!KSC/NAA). 
- Mo 8i.nificant chan~e. to L/C 34 
testing were requested by the 
Checkout Management Panel. 
- TEST CONF·IGURATION 
A. SIC and L/V ~ere mechanically 
.ated, and were electrically mated 
1­through fuse boxes. 
B. 	 SIC Internal Power Sources: 
1) Pyro batteries (test) 
installed. 
2) Entry and Post landing 
batteries installed. 
3) 8M jettison controller 
(SMJC) batteries (test) 
installed. 
4) GSE test batteries used to 
replace fuel cells. 
5) GSE power to Spacecraft 
busses. 
C. Installed Pyros disconnected 
and shorted. 
D. 	 Forward Heat Shield installed. 
E. CM and SM RCS Simulators 
connected. 
D-7-46 
6 September 1966 
19 September 1966 
F. G and N Flight Ropes. 
G. ECS CM WIG circulation. 
R. Operational TV camera mounted. 
I. LES installed and electrically 
and mechanically mated to CM. 
J. Flight Qual and DSE Recorders 
loaded with pegaussed Tapes. 
K. ACE Carry-on disconnected. 
L. Physiological Simulators in­
stalled (MDAS connected). 
- Reviewed and redefined plus-time 
operation, specifically regarding 
the scope of G&N programs to be 
conducted during the altitude 
chamber runs and plugs out tests. 
This was done to adequately divide 
all the G&N checKout among the 
separate OCP's which have plus­
time mission sequences. 
- Flight crew requested emergency 
egress practice prior to Countdown 
Demonstration Test due to hazardous 
conditions in the COOT resulting from 
fully fueled Laun~h Vehicle. 
20 September 1966 - Rough draft scnt to keypunch for 
preliminary flimsy printout, de­
livered 21 September. 
26 September 1966 - Flimsy copy of OCP to NAA Safety 
for electrical hazard revi~w. 
27 September 1966 - Decision made in NASA/NAA OCP 
Control Board Meeting this date to 
run emergency egress test after com­
pletion of the mission runs in 
OCP-K-0021. The following was then 
coordinated with the back-up crew 
Command Pilot: 
A. Back-up crew to participate in tc 
test, then the prime crew would per­
form a normal ingress and the emergency 
egress test during L/V reset period. 
(See sequence 07-310, " Page 7 - 56 of 
OCP-K-0021-1. ) 
B. GSE air and open hatch for simu­
lated mission by back-up crew. Full 
hatch close-out (including Doost Pr~ 
tective Cover) for prime crew emcr~ 
gency egress test. 
C. Prime Crew wanted normal pre­
T-O ingress and closed hatch dur­
ing simulated flight missions, but 
D-7-48 

4 October 1966 
19 October 1966 
30 October 1966 
31 Octobcr 1966 
the ELS Sequencer Controller 
Pressure Stimuli Generator 
(C14-45i) would have interfered 
with hatch close-out. 
D. The purpose of OCP-K-0021 was 
changed to add, "C. To verity 
astronaut emergency egress pro­
cedures (unaided egress)." 
E~ On this date, review comments 
from 21 September were sent to 
keypunch tor a second set of flim~eys. 
-Third set of fllmseys printed for 
mark-up ..... 
- Distributed printed preliminary 
hard copies of procedure for review. 
Had been sUbmitted for printing on 
14 October. 
- Formal review meeting held. Attended 
by all systems except G&N. 
- In accordance with Astronaut and 
checkout team desires, and followin~ 
a technical investigation, it was 
agreed to delete the ELS Sequencer 
Controller Prcssure Stimuli Genera­
tor trom the test thus allowing the 
D-7-49 
7 November 1966 
15 November 1966 
21 November 1966 
7 December 1966 
following test rhilosophy changes: 
A. Allo. perf'·.·... :tnce of normal flight 

cr•• countdown. (OCP-K-5117) (This 

1. the astronaut procedure from wake­
~p to arrival at the launch complex.) 

~ . Back-up crew to perfOrm their · nor­
.n l launch day functions. 

C. Prime crew to ingress and run 

entire test as on launch day. 

D. Emergency egress test to be 

performed by prime crew after simu­
lated landing. 

E. Normal cabin hatch close-out and 

!'unnlng of the test on 02 were results 

from these decisions 

- Crew Systems Stowage was added to 

be performed as part of the test se~ 

ups per request of loca I ~ISC crew 

support personnel. 

- G&N information available. Coord~ 

nation with L/V procedures in progress. 

- Received the mats for printing the 

basic issue of OCP-K-002l. 

- Six copies of the final master 

flimsy were presented to Systems 

Engineering for tinal review. 
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10 December 1966 
13 December 1966 
13 January 1967 
- Final mats approved, cover sheet 
.lgned, sent to print shop. 
- Procedure published ~nd released 
foulally. 
- Meeting held at KSC attended by the 
prime crew Pl10t (MSC) , Lou DeWolf 
(FCSDl, Tom Grler (FCSD) , Don Nlchols 
(~SC), and F. J. Powell (NAA) , the 
followlng ltems were discussed and 
tentatlvely agreed to: 
A. Back-up crew was to perform a 
panel-by-panel check of all C/M 
controls during "Back-up Crew 
Pre-Launch Checks." (See sequence 
8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 of OCP-K-0021.) 
These checklists were to be con­
ducted on a swltch-by-switch basis 
over the intercom. 
B. After ingress, the prlre crew 
waa to perform a panel sweep of the 
display console and associated panels 
which can be reached from couches 
(lower equipment b~y not to be re­
cbecked). This ~hecklist was not to 
be called out over the interco~. 
C. The information to be contained 
In tbe awitch lists in Items A and 
D-7-51 
and 8 above, were discussed and 
Mutually agreed upon. This infor­
Mation was subsequently provided to 
rcso for incorporation in Section 1 
and Section 2 of the Crew Abbreviated 
Check list. 
O. Panel nomenclature was called out 
in all switch lists. In a case where 
simplification of call outs could 
be made, the Test Conductor was to 
cOJllbine such call outs as "Main A" , 
"Main 8", and other similar swi tch· 
nomenclatures. 
E. Plugs In, Plugs Out, Flight 
Readiness, and Countdown test pro­
cedures were revamped to a standard 
minus time operation from approxi­
mately T-2 hours to liftoft. 
F. ~ll SIC 012 OCP's had ' been 
written utilizing the 14 November 1966, 
SIC 012 Crew Checklist (SM-2A-OJ) as 
a reference document. 
From this date (1/13/67), NAA was 

in the process of updating procedures 

to the 5 January 1967, Version plus 
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23 January 1967 
26 January 1967 
27 January 1967 
tbe changes tha~ would be supplied 

by rcSD in their 16 Jynuary 1967, 

r.vl.lon. 

- Preliminary Launch Countdown, OCP­

K-0001, was published. ThlR proce­

dure provided a baseline from 
approximately T-3 .hours to T-Zero 
tor use in the Plugs Out Test. 
- (5:30 p.m.~ Rev. -1 consisting of 
209 pages was released with updnte 
trom OCP-K-0006, Plugs In Test 
experience, plus 4 w8eks informa­
tion accumulations and incorpora­
tion of agreements made in the 
13 January meeting. See Attnchmcnt 
7-3 for details and dates related to 
the reasons for the -1 Revision of 
OCP-K-0021. 
-(10:00 a.m.) -1 Revision A delivered. 
All changes affected plus time 
l!Iequences only. (Four typed pages 
in lieu of having to write on-sta­
tion deviations.) 
D-7-53 
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TYPICAL 012 PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FLOW PLAN 
CONTRACTOR G~OUND OPERA TIONS 
PROCESS SPECS REQUIREMENT PLAN 
(NAA DOWNEY) 
 (MSC) 
\ ~ \ 

\ 

\ 

NAA DOWNEY OCP'S 
(FOR INFO) 
MSC OCP' S 
(FOR INFO) 
~, 
// 
V 
KSC 
SAFETY 
I'
.... 
AFETR 
SAFETY 
RELEASE & 
DISTRIBUTION 
MSC 
REVIEW 
NAA 
DOWNEY 
FLIGHT 
CREW 
NAA/ KSC 
TEST TEAM 
TEST OUTLINES 
(NAA FlA KSC) 
PR E LlMINA RY T!:ST
" 
P~OCfl)uRE (OCP) 
(NAA FLA KSC) 
PROCEDURE REVIEW 
(NAA F lA KSC) 
+ 
IiCOOROINATlON AS REQO. 
FLIGHT CREW 
-... (MSC) 
SAFETY REVIEW TO 
IDENTIFY HAZARDS, (NAA FlA SAFETY) 
'\..COOROINATION AS REQO . 
:1 
~lORMAL • PPROVAL 
OF HAZARDOUS 

OPERA TIONS 

~ 
H 
COORDINATION AS IfE~ 
SAME DISTRIBUTION 
AS BASIC ~ 
KSC 
SAFETY 
~ 
~FORMAL APPROVAL 
OF A II REVISIONS 
EFFECTING 
HAZARDOUS 
AFETR OPERATIONS 
SAFETY 
REVISION (IF REQD .) 
PRE - TEST BRIEFING 
(ALL OPERA TlONAl 
ELEMENTS) 
T'=ST OPERATION 
~-------
ENCLOSURE 7-4 
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••• ..,.._, rCJll' .. .., , • 
.... ... , '."-0• 
• "'.. ...- •• , t t . '.'_" .t 
U:-ilTEO STATE') ,~O\'£R:-;~IE.:-;T 
Memorandum 
TO • Apollo 204 Review Board Pariel - Task No. 7 DATE: Feb~ 13. 1967 
Test Procedures Review/Attn: Nichols, Chaiz,nan 
now Chief, Safety Office, RE RE-l/lQ6/Barnot:t:mr 
867-3973 
IUB,JEcr: Test Procedures Review for Hazaruous O;>erations 
1. The requirement for the KSC Safety OfficI! and the Air Force Range 
Safcty review of test procecures for ha~ardous operations is specified in 
Section I, paragraph 3, page A-l of KHI 1710.1, Attachr..ent A, dated 
October 4, 1966, and Section C, r~ragraph 3, page C-S of AFET~~ 127.1 
Range Safety Manual dated 1 Nover.;i>er 1966. 
2. Some operation4 that have been specified as hazardous in nature are 
8S fallows: 
8. Propellnnt sprvicing 
b. Pressure testing 
c. Pyrotechnic (ordnance) work 
d. Radioactive and toxic material operations 
e. Operations \lith hazardous gases 
3. The responsibility of submittin& hazarGou5 test procenures for Saf~ty 
approval is with the contractor. A t est to be conducted on Cape Ker.ne .:!~' 
requires S copies of the Test Procedure to be subl:'.itted to the KSC Sill.'ety 
Office. One of these copies is retained by the ](SC Silfety Office anu o:-.e 
is sent to Bendix Systems Sa fc ty for cor,nent; tJu'ee copies are then for­
warded through the Apolio/Sa t:".ll':l I-V Requir e:ncnts Branch, DK-3, to Air 
Force Range Safety (ErOSII) for r cview and approv"l. 
4. Corranents from ETOSH and Denuix Syster.1s S"fety are submitted to the KSC 
Safety Office, ....ho in turn transmits the conr:lents to the contractor , for 
incorporation into the OCP. 
S. It should be noted that the AFETRli 127-1 Rilng() Safety !-{anual r c;.uires 
a lIl:inUlum of 30 ,days for review of documents. Apolio, Procedure sub::-.ittals 
have been vary delinquent 1n ~eetin& this tL~e requir~ent. The late 
submittal of procedure~ has repe il tedly been brought to the attention of 
North American and Spacecraft O,lCrations in various meetings and correspo:\­
dence. Some procodures ·have been sub:nitted with 'as Jittle as two days 
Buy US. SallingI BondI Rttul.1f/y on the Payroll SallingI P/.m 
"~""" 
ENCLOSURE 7-5 
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allowable safety review time. Also, eha:·.: !!s to an approved proeeduro 
have ·been published on the day of the tc::;;, thereby eliminating any allotted 
time far Safety review. 
6. OCP-0021, s/V Plug Out Integrated :,~st was reviewed far Sic 009 and 
wa. classifiod a. a non-hazardous tl . ~, thereby eliminating required 
Safe1;y approval. This type procedure is not again submitted to KSC 
Safety for review unless it is changed· i:1 such a way as to make' the 
lparating hazardous. OCP-0021 for SIC 01.: ..as not subD11tted to. the IQiC 
Safety Office for approval. . 
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.\0-67-32 
INTfRNAL LI:.HER 
North American Aviation, Inc. Date ~3 February 1967 
TO 
Address 
Apollo Supervision 
'42-820, 818, 41-696/697 
FROM 
Address 
J. 
S. 
L. 
M. 
Pearce. 
Treman. 
42-Rlft ZKIA 
41-696-697 Htjt 
Phone 	 867-6151 
923-1121 
Subject 'Memorandum of Understanding _ Coordination of 
Preparation of Engineering Test Specification 
and Major Test Outline Document for Florida 
Facility Block II Apollo Spacecraft Test 
Operations 
The purpose of thl~ memorandum is to r~cord understa~ding of 
rc~ponsibilitles lor coordinated preparation between the Florid~ 
Facility and Downey Spacecl"aft Design of the test specificati.on 
and cl"iteria and FF \Iajor Test Outline documents for Block II 
Apollo spacecraft operations at KSC. 
Specifically. C/O Inte&l"ation and Combined Systems (0/697- ·100) 
is responsible for the preparation of a document to provido . 
requirements for Block II spacecraft functional test and 
servicing operations to be performcd at KSC. The document I~ 
to be modular in form and generally system-oriented. "It shall 
be consistent with the requirements of the applicable Block (1 
S/C GORP. . 
The document will be prepared wilh the direct support ot" Flnri'b 
Facility Apollo Engineer"lng (0.'820) and Apollo Opcl"ations (\). : ~l::i)" 
.\ctive coordination channels will be establislicd to ;ISSUI"C l;,at 
the fOI"m. content. and deta i Is of the n()C11I"('nt :"1.~et t hc n"~r:!~ "f 
Apollo SIC operations as planned and scheduled by the Florida 
Facility organization. 
norlna Facility Apollo ()P('I";\ti,)"~ (0/ :318) i:; \"~·spvllsi\)lc (Ul" 
lile pl"eparatton of the ~Iajor Tcst 01ltllne (j')I"~I !'I C''lt applic:lble 
t.) 01'Jck II ::l/e 1I.::it: opuratio.ls in ':.)0\"':\ ""Hil)t1 \.ith n.' ~20. 
Tilis tlocllmp.nt will meet rC ;111!\',' "II "II: ., '-' ·' i\t"i '~ · · d ill tilO l,'sl 
·- ~.',.·~!ri''': :.1l1o.tl .:lnd ~,,:i~ ": l·i.) Jv\-,,,uln,; Ut au..! will ut:' ill dCl..:uJ."Uallct? 
with the applicable Block II SIC GORP. The document .. -ill be 
submitted to 0/820 for review and concurrence . . The document 
will simultaneously be provided to 0/ 696 and 697 for review 
and comments. These comments will be provided to ~ ·820. 
D/697-400 will provide teChnical support to 0 / 818 as necessal'y 
during document preparation. A summary of the contents of the 
FF Major Test Outline document is enclosed (See Attac~~ent 1). 
0 / 820 is responsible for assuring that OCP outlines satisfy the 
r~quiremcnts of the test specification and 'criteria document. 
D' 826 will take necessary action to assure that these documents 
al"e compatible. 0 / 820 will, in this capacity. directly support 
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D/697-400 in the timely on-the-spot assurance of test 

specification/OCP outline compatibility. 

Following initial EO release of the test speCification, Downey 
changes must be implemented utilizing existing Engineering 
procedures. Copies of EOC's will be supplied to FF for advance 
informatioD. Changes initiated by FF must be implemented 
utilizing the FEO/FCA system. 
A flow chart depicting the channels of communications and 
coordinatton is enclosed (Sec Attachment 2). 
To facilitate coordination and implementation of the provisions 
of the memorandum, single point contacts will be named 1n 
Departments 818, 820, and 697-400. The pl'i~e coordination 
contact at KSC for interfacing with 0/696 and 697 will be 
provided by 0/820. 
Q~{0ei"l <- <_ 
..??;! j~<4't(ll-<..\.../
O'i: L~ Pe:\~ ===--- S. W. Trcman Uirector CS\\ Director Florida Facility Spacccl":t ft Des i"n 
~c: G. W. Jeffs 
R. L. Benner 

.~ . B . Kehlet 

G. 8. ~'errick 
L. G. Rochest<'r 

\1. Karp 

J. P. Proctor 
R. E. Hal'ton 
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Attachment 
DEFINITION OF SEC.TIONS Ot' Tilt: 
FLORIDA FACILITY MAJOR TEST OUTLINE lJ()(;U\IES'r 
SECTION A 
IDternal Power Configuration Plan 
A chart showing usage of batteries, battery substitute 
units, fuel cells, fuel cell simulators and fuel cell 
substitute units as a function of various major KSC 
teats. 
SECTION B 
GSE Utilization Plan 
A chart ShOwing usage of GSE models and VfT's on a 
per test baSis. 
SECTION C 
Spacecraft Test Plan 
1. 	 A chart showing types of missions :lnd aborts on' 
a per test basis. 
2. 	 A prose description of each test Jrfining the t~~t 
objectives and clarifying the goals of the days
activities. 
SECTION D 
Test Limitations 
1. 	 Rp.ferences appl"opri:lte placard!.> aild li:nitatiollS 
guide, 
2. 	 ReCcrl'l1e.-,s "PIll'upt"iate l\::;C ar.J k.I'H ;i;ll'ety 

lim it a til' '1S " 

3. 	 Describes the limitations of the allocations oC 
activities per test to insure that total KSC 
testing d.oes not exceed limits. 
SECTION E 
Spacecraft Flow Plan 
A sequential listing of the details of the test fluw 
plan intended as a guide to checklist preparation. 
0-7-69 

Attachacnt 1 
SEcrlON F 
Plao of Syste. Testing 
Either a prose description or a matrix, as appropriate, 
sbowing. tbe plan for all KSC test on a per systeJII 
baeis. It is intended to be a convenient guide to all 
parochial interests to examine the plot of each syst~m 
io Florida. This section also includes a table of 
.easure.ents tested and on-board display correlation 
witb tele.etry on a per test basis. 
SEcrlON G 
Mission Test Sequence 
A sequential listing of all normal or bRC~Up event 
blocks. Does not conform to the n tjj;ht plan. The 
intent is to detail all items occurring While going 
thru an exercise. Test outlines would then pick out 
selected blocks for performance as apprnprtate 
considering the primary test objectiv~s. 
SEcrION H 
Test Outlines 
A detailed litep by step outltneor I'ach OCP from 
bc~inning to end. Each itelll in the vLltline wuuld be 
the same as a block title in eithC'l" the . \ppendices 
or the Mission Test Outlin~s. 
• 
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AO-67-34INTERNAL LEITER 
North American Aviation, Inc. Date 2 March 1967 
TO 
Address 
Subject 
~: 
Apollo Supervision FROM J. L. Pearce, 42-818 ZKlA 
42-820, 818, 41-696/697 Address S. M. Treman, 41-696/697 HC30 
Phone 867-6151 
923-1121 
r-erorandum of Lhderstanding ­
Concerning the FoIl1l, Content, and Intent of the Block II 
Florida Facility Engineering Checkout Process Specification 
(a) 	 Memorandun of Understanding, J. L. Pearce and S. M. Treman, 

Coordinate<iPreparation of Engineering Test S;:,ecification 

and Major Test OUtline Document for Florida F~r.ility 

Block II Apollo Spacecraft Test Operations, dated 

23 Februa.IY 1967 

(b) 	 Meeting at Florida Facility, 28 February 1967, Attended 

by E. E. Dale, W. F. Cahill, w. L. Ecl<r.eier, W. F. Edson, 

H. E. Heilman, R. H. Jones and T. H. Linsday 
'llle 	purpose of this manorandum is to describe the format and objectives of 
Sections 4.0 and 5.0 of the CSM Checkout Process S;:,ecification being prepared 
for Florida Facility Block II spacecraft prelaunch checkout o;:,erations by 
0/697-400, Checkout, Integration and Canbined Systems. This mem::>randum is an 
ad:lendun to Reference (a) in order to provide the details of the Process 
Specification. 
The proposed specification, in exmsonance with the Vehicle plan (GORP) for 
Block II Apollo spacecraft, is the logical extension of Part II of the 
Contract End Item S;:,ecification ir. that the latter docunent contains only 
Daomey located post-rnanufacturing checkout o;:,erations. 
Florida Facility 0/820 Systems Engineers and 0/818 Operations Integration 
Engineers and Publications Analysts require firm, accurate, and timely 
engineering docurentation fran CONney Spacecraft Design in oreier to plan 
and prepare mission oriented Operational Checkout Procedures (CCP' s) for 
th::>se Apollo CSM spacecraft intended for checkout and launch fran the KSC. 
The follcwing stipulations and definitions defined at the Rcf=ence (b) 
meeting will produce a readily usable docurent to satisfy this requirement: 
A. 	 Stipulations­
1. 	 The specification should provide CONney Engineering C&~ 
checkout requirerrents; ar.d these should be ccrnpatible 
with the applicable CPRI'. Tests subsequently identified 
at the Florida Facility as s;:,ecial or addiLional· r8qUire­
ments will be coordinated with Engineering and EO's 
generated for ;:,eonancnt s;:,ecification changes. 
'Of"" Ill · ' I ... . 1 ·~ 
ENCLOSURE 7 -10 
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J. L. Pearce/S. M. Tr€l1'ldn 
2 March 1967 
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2. Fbr KSC checkouts required, it should provide requi~ts 
and planning =nstraints in Section 4.0 and specifications 
and criteria including operational constraints in Section 
5.0. These data should be in the form of hardware 
performance values and tolerances relative to a specific
operating oondition. 
]. 	 'lbe specification shoulc! be subsystem oriented and must be 
approved by Subsystems rlesign Groups. 
4. 	 It should include a definition of relationship to other 
docunents and will take precedence over subsystem level 
process specifiCations. Subsystem specs are not effective at FIF. 
5. 	 It shcW.d be controlled by the Engineerirq change system 
including field change procedures. 
6. 	 An m on a subsystem process specification will not be 

effective on this specification. However, changes 

applicable to this specification must be generated 

iJmediately to keep the specifications C'Olpatible. 
7. 	 Initial issue of Section 4.0 should be five (5) rronths 
before CSM arrival at KSC. Initial issue of Section 5.0 
should be four (4) months. 
8. 	 It shcW.d be updated ]0 days before CSM arrival at KSC; 
subsequent updating at 30 day intervals should be acoanplished 
until a final m in=rpcration is accatplished after launch. 
9. 	 A tabular form should be used for stimuli and rreasurement 
toleranCleS, torque values, etc (with respect to system
txlndition) . 
10. 'lbe Launch Mission Rules will take precedence for launch. 
B. 	 Definitions-
Section 4.0 - "Checkout Requirements" (Definition of the 

Engll1eenng requi~ts per Subsystem for checkout at KSC.) 

Presents the follOWing: (See Exhibit No. 1 attached) 
1. 	 Test code nlllT"ber 
2. 	 Brief description of the required Subsystem checkout. 
D·7·74 
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3. Statement of major checkout planninj constraints (e.g. 
is a prerequisite to another checkout; time/cycle
limitations) . 
Release date for this portion of the specification will be five (5) 
IlDnths prior to spacecraft delivery. Subsequent updatinj at 30 dayintervals. 
Section 5.0 - "Specifications" (A statanent of hardware performance 
vaIues per subsystan with respect to a specific input or operatinj
ccn:lition. ) 
Presents the follcwinj: (See Exhibit No. 2 attached) 
1. 	 Brief systan functional performance description. 
2. 	 Measurement nUT1ber and title. 
3. 	 Stimuli characteristics (e.g. arrt>litude, frequency,
duration, pressure, etc.). 
4. 	 Performance (output characteristics with tolerance expressed 
.as nc:mi.nal +/-XX, in engineerinj units; also may involve 
other characteristics such as acceptable leakage rate, as 
applicable and should be <XlTpatible with Launch Rules.) 
5. 	 ~ational oonstraints affectinj specified performance
values. 
6. 	 Critical spacecraft configuration and interface requiranents. 
Release date for this portion of the specification will be four (4)ITOlths prior to spacecraft delivery. 
nus memorandun states the mutual agreenent of the undersigned to 
the 	form,content and intent of a sinjle Checkout process specification for 
each BlockII Apollo CSM that will receive a prelaunch checkout at KSe. Qu/f\ '.....n--1 L J->- :Rtttc <. 
~. L. Pearce --fi7?!/',bdLt( u . 
pirector CSM S. M. '!'reman
.J lorida Facility Director 
Spacecraft Design
=: G. W. Jeffs 
R. L. Bermer 
A. 	 B. Kehlet 
G. 	 B. Merrick 
L. G. Itx:hester 
M. Karp 
J. 	P. Procto+ 
R. E. B.uton 
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EXHIBIT 00. 1 
(Section 4.0 of C/O Spec for Florida Facility) 
TFOOOl DIVI~ a:Nl'OOL SYSI'DI 
SERVICING, A::TIVATloo, AND VERIFICATlOO 
Perfonn an ECS servicing, activation, and verification of the primary and 
secondary water-glyool loops, oxygen system, and suit loop system. 
Performance of this checkOut is a prerequ:..site to CSM system activation and
verification operations. 
-------------. - -- --- - ----- ---------- -- .._ - -0- ._ ___ ._ ._ _ _ _____ __.___._. __ .__ _ 
THOOl2 STABILIZATloo AND a:Nl'OOL SYSTEM 
~ RESPOOSE 
Perform an SCS frequency response checkout tc dEmonstrate capability to 
gimbal the SPS engil1e, using both primary and seocnd:iry gimbal =tors, 
with the proper magnitude, rate, and direc t.ion. 
Frequency and step response must be verified in both the UM OFF and 
UM 00 operat.ing oondi tions. 
D·7·76 
--------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT~. 2 
~<OVr SPECIFICATIONS 

(Section 5.0 cf C/O Spec for Florida Facility) 

The specifications a~licable to ECS servicing are as follows: 

FFS026P 
 WIG 5U{:ply Pressure
FFS027Q WIG Flow 55 +/- 15 PSIA 
FFS028P WIG Diff Pressure 200 +/- ~~ Ib/Hr
FFS029I' WIG Return T~ 35 +/- l~ PSID 
FFS030T 55 +/- 10 [)eg. FWIG SU{:ply Temp 
35 +/- ig [)eg. F 
The above specifications apply after systan stabilization. 
Sl'ABILIZATIOO AND cnnwL SYSTEM 
The specifications applicable to SQ;/SPS engine frequency response areas follows: 
INPtJI' ~ 
(Deq./Sec.) 
3.0 0.318 15 00517 Gimbal Pos, (XXX+/-X)Pitch 
D·7-77 
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1. 
2. 
MINUTES OF MSC/KSC/OMSF MEETING AT KSC 
JANUARY 26, 1967 
In accordance with an OMSF TWX 362 2204, dated December 22, 1966, a meeting was held 
at KSC (attendees listed in Attachment 2) to review spacecraft checkout experience over 
the past year and discuss actions that might be taken to improve checkout of subsequent 
spacecraft. Items discussed were those submitted by MSC and KSC prior to the meeting 
(Attachment 3). 
The discuss ion of the agenda items resulted in the follow ing agreements or actions: 
a. MSC and KSC to continue to track the 7 configuration verification discrepancies found 
by KSC on a spot check of 30 odd pieces of hardware to assure that the configuration 
control paperwork eventually reflects the "as is" condition and review the time lag be­
tween the hardware reconfiguration and the time this reconfiguration is reflected in the 
paperwork. A similar type spot check will be made on sic 020. 
b. MSC and KSC will review the Cape receiving inspection records on 017 and consider 
the preparation or modification of inspection criteria for those items where the presence 
of well written criteria would tend to reduce inspection variances among Quality Control 
personnel. 
c. KSC will provide a Quality Control inspector to participate in the final inspection of 
subsequent spacecraft at Downey through spacecraft 102. MSC will also provide a NASA 
Quality C;ontrol inspector to participate in spacecraft receiving inspections at the Cape 
through 102. Data collected during these inspections will be used to refine and improve 
inspection methods and criteria. 
d. MSC will provide direction to see that all contractor and GFE non - flight hardware is 
clearly marked and so identified in the spacecraft paperwork. 
e. KSC will bring to the appropriate Program Manager's personal attention any non - flight 
hardware that is installed on a space vehicle and not clearly marked. 
f. KSC and MSC will arrange a subsequent meeting to discuss the other actions recom­
mended in the KSC handout to improve overall quality and review the use of the Engineer 
ing Disposition Book. 
g. MSC indicated that PAR closeout action by NAA reflects the engineering order number 
or other specific written corrective action that has been taken to correct the problem. 
h. MSC will check _to determine why EO number E15 - 420603 and 604 were not incorporated 
in spacecraft 017 before delivery to the Cape. 
0-7-80 

1. 	 MSC will check recurrence control applied to the cabin relief valve (part number ME­
284 -0149-0021) to assure that the system is operating as it should. 
J. 	 KSC will provide MSC a specific list of areas where it would be helpful to consolidate 
several process specifications into a single process specification which summarizes 
requirements. 
k. 	 MSC will review MSC and NAA non-metallic crew bay material requirements documents 
to update them and assu re they are compa ti ble. 
1. 	 MSC will review NAA documentation on functional checkout and/or PIA time cycles on 
spare componen ts and provide written guidance to KSC. 
m. 	 MSC will review the list of hardware problems presented by KSC in discussing design 
problems (electrical switch, communications cables, bi - metallic interfaces, DSE re­
corder, signal conditioner fuses, hand controller cable covering, water glycol and 02 
line installation) and assure that appropriate corrective action is in process. 
n. 	 MSC is preparing a revised flow plan and is reviewing the technical requirements to 
which the system and subsystem is tested as it progresses from assembly through 
checkout at the Cape. This system will be implemented for Block 2 spacecrah and will 
provide a better overview of the total testing done on flight hardware before launch. It 
will also assist in providing better visibility into the test status of hardware when the 
DD 250 is signed. 
o. 	 MSC will recheck the list of items indicated under Part VI, Level of Testing, In KSC 
handout to assure that the problems indicated have been fed back into NAA for appro­
priate corrective action . 
p. 	 MSC and KSC will take action to arrange for a joint review of the classes of problems 
found during checkout of each particular spacecraft after it has flown and discuss cor­
rective action that can be taken to reduce the same type of problem on subsequent 
spacecraft. 
q. 	 MSC is taking action to assure closer control over the listing of engineering orders in 
the Configuration Verification Records of the appropriate spacecraft in accordance with 
the effectivity point in the EO. 
r. 	 MSC and KSC will have a meeting the week of February 13 and formally coordinate the 
Block II CSM, the LEM and the integrated Ground Operation Requirements Plans 
(GORP). Any unresolved problems will be presented to the KSC Program Manager and 
the MSC Program Manager for decision or submission to higher management levels for 
resolution. KSC will formally sign the basic GORP documents and approve all sub­
sequent changes in writing. Coord ination and sign - off on the GORP will be binding on 
both parties. Additional testing of the type specified in the GORP will not be added at 
D-7-81 
the Cape w ithou t formal coordination. Changes recommended by either party w ill be 
officially submitted to the otherparty for approval. Contractual directiqn to the con­
tractors will not be provided by CCA until coordination has been accomplished. As 
a part of the meeting during the week of February 13, MSC and KSC will develop a 
written change procedure to permit expeditious revision of the GORP . During this 
meeting consideration will also be given to reviewing a proposed system for controlling 
operational checkout procedures (OCP's) including the necessary interface with en­
gineering orders. 
s. 	MSC (Mr. Kapryan) and KSC (Mr. McCoy and Mr. W. Williams) will develop a proposed 
procedure for integrating into a single Board the present MSC Configuration Control 
Board at the Cape and the KSC Spacecraft Change Implementation Board. This pro­
posal will include membership, responsibilities, appeal procedures, documentation, 
signatures, and other appropriate items. This proposal will be prepared for coordina­
tionand approval of the KSC Program Manager and the MSC Program Manager. After 
completion of FRT approval to remove or replace spacecraft flight hardware (compo­
nents, panels, cables, etc.) will require approval of appropriate KSC and MSC personnel. 
KSC will develop written procedures to implement this basic policy, and coordinate it 
with MSC (Mr. Kapryan). 
t. 	 A discussion of the procedure for processing of failed hardware led to reconfirmation 
that MSC makes the decision as to where failure analysis is to be conducted. 
u. 	 MSC will review the paperwork associated with the expeditious return of failed hard­
ware to a vendor for repair and return to the Cape and make appropriate changes to 
facilitate the process. 
v. 	 The return of A€:E Station No.5 from GAEC to the Cape will not take place before 
August 1, 1967 . Therefore checkout at the Cape through the summer of 1967 will be 
limited to 4 ACE stations. KSC will review ACE program development verification, 
number and ex,perience of maintenance personnel and other factors associated with 
utilization of their ACE equipment and will develop by March 1, 1967, any neces­
sary recommendations to assure checkout schedule will support the OMSF official 
working schedule. MSC (Dr. Lanzkron) will provide necessary assistance in consider­
ing the use of MSC ACE equipment to assist in software development. 
w. The Apollo Program Office (OMSF) is developing revised schedules v.n ich will show a 
working schedule based on an earliest possible launch date and assuming clean hard­
ware is delivered from the factory. These dates are to serve as objectives for everyone 
to work toward in an effort to launch as early as hardware will permit and still assure 
miss ion success . This schedule wi 11 recei ve further review and discuss ion du ring the 
time period February 8-10. 
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l si 	 Samuel C. Phillips lsi Joseph F . Shea 
Di rector, Apollo Program Manager, Apollo Spacecraft 
OMSF Program Office, MSC 
l SI 	 John G. Shinkle lSI Rocco A. Petrone 
Manager, Apollo Programs Office Director, Launch Operations 
KSC KSC 
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SPACECRAIT CONFIGURATION 
:\hitudl' Challlhl'l (KI)tn~ . \) \'nsl,s Pad : I~ Plugs Out (KOO:.!I) 
.\LTll'l'DE (:1 L\\IBER 
L'mbilical In 

(:an'y-on Disconlll'Cled 

Watn(;lycol - Illlcrnal Cirn'lation 

II" Tank Pressurilcd with (;:\" 

CI;'Ogcllic (J~ Supplicd hy (;S~: 

Watcr Tallks Filled 

Inner Ilatch Installed 

Outer Patch :\ot Installed 

L \ - Siml'iator Auached 

GSE POYo'er Supplied Throl'gil SI C L'mbilical 

Boost Protective Cover :\ot Installed 

PAD :H 
Umbilical In 
Carry-on Disconnected 
" 'ater-Glycol - Cilculated Thr0l'!~h SpaceClaft Flom GSE 

Gaseous ()'2 Supplied by GSE 

Water Tallks Empty 

luuel Hatch Installed 

Ol'ter Hatch Installed 

\ I a ted to Booster 

Fl~ el Cell Sub~titute L'nit Utilized 

GENERAL INFORMATION (ALTITUDE CHAMBER RUN) 
Dl'1 ing the altitude chambel I un, the spaceclaft was powered up and all systems verified prim 
to crew ingless. After crew ingress, suit integlity tests ale made and the inner hatch is closed. 
The following functions were performed in the listed ordel after inner hatch closure: 
a . Cabin purge and leak check . 
b . Sleep switches installed in cobra cables (not applicable to plugs Out, pad :~4) . 
c. Post ingress swiich list performed . 
d . Logic and pyro bl'sses armed . 
e . \ '11 F n\, C-band transponder and S/ band checked . 
f. Coolant tempelature lowered to 45 :t r, deglees F and the water glycol tlimmed. 
g. Gas chromatogtaph signal checked . 
h . Batiery buS ties placed from off to al'to. 
i. BallelY relay bus, ballery A and B, Cilcuit bleakels closed. 
g. Guidance system put in gyro compassing mode. 
k. The spacecraft was taken up to altitl'de. All testing and miSSion functions from here on were 
performed undel altitude conditions (cabin pressure 5.71 psia , sl~it pressure 6.14 psia). 
This points Out that during the altitl'de runs , minimum testing is accomplished at sea level pressures . 
Whereas during the pad operation all testing is accomplished at sea level pressure . 
The following list itemizes system tests perf01 med on K0034 and KOO:.!1 pi ior to hatch closure: 
ENCLOSURE 7-12 
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:\(lC Opel ,Ilion;" Test 
OSK\" i'l'shbutton Check 
l'plink , \)o\\'nlink Check 
Bank Sl'lll Check 
C·Relay .\Iarm Checks 
(, , :-': Operations Test 
Optics Power·on Tcst 
G:\I(: CLock Alignment 
:-':cgative Delta T 
SCS SCS .\ctivate 
B:\I:\G \\"allll'up 
RF RF System \'IIFJ:\I Test 
C ·Band Test 
Recovel}' Beacon 
\'HF/. \:\I Test 
HF Test 
S·Band and T\' 
l'DL/ L'HF 
COL 
End·to·cnd 
I l"STRUl\l E:-':TAT I 0:-': 
DSE 
Flight Qual Recorder 
ECS (See General ECS Configl'lation) 
The following li~'1 itemizes system tests 
aftel hatch c1osl'le and prior to Iift·off 
altitl~de . 
Cabin Purge and Leak Test 
Auto Water Boiling 
SPS Abort and Reset 
EOS Test 
NOI mal Mission Preps 
Sleep Switches Installed in L"mbilicals 
SPS Engine Gimbaled (MT\'C) 
RCS Static Firing 
Floodlights On 
FCSM SCS in SCS Mode 
FCSM (;~.\ :\10de 
RCS PlOP Isolation Cilcuit llicakeis Closed 
TVC Powel I and 2 On 
Direct RCS On 
SCS Channel Al e :\10de 
:l Engine Out in :\uto :\lodc 
KOII:S.J KOO:lI 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
x 
X 
x 
X 
X 
X X 

X X 

and genelal configl'lation deltas between K0034 and KOO:ll 
for mission run . Coded (a) designates test is perfOlmed at 
KOO34 KOO:ll 
X X 
X(a) 
X(a) 
X 
X(a) X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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1.\' R,III'S III .\UtO .IIIOdl' 
,,',Ill'!' .\("("l'nll.lalOr ill .\\110 ~10l1t­
:\OIl·EsSI'lIlial Tdl"l"OIl lin :\C i 
:\on· E;scnti ,t/ Tdl'cun 011 .\C ~ 
Cryol-:cnir QLalllily .\ll'Ipiilil'l"' ()n 
\)1 illkin!) ,,'a ll'r Sl'pply Oil 
(;,", (:111 olllalUh'Tapil !'and ()II 
(:\01 (nstallcd for K(KI~I) 
Ballcr}, (: 10 :'-(ain Bus .\ .OPI'II 
Ballcl Y C 10 :'-\aill III'S B " 0pl'n 
lIallcl), Ycnt in \ "cnl 
()., ((calcrs in .\UlU 
II:! Fans in ,\UIO 
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ECS PREPARATION PROCEDURE AND SYSTEM TEST 
Comparison of ECS configuration in the manned altitude chamber run OCP K0034 and LIC 
34 OCP K0021 Plugs Out Test. 
GSE WATER GLYCOL ADJUSTMENTS 
ECS Prep (GSE) 

Trim Unit No. 1 and 2 Verification (GSE) 

Refrigeration Unit 1 and 2 Verification (GSE) 

Adjust Rl on S14-140 (GSE) 

Transfer Trim and Refr Units to ACE control 

Transfer accum. quantity to remote (GSE) 

Transfer Trim and Refr units to manual (GSE) 

SIC SYSTEM VERIFICATION 
Cabin Air Fan Checks 
Suit Compressor Checks 
ECS Pump Check 
ECS Oxllant Loop Check 
Pressurize H2 Tanks with N2 
Cabin Temp Control Checks 
Glycol Pump Deadhead Check 
02 Tank Purge 
Suit Circuit Purge 98% 02 (Note 1) 
Cabin Press Using S14·079 at Hatch Adap 
02 Press Relief Valve Crack Press 
02 Press Relief Valve Re~eat Press 
02 Purge 20 Min at 14:7 psia 
02 Purity (Note 3) % in Cabin 
Increase 02 Pressure to (Note 2) Press and 
Perform Leak Check 

Install Hatch Plug 

Install Outer Hatch 

ECS CONFIGURATION PRIOR TO LIFT OFF 
ECS Radiators On 

Battery Vent 

Glycol Compressor Pump 1 on AC 

Cabin Air Fans On 

Suit Compressor Pump 1 on AC 1 

Gas Chromatograph Cabin Auto 

Gas Chromatograph Start 

Waste Tank Inlet Auto 

Potable Tank Inlet Open 

Press Relief Both 

Waste Tank Servicing Valve Closed 

Cabin Repress Closed 

Direct 02 Flow Reg Off 

Pot H20 Heater Off 

KOO34 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
KOO21 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 

X 

X 
X 
X 
X 

X 

X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
0-7-88 

Cabin Temp Auto (R4) Full Deerease X X 

Cabin Temp (S12) Manual X X 

Steam Press (S23) Auto X 

Steam Press (S24) Incr/Deer Enter (OFF) X X 

Temp in (S25). Manual (Note 4) Auto X 

Glycol Evap H20 Flow (S22) OFF (Note 5) X X 

H20 Ind (S1O) Potable X X 

Suit Evap (58) Manual X X 

Waste H20 Tank Refill (S36) OFF X X 

H20 Accum (S26) Auto 1 X X 

H20 Accum (S22) OFF (CTR) X X 

H2 Fans OFF Auto X 

02 Fans OFF X X 

02 Heaters OFF Auto X 

02 Pressure Ind Surge Tank (S28) X X 

H2 Heaters OFF X X 

Suit Ht Exch Gly Evap Note 6 X 

Demand Reg Selector 1 and 2 Note 6 X 

Demand Reg (Suit Test) OFF X X 

Oxygen Surge Tank ON X X 

02 S/M Supply ON X X 

02 Entry ON X X 

Glycol Reservoir Inlet Open X X 

Water and Glycol Tank Press Regulator and 

Relief Nonnal X X 

Glycol Reservoir Bypass Close X X 

Glycol Reservoir Outlet Open X X 

Glycol to Rad Open X X 

Safety Latch OFF X X 

Cabin Press Relief Right (Boost Entry) X X 

Emergency Cabin Pressure OFF X X 

PLSS Fill Valve Closed X X 

02 Main Regulator Normal X X 

Suit Evap OFF X X 

Evap H20 Auto X 

Glycol Reserve OFF X X 

H20 Accumulator 1 and 2 Remote X X 

Glycol Evap Temp in Full Cool X X 

Suit Flow Relief OFF X X 

Suit Evap Glycol ON X X 

Glycol Accumulator ON X X 

Glycol Evap H20 Control Bypass OFF X Bypass 

Suit Circuit Return Air Manual Valve Close X X 

Surge Tank Press Relief Valve Auto X X 

Glycol Press Bypass 1 and 2 ON X X 

Louvers Cabin Open X 

Drinking Water Supply ON X No Info 

Cabin Temp As Is Battery Vent X No Info 

NOTES: 1. Suit loop purge is perfonned twice prior to crew ingress in 0034. 
2. 3-3.5 PSIG OCT 0021 and 5±.2 PSIG in OCP 0034 . 
3. 75% 02 purity required OCP 0034 and 95% 02 purity required OCP 0021 prior to crew 
ingress. 
4. Difference is at 180 K altitude performing water boiling. 
5. On for 3 minutes and then oIT in OCP KOO34 . 
6. Removed by deviation 13-01 to update OCP to latest SW list configuration. 
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A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Materials Work Panel, 8. The task assigned for ac· 
complishment by Panel 8 was prescribed as follows: 
Assemble and summarize data and analyses related to flammability of spacecraft materials. 
Results of other programs as well as Apollo ihall be considered. Requirements for additional test­
ing shall be recommended. Review Apollo test conditions for adequacy. Make recommendations 
for materials or configuration changes to alleviate fire hazard. Perform analyses as appropriate to 
determine overall energy balance, correlations with temperature and pressure buildup, etc. 
In addition to the above briefly summarized Work Statement, a detailed Work Statement was pre­
pared and submitted to the Board on February 1, 1967, which contained the following salient features in 
keeping with above Work Statement: 
1. Assemble, summarize, compare and interpret requirements and data describing the flammability 
of nonmetallic materials exposed to the crew bay environment of the spacecraft and in related appli­
cations. 
2. Specify and authorize performance of tests and/or analyses to furnish additional information as 
to flammability characteristics of these materials alone, and in combination with fluids known or 
postulated to have been in the Spacecraft 012 cabin. 
3. This panel, in support of Panel 5 - Origin and Propagation of Fire shall interpret and imple­
ment the requirements for analyses of debris removed from the spacecraft. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Materials Work Panel: 
Mr. W. Bland, Chainnan,Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. A. Busch, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Dr. A. Staklis, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. W. Riehl, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), NASA 
Mr. A; Archer, North American Aviation, Inc., KSC 
Mr. R. Olsen, North American Aviation, Inc:, Downey 
Mr. E. Welhart, McDonnell Company, St. Louis 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER 
Dr. M. Faget, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA, was assigned to monitor the Materials 
Work Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. APPROACH 
The activities of the Materials Panel were divided into ' three major categories In implementing the 
panel work statement (Ref. 8-74, 8-75, and 8-76): 
a. Determine the nonmetallic materials configuration of Spacecraft (S/C) 012. 
b . Determine combustion characteristics and properties of these materials. 
c. 	Conduct special tests and investigations. 

The special tests and investigations conducted are separated into four broad areas: 

a. Fire Initiation 
b . Fire Propagation 
c. Materials Criteria and Controls 
d. Displays and Information 
Within the fire initiation investigation, several studies were undertaken. These dealt with poten­
tial spark ignition sources, spontaneous ignition sources, and impact ignition sources. 
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The fire propagation investigation was divided into six subcategories. These included the usage 
and properties of flammable materials on SIC 012 and a theoretical analysis of materials com­
bustion . Temperature mapping of SIC 012, the flammability of water/glycol, simulated mockup 
testing of materials configurations similar to SIC 012 and an evaluation of substitute materials for 
flammability were also included. 
The criteria and controls investigation was directed to an evaluation of eXistIng acceptance 
criteria for spacecraft nonmetallic materials located in the crew bay and to a determination of the 
effectiveness of controls of materials usage in design and fabrication. 
The displays and information activity was directed to a determination of methods for presenting 
materials location and usage information, alternate nonflammable materials and materials proper­
ties and characteristics in graphical and usable form. 
Status of the Materials Panel investigation program and special displays were maintained at 
KSC for use by Materials Panel Members and supporting personnel and by other Apollo 204 
Review Board activities. 
2. 	SCOPE OF THE REPORT 
The scope of this report includes the following major categories of investigations: 
a. Configuration of nonmetallic materials, including changes, in SIC 012. 
b. Results of routine materials tests to determine combustion properties. 
3. DETAILED TASK PROCEDURES 
The following sections present technical results of Materials Panel investigations. The presentations 
include the objectives of the study, methods utilized and details of the results . The proceedings pre­
sented in this report are in general abstracted from more detailed reports referenced in Section E, Sup­
porting Data. 
4. NONMETALLIC MATERIALS CONFIGURATION OF SIC 012 COMMAND MODULE 
a. OBJECTIVE 
The nonmetallic materials configuration of SIC 012 was an essential element to evaluate mater­
ials combustibility data, potential ignition sources, propagation paths and intensity. A review of 
existing documentation was undertaken to develop a list of SIC 012 materials and test data. 
b. APPROACH 
A format containing required data was prepared. Data covering as-designed materials config­
uration, as-installed materials configuration from Discrepancy Report Squawks (DRS's) and Test 
Preparation Sheets (TPS's) and test data were included in compiling the SIC 012 nonmetallic 
materials list. . 
c. DATA FORMAT 
The format is divided into four major sections: material description, location in the SIC, test 
information and quantity of material used. A sample data page is provided in Enclosure 8-2, 
Section E. 
d.SOURCES OF DATA 
(l) Design configuration data. Supporting References 8-1 through 8-13 were utilized. 
(2) Test data . Supporting data References 8-14 through 8-27 were utilized. In addition, data 
available from the activities described in 5., "Routine Materials Tests", were added as they be­
came available . Test data at oxygen (02) pressures to 21 psi a covering the major combustible mat­
erials which contributed to the fire were available (Reference 8-91). 
(3) Test conditions for existing data are shown in Table 1. 
(4) Configuration changes. Documentation covering materials added to SIC 012 at KSC was 
reviewed. The documents reviewed included Discrepancy Reports (DR's), DRS's, and TPS's. The 
nonmetallic materials were identified and the amouRt wed Wai noted. Photographs of the SIC as re­
ceived at KSC and photographs of the SIC shortly before the fire were also reviewed for materials 
location and quantity. 
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(5) The crew bay materials usage lists of all contractors and suppliers were assembled into a 
master usage list. This list contains all of the materials that could have been used on SIC 012 but 
is not an as-built configuration list. This means that some of the materials on the list may not 
have been used and others may appear more than once. (Reference 8-28). See Enclosures 8-11 to 
8-17 for location. 
TABLE 1. SOURCE AND TEST CONDITIONS FOR EXISTING MATERIALS DATA 
Note: All vertical tests are downward. 
Source Test 02 Pressure (psia) 
Number of 
Tests 
Collins Flash 15 
(5-64) Fire 15 
Autogenous 
Ignition 
15 
61 
Mass. Inst. of Tech. Flash 5 
(1-67) Fire 5 
Combustion Rate 
(Vertical) 
5 
31 
Hamilton Flash 5 
Standard Fire 5 
Autogenous 
Ignition 
5 
Combustion Rate 
(Horizontal) 
5 
200 
NAA (Hughes) 
(to 1-67) 
Spark Ignition 
to 4000F 
15 
102 
NASA 
(to 12-66) 
Combustion Rate 
(Vertical) 
5 
112 
Brooks Combustion Rate 
(Vertical) 
(Horizontal) 
5 
66 
Grumman Autogenous 
Ignition 
5 
Combustion Rate 
(Horizontal) 
5 
48 
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e. MATERIALS USAGE SUMMARY 
A swnmary of the nonmetallic materials used or suspected of being used in the Command 
Module (C/M) of SIC 012 is presented in Table 2 (Ref. 8-28). 
TABLE 2. MATERIALS USAGE SUMMARY 
Generic Type Products Identified 
Solvents 18 
Lubricants 86 
Foams 82 
Thennal Insulations 7 
Fabrics 395 
Tapes 123 
Encapsulants 164 
Electrical Insulations 185 
Plastics 394 
Elastomers / Rubbers 238 
Paints and Coatings 222 
Laminates 78 
Adhesives 322 
Glass 39 
Command Module, Coolant 1 
Miscellaneous 174 
Total 2,528 
f. MATERIALS ADDED AT KSC 
. Of the listing in Table 2, the following materials shown in Table 3 were added at KSC. (Ref. 
8-55and 8-64). 
TABLE 3. MATERIALS USED IN THE CIM AFl'ER DELIVERY 
Material Category Number of 
Material Types 
Quantities 
( Approximation) 
Adhesives 9 32 ounces 
Lubricants 8 10 ounces 
Paint and Coatings 6 9 ounces 
Encapsulants 6 12 ounces 
Tapes 13 80 square inches 
Solvents 4 Unknown 
Miscellaneous 29 Several instances of large quan­
tities, Ex: 960 inS polyurethane 
foam, 7 lb. Velcro, etc. 
The complete documentation of all DR's, DRS's, TPS's used in preparing this compilation are 
available and were bound into volumes by categories. 
g. ESTIMATED TOTAL QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS 
In addition to the document review a determination was made of the appropriate mass of major 
combustible materials which were directly exposed to the cabin environment (not in closed boxes or 
stowage compartments) in SI C 012 at the time of the accident (Ref. 8-57,8-64) see Table 4. 
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TABLE C-4, ESTIMATED QUANTITIES OF MAJOR COMBUSTIBLES EXPOSED TO CABIN 

ENVIRONMENT ON SIC 012 AT THE TIME OF PLUGS OUT TEST 

Material Function 
Total 
Weight 
(lba) 
Portion In­
stalled at 
KSC (lbs) 
Portion 
which 
was non-
flight (lba) 
NON - GFE MATERIALS 
Velcro Pile Zero-G attachment 
mechanism 
3.9 1.1 
Velcro Hook Zero-G attachment 
mechanism 
5.9 4.5 
Uralane 577 ECU Insulation 5.2 
Pads on floor 2.4 2.4 
Trilock Couch Pads 2.7 
Green Nylon Covering for 02 
suit hoses 
0.2 
Rasche! Knit 
(nylon) 
Debris Net 2.4 1.3 
Cotton Cloth Remove-before-flight tags 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Plexiglas Display panels 
Flood lamp covers 
1.8 
Nylon Webbing Tie-down straps 
Couches 
Storage Compartments 
3.9 
Nylon oxford 
cloth 
GSE Window covers 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Nylon cord Electrical cable 
tie wrap 
9.1 
Nylon tape Crew provisions 
equipment 
Binding for debris 
nets 
5.7 
Paper (non­
flight) 
OCP, Not~ paper 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Paper (flight) Flight/ Preflight 
checklists 
1.0 1.0 
Velostat Covering for Uralane 
floor pads 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
Silicone foam ECS Line insulation 5.0 
GFE MATERIALS 
Cotton cloth Gannents 4.3 
Lexan Visors 3.0 
Nomex fabric Gannents 6.4 
Nylon Oxford Gannents 3.5 
TOTAL 72.5 18.8 10.9 
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Displays have been prepared showing the location of Velcro, Uralane Foam, Raschel Knit and 
Space Suits used in SIC 012 and their location (See enclosures 8-11 to 8-17) . 
h. Nonmetallic Materials Status 
A review of the acceptability and test status of materials identified on this list to the NAA 
MC999-0058 criteria was accomplished. The approved and waiver status of materials in Govern­
ment Furnished Equipment (GFE) to MSC-A-D-66-3 (Ref. 8-85), was also determined. The results 
are reported in a subsequent section on Criteria and Controls. 
i. 	SUMMARY 
The nonmetallic (potentially combustible) materials configuration for the major elements of the 
as-designed configuration of SIC 012 and for the modifications actually installed at KSC was ob­
tained (Ref. 8-28) . Results have been tabulated in a standard format and reviewed for status. Tests 
have been initiated where data were not available. (See Paragraph 9). The precise nonmetallic 
materials configuration of SIC 012 was not obtained. There is some uncertainty about the materials 
used in the black boxes and materials applied during assembly at Downey. 
5. ROUTINE MATERIALS TESTS 
a . 	O~TECTIVE 
As the compilation of data described in Section 4, "Nonmetallic Materials Configuration of SIC 
012 Command Module" proceeded it became evident that test data were not available on the majority 
of materials used. A routine testing program was implemented to develop test data on some of 
these materials at one atmosphere or 16.5 psia oxygen (Ref. 8-31). 
b . PROCEDURE 
Procedures for testing were prepared and accuracies determined using Nomex cloth as a stand­
ard (Ref. 8-80). The following procedures were prepared: 

Nonmetallic Materials Combustion (Propagation) Rate Test 

Autogenous Fire Point Determination 

Flash and Fire Point Determination of Nonmetallic Material 

Combined Thermogravimetric Analysis and Spark Ignition Test 

Electrical Wire Insulation and Accessory Spark Ignition Test 

Electrical Wire Insulation and Accessory Flammability Test 

c. STATUS OF MATERIALS TESTING AS OF MARCH 8,1967 

(Ref. 8-80 and 8-98) 

2,527 Materials identified 	and tabulated 

665 Materials determined to require testing 

474 Materials orders 

446 Materials shipped by supplier 

429 Materials received at MSC 

280 Tests in progress 

245 Tests completed 

d. 	REPORTS 
Additional test results applicable to this Section of the report will be contained in Appendix 
G . Test data are logged in to the Materials List (Ref. 8-28) as they are reported . 
e. RESULTS 	 .. 
Results obtained on several samples of materials used in large quantities in SIC 012 are listed 
in Table 5. Prior test data at 5.0 psia oxygen are also shown for comparison (ref. 8-33 and 8-91). 
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TABLE 5 
Average Downward Flame Propagation Rates (In/Sec) 
Material 
Oxygen Pressure Ratio of Burning 
Rates5.0 psi a 16.5 psia 
Raschel Knit (Blue) 
Velcro Hook (Blue) 
Velcro Pile (Blue) 
Trilock 
Polyurethane Foam 
0.4 1.0 
0.5 0.8 
1.4 2.5 
1.1 1.8 
2.1 4.5 
2.5:1 
1.7:1 
1.8: 1 
1.7:1 
2.2:1 
As stated, the above data are downward rates, i.e., the slowest rate possible at 1 g in 16.5 
psia oxygen pressure. Upward rates are much higher. The average overall rate for materials as in­
stalled in SIC 012 will be much greater than those shown above. 
f. SUMMARY 
The materials which probably contributed heavily to the fire burned at least twice as fast at 
the accident conditions (16.5 psia) than that at which they were evaluated for space flight (5 psia). 
6. SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TESTS - FIRE INITIATION 
Early tests were primarily concerned with materials (solvents and liquids) that might ignite with 
electrostatic sparks or with low energy arcs. 
The extremely low energy reported to ignite solvents and gases in 15 psia of oxygen prompted 
a search for possible presence of solvents in the spacecraft especially as they might be absorbed on 
fla.-nmable solids thereby sensitizing them to ignition and promoting propagation. The approximate 
spark ignition thresholds of flammable solids with and without absorbed solvents and glycol coolants 
were evaluated in laboratory tests . . The electrostatic charging of materials and the space suit were stud­
ied. Arcing ot' audio circuit connectors in various concentrations of a solvent in 16.5 psia oxygen atmos­
phere were also tested. 
Impact ignition In gaseous 16.5 psia oxygen was suggested from liquid oxygen experience and is 
being tested. 
Water/glycol spillage and cleanup simulations on wire bundles and connectors are in progress to 
study corrosion-induced short circuits and electrical heating or arc ignitions. 
Spontaneous ignition was also evaluated as a potential source mechanism (Ref. 8-33). 
a. 	RETENTION OF SOLVENTS 
OBJECTIVE 
Investigate the contribution towards the fire of any solvent absorbed by the more widespread 
non- metallic materials in the cabin by evaluating solvent evaporation data and analysis. 
PROCEDURE 1 
Air-dried samples were weighed, saturated with liquid solvent, and allowed to air-dry until 
essentially free of solvent while being weighed. 
RESULTS 1 
Velcro hook samples soaked in methyl-ethyl-ketone (MEK} for ten minutes absorbed 3.2 x 
10-5 Ib in2 of solvent. When evaporated into 50-percent relative humidity 75°F room air, they 
retained as much as 4O-percent of the solvent for 5 hours (Ref. 8-103). 
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PROCEDURE 2 
Tests with samples of Velcro pile. Uralane. Velostat covered Uralane. and couch material satu­
rated with MEK for approximately V2 ininute. air-dried for either 15 minutes or for I hour and then cov­
ered so that evaporation from the material had to take place by diffusion under the edge of an inverted 
20 cc conical cover were conducted as described in Ref. 8-41. These tests were designed to deter­
mine the likelihood of vapor entrapment by equipment placed on saturated materials. 
RESULTS 2 
Diffusion of MEK and air under the edge took place rapidly. Vapor concentration fell below 
the 1.9-percent lean limit of flammability in less than 1 1/2 hours (Ref. 8-103). However, the 
results would be modified (l) if the edges of the material were sealed, (2) if the materials were 
not allowed to dry or (3) if the ratio of edge area to volume were very smalL In these cases evapo­
ration would be reduced and trapped pockets and/or heavy film layers of flammable mixture 
solvent vapors could have e~sted at the time of the fire. 
SUMMARY 
Velcro hook material can become saturated (after 10 minutes) with small amounts of MEK 
(3.2 x 1O-51b/in2). When exposed to a 50-percent relative humidity, 75°F environment the solvent 
retention in the sample decreases after 5 hours to 40-percent of the total amount absorbed. 
Combustible concentrations of MEK solvent were not released into air from wetted Velcro 
pile, Uralane foam and couch material except for a short 1 1/2 hour period under conditions 
which restricted diffusion of vapor and air through the material to an area under the edge of the 
covering object. 
The presence of significant volumes of concentrated solvent vapor in the spacecraft is unlikely. 
However. the retention of solvents in the surface layers of solid flammable materials could possibly 
contribute to their ignition (Ref. 8-103) . 
b . 	MATERIALS ODOR EVALUATION 
OBJECTIVE 
Odors resembling "sour milk" and MEK (see Materials Time Line, Enclosure 8-8) were 
reported . The objective of this analysis was to identify potential sources of these odors. 
RESULTS 
The evaluation of the "sour milk" odor involved the review of the K-bottle 0<.2 analyses, the 
Beckman Analyzer analyses, a gas sample taken at the crew mouthpiece and earlier sample analyses 
from August 29, 1966 to January 23, 1967. The review of the K-bottle analyses revealed no unusual 
impurities and the gas analyses met specifications as required. The analysis of gas from the two 
Beckman Oxygen Analyzers revealed no significant information on "sour milk" odor. 
The gas sample taken at the crew mouthpiece on January 27, 1967 revealed approximately 
400 ppm of unidentified hydrocarbons which could contribute to an odor condition (lab report 
Number TS75381 indicated odor to be of human origin). 
A summary of previous analyses including earlier manned altitude testing samples revealed 
no significant information to identify any "sour milk" odor. 
Re-Interrogation of witnesses revealed the following: 
(l) There were no reports to the contrary that "only very minor amounts of solvent were 
introduced to the cabin on January 27, 1967" and these were by way of slightly dampened, 
wiping materials. No "spillage" or "dripping" of solvents was recalled. 
(2) There was agreement that no one smelled anything of significance in the cabin dur­
ing hatch closeout activity. 
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(3) There was general agreement that the strongest odors were detected at initiation of 
the first (20 minutes) cabin purge operations, approximately 3:32 pm EST, and decreased 
toward a "slightly detectable" level at completion of the second (10 minute) cabin purge 
operation approximately 4:18 pm EST. The odor was detected both within the white room 
and outside on Level A-8. There , is also evidence which tends to indicate that this odor was 
was emitting from the steam duct just below the lower edge of the cabin hatch. An on-site 
review revealed that the configuration could allow some of the flow of gas from the steam 
duct to be deflected up into the white room and some of it could also be deflected downward 
into the general area of Level A-8. The other emission points of this odor were at the gas 
analyzer inlet bleed port and at the analyzer squeeze bulb exhaust port . Odors were de­
tected at these points during environmental sample extraction. 
(4) Description of the odor by the persons interrogated was that it was (1) MEK, (2) 
smelled "like" MEK, or (3) smelled like a solvent. 
It appears that a fair degree of uncertainty is. associated with identification of odors. Data 
indicate that the first threshold of smell for solvents such as MEK and isopropyl alcohol is ap­
proximately 0.01 percent to 0 .03 percent by volume. The concentration that might be described 
as strong, irritating, and/or sickening is in the range of 1 percent to 4 percent by volume. 
Samples of gas taken from the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) prior to the accident and 
also from the reassembled GSE system at the site provided negative results on significant hydro­
carbon content. Solvents initially in the GSE would have been purged dry in the process of cabin 
purging. There is no reason to expect that further investigation will uncover a proof of solvents 
Introduced by the GSE system. 
SUMMARY 
No particular suspect item was identified as emlttmg a "sour milk" odor although some of 
the Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) potting compounds have distinct , pungent odors that 
probably come closest to fitting this odor description. 
It is possible that accumulated solvent vapors could have been expelled through the steam duct 
during cabin purge. 
Since the Command Pilot opened his faceplate for approximately 4 minutes at 6:19 pm EST 
and did not report significant odor concentrations it is likely that there were no solvent mixture 
concentrations in open areas (areas where the cabin fan produced reasonable flow). It should be 
noted that outward flow from the faceplate opening does not preclude cabin odor detection. 
There is no evidence that significant concentrations or organic vapors existed in the spacecraft 
at the time of the accident (Ref. 8-54). 
c. 	ELECTROSTATIC SPARK IGNITION 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective was to investigate the possibility of generation of sufficient electrostatic energy 
by movement of a suited astronaut to ignite combustible fuel-oxygen mixtures and materials of the 
type ~ound in the SIC. Solid materials with remnant solvent had to be evaluated to determine 
required energy for ignition (Ref. 8-29). 
PROCEDURES AND RESULTS 
(1) Nylon fabrics, Raschel knits. polyethylene and neoprene were tested by rubbing with 
nylon. Only the nylon materials had appreciable charges generated on them at 50 percent 
relative humidity . Those that did not develop charges at 50 percent were tried again at 8 per­
cent relative humidity and found to be still without appreciable charge (Ref. 8-32). 
(2) In the laboratory a suit on a subject was charged by rubbing with nylon. He sat and 
then reclined on a linoleum covered metal table used to simulate spacecraft couches. Volt­
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ages and energies induced were somewhat higher than the values later obtained in the space­
craft itself. 
Capacity measurements were made using a 60 cps capacitance bridge and a radio fre­
quency capacity meter. For the reclining subject they ranged from 500 to 600 picofarads. 
For the metal parts of the suit an increase over the theoretical values is explainable by coupled 
capacity of other objects such as the suit neoprene bladder and other metal parts. 
TABLE 6 
Muimum Voltages Induced and Energies Calculated 
Item Potential, KV 
Energy, 
Millijoules (mj) 
Neck ring 
Exhaust fitting 
Inlet fitting 
Zipper 
Wrist ring 
Subject and EKG lead 
2.1 
2.2 
2 .2 
1.7 
1.9 
3.3 
1.36 
0.15 
0.15 
0.56 
1.1 
3.75 
Resistances to ground which were measured at 109 to lOll ohms would result in some loss 
of electrostatic energy during the process of measurement. 
(3) A suited subiect in CIM 014 at 8 percent relative humidity showed it was possible to 
obtain comparable capacitances to ground as in the laboratory. The subject's motion on the 
couch resulted in the generation of one (1) KV (Ref. 8-104 and 8-105). 
(4) Capacitance spark tests showed that certain materials are ignitable by spark energies 
as follows (Ref. 8-79): 
Materia! Dry Damp 
U ralane foam 
Cotton (constant wear 
garment) 
Velcro 
190 mj 
g 
g 
40 mj (MEK and isopropyl alcohol) 
210 mj (dampened with face oil) 
200 mj (ethylene glycol) 
" No ignition up to 300 mj 
SUMMARY 
Sufficient electrostatic energy (about 4 mj) can be stored on a suited astronaut to ignite MEK 
vapor and methane in 14.7 psia 02 (0.002 to 0.004 mj required) (Ref. 8-42). Samples of suit and 
other spacecraft materials were not ignited by this energy level even when soaked in combustible 
fluids which were then allowed to evaporate for about 5 hours in a laboratory environment before 
being subjected to the spark test. 
d. 	COBRA CABLE SPARK IGNITION TEST 
OBJECTIVE 
Reports of Cobra Cable connect-disconnect actions immediately prior to the fire were received. 
A test . was designed to investigate the possibility of igniting flammable MEK mixtures in high con­
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centrations of gaseous oxygen. This was accomplished by breaking and mating spacecraft connectors 
with power applied. For the test, two cables were fabricated using spacecraft approved materials 
and spacecraft qualified Deutsch Connectors. 
PROCEDURE 
The test setup consisted of three power circuits routed through the Deutsch Connectors in the 
pressure chamber to loads outside the chamber. The loads were identical to the circuit loads used 
in CIM 012. The communications load was an identical impedance (600 ohms) to that of a pressure 
suit helmet headset. The biomedical load was a physio-simulator. The simulator has a DC-DC con­
verter which is flight-qualified and identical to the three used by astronauts in SIC 012. The con­
verter had an input impedance of 300 ohms when loaded. 
The spacecraft microphone amplifiers were powered from a 28-volt DC battery through a series­
dropping resistor. Therefore, the spacecraft power source did not present any significant inductance. 
The test power supplies did present some inductances, since no dropping resistor was used. This 
test, therefore, presents a more severe arcing condition than the spacecraft system which was simu­
lated. 
Three separate AC to DC rectifier / transformer power supplies were used, one for the right 
microphone 16.8 VDC, one for the left microphone 16.8 VDC and one for the biomedical con­
verter 28.2 VDC (Ref. 8-48 and 8-49) . 
RESULTS 
With the circuit previously described increasing concentrations of solvent were established in 
the pressure chamber.During the first test the chamber was filled with air at ambient conditions. 
In the ambient condition the Deutsch Connectors were separated three times under circuit load. 
During the connector breaks 200-frame-per-second 16 mm pictures were taken to record any sparks 
or ignition. No sparks or ignitions were noted either visually at the time or on the film. 
The second test setup was run with 97-percent oxygen at ambient in the chamber. The oxygen 
concentration requirement was 96-percent o~ greater. Chemical analysis revealed the oxygen concen­
tration to be greater than 97-percent. With power on the circuit the connectors were separated a 
minimum of two times. No sparks were generated with sufficient energy to ignite the connector. 
Other tests were performed with MEK concentrations of 2.0-percent, 4.0-percent, 8.0-percent, 
and saturated (less than 15.4-percent with the remaining atmosphere having an oxygen concentration 
of greater than 97-percent. A minimum of three separations and remates were performed at each 
mixture level. No sparks were initiated with sufficient energy to ignite the mixtures. 
Modification No. 1 reconfigured the circuitry so that the current was increased to 150 mao 
This is 2.5 times maximum operating current which approximates the worse case. Namely, the 
maximum current drain encountered if the biomedical power were shorted in the spacesuit umbilical. 
The connectors were separated several times. with 4.0-percent gaseous volume of MEK in the 
chamber. No sparks were generated of sufficient energy to ignite the mixture. 
Modification No. 2 configured the circuitry so that single wired pins could be pulled at 60 ma, 
28 VDC (normal operating conditions). The pins were pulled twice at MEK concentration of 
4.0-percent and once at 15.0 percent. No sparks were generated with sufficient energy to ignite the 
mixture. No sparks were seen by an observer or recorded on the high speed film (Ref. 8-48 and 
8-49). 
SUMMARY 
Separating simulated Cobra Cable audio and biomed 16-volt circuits produced neither visible 
arcs nor ignition. Separations of connections at maximum nominal power with MEK-saturated 02 
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and at 2.5 times nominal power in MEK concentrations to 4 percent, all in 16.4 psia oxygen 
produced no ignition. Tests using flight type Cobra Cables with audio center loads and battery 
power supply will be reported in Appendix G . 
e. 	IMPACT SENSITIVITY OF MATERIALS IN COX 
OBJECTIVE 
I t is known that many materials in contact with liquid oxygen (LOX) are capable of exploding 
or igniting when subjected to mechanical shock or some other sudden energy surge. Organic mater­
ials of the type used in SI C 012 such as netting, lubricants, foams and Velcro are examples of 
ignitable substances. 
Whether such materials form impact-sensitive hazards in low-pressure gaseous oxygen was un­
known . Thus it was decided to investigate the feasibility of this method of fire initiation in gaseous 
oxygen at 16.5 psia and with typical flammable materials in SI C 012. 
RESULTS 
A standard method of evaluating the compatibility of materials with LOX has been used by 
Marshall Space Flight Center. The test equipment is shown in Reference 8-30. The test equip­
ment was modified to permit impact of materials in contact with gaseous oxygen at slightly above 
atmospheric pressures. This corresponds to spacecraft conditi,ons . Impacts are applied by a 20 lb 
plummet falling 43 inches and delivered through a I j 4-in. diameter striker pin face (less than 72 
foot-pound). The chamber was purged with sufficient oxygen to maintain a 5 psig differential 
for fifteen minutes then bled off to 16.7 psia prior to impact. 
The following materials were tested under impact in contact with gaseous oxygen (GOX). 
Each was applied to a I-inch diameter disc of aluminum for test purposes: 
Velcro Hook (pressure-sensitive adhesive backing) 
Velcro Pile (pressure-sensitive adhesive backing) 
Velcro Hook and Pile together (pressure-sensi tive adhesive backing) 
Velcro Hook - Cross-cut grooves to expose adhesive 
Velcro Pile - Cross-cut grooves to expose adhesive 
Velcro Hook - Creased intentionally during application 
Velcro Pile - Creased intf!ntionally during application 
Rasche! Knit 
Six Ve!cro hook samples were run. No fires resulted but in two of these burnt odors resulted. 
Three samples of Velcro pile on the hook were run . In these one burnt odor was detected and 
one sample ignited and burned vigorously. Of three samples of Raschel Knit impacted to date two 
ignited and burned (Ref. 8-30). 
SUMMARY 
These tests have shown that mechanical impacts on Velcro or Raschel Knit in contact with 
16.5 psia 02 can produce ignition and burning., A survey of spacecraft loose and movable objects 
revealed no possible high-impact condition on flammable materials . 
£. AUTOGENOUS IGNITION SCREENING TEST OF SIC 012 MATERIALS 
OBJECTIVE 
Tests were undertaken to determine if combinations of solvents and materials could lead to 
unusually low spontaneous ignition temperatures in the oxygen atmospheres used in the SIC 012 test. 
PROCEDURES 
The tests were run in stainless steel pressure vessels equipped with a viewing port, thermo­
couple and a method of maintaining a 16.5 psi O2 atmosphere together with a heat source. All 
samples were exposed to programmed heating, culminating at 400"F for ten minutes. They were 
then examined . Samples for gas chromatographic analysis were taken . 
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Materials which have a significant capacity for absorption of solvents such as foams and fabrics 
were tested in the as-received condition . This was done after soaking in methyl-ethyl-ketone, iso­
propyl alcohol, 50-50 ethylene glycol / water and in various combinations of these f,Juids . Samples 
. were allowed to dry for approximately , 5 hours prior to testing. Materials exposed to trese tests 
were as follows : 
Uralane Foam 

Velostat 

Velcro (various colors), Hook and Pile 

Raschel Knit 

Trilock 

Materials tested without solvents were as follows: (Ref. 8-46 and 8-93) 

Epon 828 Minn Hon 6745A Oil 

Mystic Tape Bray Oil Lube 812 

DC 4 Lubricant PR 240 AC Lubricant 

Rayclad Sleeving Versilube 300 

EC 1469 Adhesive DC 33 Lubricant 

Aero Shell Grease NOPCO Foam A 206 

AiResearch Grease 3M, No. 27 Tape 

DC 30-121 Nomex-HT-1 Suit Fabric 

Epon 828 + Versamid RTV 90 Encapsulant 

115 RTV 577 Encapsulant 

Stycast 1090 RTV 560 Encapsulant 

Epon 934 Organoceram 

EC 1469 

SUMMARY 

No autogenous igmtlOn of materials tested was detected at or below the 400°F test limit even 
samples treated with cleaning solvents. 
g. 	EFFECT OF WATER/ GLYCOL ON WIRE BUNDLES 
OBJECTIVE 
This task was undertaken to determine the effects of spacecraft cabin environment on electrical 
wire bundles of S IC 012 types which had been exposed to water / glycol at some previous time. 
I t has previously been observed that flammable aircraft wire insulation such as polyvinylchloride 
(PVC) and nylon may burst into sustained flames in air even though adequately protected with 
circuit breakers. This can occur provided the following conditions are present: 
(1) Insulation on adjacent wires is damaged to the conductors. 
(2) Sufficient moisture is presen\ to bridge the darriaged areas . 
(3) An electrical potential exists between the conductors of the damaged wires . (Ref. 8-38, 
8-39 & 8-78) . 
These we~wire fires were observed without tripping circuit protective devices because the 
current through the wires may be as low as 10 percent to 20 percent of the regular wire cur­
rent at the time of ignition. The above results were recorded in a Lockheed Company film 
(Ref. 8-92 and 8-94) . 
The present task was undertaken to determine whether spacecraft wire bundles were suscept­
ible to fire initiation and propagation as observed in the Lockheed tests . 
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PROCEDURE 
Tests are in progress at NASA Manned Spacecraft Center on wire bundles. The test procedure 
includes a method for keeping the wire bundles moist with the water/glycol solution. Several wires 
in each bundle have intentionally-damaged wire insulation. The tests will be continued for at least 
several months to verify whether or not the effect of the water/glycol is appreciable. 
In a special test Teflon covered shielded wire that had been purposely cut through to the con­
ductor and exposed to ECS coolant caught fire. The fire occurred after about 8 hours in ambient 
atmosphere with less than 5 amperes passing through the conductor. The coolant was applied as 
droplets into the damaged area (Ref. 8-107) . 
SUMMARY 
Initial test results show that fire initiation is possible. Additional test results applicable to this 
section of the report will be contained in Appendix G. 
h . 	EFFECT OF WATER/GLYCOL ON CONNECTOR ASSEMBLIES 
OBJECTIVE 
Water / glycol coolant spillage occurred on a number of wire bundles and connectors used in 
SIC 012. The objective of this test program is to evaluate the effect of water/glycol and of the 
cleaning procedures used on SI C 012 on connectors similarto those used in SIC 012. 
PROCEDURE 
A series of tests have been defined to determine the effects of water/glycol spillage on wire 
bundle assemblies with connectors. A total of twenty-nine harness assemblies were ordered from 
NAA Downey for this testing. The assemblies are as follows: 
V16-420337, C05W5-P91 5 assemblies 
V16-420303, C05W5-P167 5 assemblies 
V16-420308, C03W15-P50 5 assemblies 
V16-420307, C03W15-P58 5 assemblies 
V16-420316, COIWI-J94 5 assemblies 
836598-1-1 1 assembly 
836600-1-1 1 assembly 
836602-1-1 1 assembly 
836599-1-1 1 assembly 
These wire harness assemblies were selected since they represent harnesses that have been sub­
jected to water/glycol (MBO 110-006, Type II) spillage on SIC 012. These harnesses are ECU 
cable harnesses, SCS- ECA cable harnesses and spacecraft harness assemblies located under the ECU. 
The test environment is 75°F, 100 percent oxygen at 14.7 psia. These types of tests will be 
carried out as follows: (Ref. 8-83) 
(1) Test A - Dip the cables and connectors in water/glycol for 30 seconds and allow to 
drip dry. Disassemble the connectors and clean per the procedures used on SIC 012. Rejoin 
the connectors and apply spacecraft voltages and currents and monitor the results. 
(2) Test B - Test B is the same as Test A except the connectors are not cleaned and dried. 
(3) Test C - Immerse the cables and connectors in a bath of water/glycol in the 02 atmos­
phere. Apply spacecraft voltage and currents and record all readings. Allow the wire bundles 
and connectors to remain immersed in the water / glycol solution and continuously record circuit 
resistances. 
Tests A and C will be run at KSC while Test B will be run at White Sands Test Facility. 
SUMMARY 

Test results applicable to this section of the report will be contained III Appendix G . 
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1. 	REVIEW OF KSC CONNECTOR TEST WITH WATER/GLYCOL 
OBJECTIVE 
A test conducted during October and November 1966 at KSC on a connector which had been 
subjected to ethylene glycol in which shorting occurred under DC load came to the attention of the 
Panel. This test was investigated for applicability ot the fire investigation. 
RESULTS 
A review as contained in Ref. 8-66 and 8-67 of test requirements, objectives, test techniques 
and results related to the special test show that test personnel were properly concerned about the 
effects of water/glycol spillage on spacecraft electrical equipment. To evaluate the effect of water/ 
glycol on SIC connectors they chose to apply a worse-case condition to a worse-configuration space­
craft-type electrical connector in a set of laboratory . tests to check the effectiveness of a proposed 
vacuum-environment cleaning technique. Accordingly, a spacecraft-type connector partially equipped 
with pins and wires but without plugs in unused pin holes or potting applied to the exposed ends 
of the connector was dipped in a water/glycol solution of the type used in the C/M. This resulted 
in water/glycol being introduced directly into the components of the connector. After a number of 
operations involving resistance measurements, vacuum drying, room air storage, disassembly, clean­
ing, washing in water/glycol solution, reassembly and "drip drying," the connector was tested with 
active AC and DC circuits. The DC circuit failed because of an internal short. A later test at less 
voltage (28 compared to 35) was run for about the same length of time without failure. 
SUMMARY 
In analyzing test techniques, test results and statements made by the main participants in this 
test, it appears that the environment and the hardware were not representative of spacecraft equip­
ment or environment but represent an extreme set of conditions which have not been known to 
exist in SIC operation., Thus, 'the results are not directly applicable to Apollo SIC equipment. Cur­
rently planned laboratory tests of real spacecraft connectors and cables wetted with water / glycol 
constitute a better source to judge the hazard of such events . 
. 7. RESULTS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TESTS - FIRE PROPAGATION 
This section of the report deals with investigations and tests to evaluate the propagation of the 
fire. 
The effect of foam insulation burning in 16.5 psi a oxygen on aluminum oxygen supply lines in 
causing failure to these lines was evaluated. Investigations of the leakage of water/glycol solutions and 
residue were also undertaken. Temperature mapping of SIC 012 based on the condition of materials in 
various locations was investigated. The correlation of Command Module mockup tests with the SIC 012 
configuration and condition was also investigated. 
An analysis of combustion characteristics of materials was undertaken to evaluate the SIC 012 non­
metallic materials configuration from a combustibility standpoint. 
a. 	EFFECT OF BURNING FOAM INSULATION ON OXYGEN LINES 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of these tests was to determine if burning foam insulation on aluminum oxygen 
supply lines in 16.5 psia oxygen could cause failure of these lines. 
PROCEDURE 
Uralane foam insulation was placed in separate tests . on and under oxygen lines and ignited 
in 16.5 psia oxygen. Foam thickness and weight was selected to duplicate the amounts used on 
SIC 012. The oxygen lines were selected to represent lines used in SIC 012 (1/4-inch outer diam­
eter, .035-inch wall thickness). 
Normal oxygen flow was maintained in these lines throughout the test. The following specific 
tests are planned: 
D-8-17 
(1) Foam insulation around a 100 psi a aluminum line. 
(2) Foam insulation placed under a 100 psia aluminum line. 
(3) Foam insulation near a soldered joint of a 100 psia aluminum line. 
(4) Foam insulation placed under a 900 psia aluminum line. 
(5) Insulation and lines configured as in SIC 012 per test request. 
RESULTS 
Tests number 1 and number 2 are completed. No failure of the aluminum lines occurred when 
the foam insulation was burned (Ref. 8-98). 
SUMMARY 
Foam insulation representative of a single insulated line as installed in the SIC 012 ECU when 
burned in a 16.5 psia oxygen does not cause failure of a 1/ 4-inch, .035-inch wall thickness, 100 
psi a aluminum oxygen line. 
Results from the remainder of the tests pertinent to this section of the report will be reported 
in Appendix G. 
Additional tests are planned to determine the effect of a burning foam on soldered joints and 
900 psia oxygen lines and lines configured as in SIC 012. These additional test results applicable 
to this section of the report will be contained in Appendix G . 
b. 	WATER/ GLYCOL LEAKAGE IN SPACECRAFT 

OBJECTIVE 

It was postulated that water / glycol (Ref. 8-96 and 8-97) leakage in S I C 012 could have con­
tributed to the propagation or initiation of the fire. This study was initiated to determine the in­
stances of water / glycol spillage'in S / C 012, 009, 011, 017, and BP 014. 
RESULTS 
General: A review of documentation w~s conducted to determine the extent of water / glycol 
leakage in SIC 008, 009, 011, 012, 017, and BP 014. The records disclose that the water / glycol 
was MB0110-006 Type II. The following summary is a result of the review: 
Vehicle Instances Total Leakage 
Number (Oz.) 
SI C 008 1 16 
SI C 009 1 2 
SI C 011 6 52 
SI C 012 6 90 
BP 014 14 96 - 160 (est) 
S/COI7 7 Unknown 
No failures of spacecraft or boilerplate cables, harnesses, components or connectors have been 
attributed to the effects of water / glycol leakage. 
S I C 012 The following instances of water / glycol leakage have been recorded against the ECS 
of SI C 012. 
(1) ECU Removal at Downey - 2 pints . Approximately 2 pints of water / glycol leaked dur­
ing ECU removal at Downey on August 12, 1966. 
(2) Glycol Diverter Valve at KSC - Few tablespoonsful. On September 15, 1966 the glycol 
diverter valve was noted to be leaking at the rate of "approximately one drop/minute" (DR 
SIC 0188). This situation was corrected by adjusting the valve mounting bracketry to relieve 
the side loading effects which apparently were causing the leak. The DR was closed on Sept­
ember 26, 1966. The leakage had not caused other components or wire bundles to become 
wetted with water / glycol. 
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(3) Cold Plate IMU Supply Line, Weld Joint at KSC - 1 pint. On"September 28, 1966 
"three water/glycol leaks" were noted to be in existence "behind inverters - Lower Equipment 
Bay" (DR SIC 0289). The leakage was corrected by the replacement of existing solder unions 
with B-nuts and union. Following leak check and re-insulation of the affected lines the area 
exposed to water / glycol, including electrical connectors, was wiped with distilled water applied 
from a squeeze bottle, blown dry with GN2' flushed with "denatured alcohol" from a squeeze 
bottle and dried again with GN2' The electrical connectors were cleaned "inside and out". 
The subject DR (0289) was closed on September 30, 1966. DR-0305 was initiated against 
the water/ glycol contamination to electrical connectors and wire harnesses which resulted from 
the leak documented on DR-0289 . DR-0305 was closed by referencing the cleaning steps which 
were taken on DR-0289. 
(4) Transducer CF0550 Removal/ Rotation at KSC-2 pints (Oct. 11, 1966). The spillage 
of water-glycol which occurred during the operations documented on DR SI C 0436 was con­
trolled to the extent that no water / glycol contamination of components or wire bundles was 
incurred. 
(5) Pump Leak (1st) ECU Servicing at KSC - 1/ 2 cup (Nov. 30, 1966). Following ECU 
removal and subsequent investigation at AiResearch it was found that some evidence of leakage 
existed on the water/glycol pump flanges. Although leakage at this point in the system could 
not be verified the isolation of the leakage point to the pump flange area was the "best guess" 
available. (Reference DR SI C 0737). 
TPS SIC 418 documents the tests which were performed on the ECU at AiResearch. The 
only leak source which could be determined was in the area of the pump filter housing. The 
observed leak was very minor (documented as "one drop" IDR 001, TPS SI C 418) . 
. (6) Pump Leak (2nd) Servicing at KSC - 1/ 4 cup (Dec. 20, 1966). DR SI C 0811, which 
is still open, documented a water / glycol leak which " seeped down I-beam and extended to 
the wire harness on the C / M floor". The area was dried and the water/ glycol did not 
reappear. The DR was to remain open until after the FRT (OCP-K-0028) at which time 
it would be closed. 
The leak source was documented as being " exclusively associated with (water / glycol) ser­
vicing" . Through 1830 on January 27, 1967 no failures on SIC 012 cables, harnesses, or con­
nectors were attributed to the effects of water / glycol leakage. Total leakage 90 ounces (estimat­
ed). 
From a review of the referenced documentation it may be concluded that the only water / 
glycol leak which wetted nearby electrical connectors and components was the leak at the 
solder joint at the IMU coldplate water / glycol supply line. The other leaks apparently did 
not contaminate electrical components or wire bundles. The water /glycol from the IMU cold­
plate leak wetted several connectors. These connectors were demated and cleaned to eliminate 
the possibility of water-glycol contamination inside the connector. The affected connectors 
were: 
Yaw ECA: J -96, J -95, J -94, J -93, J -92 
Auxiliary ECA: J-97, J -98, .1-99, J-100 
Pitch ECA: J-101,J-102,J-103,J-I04,J·105 
Each of these connectors was cleaned by water flush-gaseous nitrogen (GN2) dry-denatured 
alcohol flush-GN 2 dry method. Each of the referenced connectors was potted . 
During the inspection of the area in the C / M which could have been contaminated by 
the coldplate leak, black boxes were removed in sequence until the inspection of connectors 
and cables revealed that water / glycol had not reached the specific area being inspected. At 
that time the ECA . units noted were determined to be the only units affected by the leak 
(Ref.8-70). 
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SUMMARY 
There have been 35 instances of water/glycol leakage on the Spacecraft listed with a total leak­
age of approximately 320 ounces including the 6 instances and 90 ounces on SIC 012. There have 
been no failures of cables, harnesses, connectors or components attributed to water/glycol leakage. 
The 14 connectors which were wetted with water/glycol on SIC 012 were dernated .and cleaned. 
c. 	FLAMMABILITY OF WATER/GLYCOL RESIDUES 
OBJECTIVE 
It was desired to determine whether a thin film of water/glycol on a surlace (from a drip or 
stream along the floor or wall) could be ignited at room temperature or slightly above by a flame 
impinging directly on the liquid surface_ 
PROCEDURE 
Tests were made in which a flame was applied directly on the surlace of a thin film of water / 
glycol/inhibitor !TIixture, pure glycol and films of the CIM coolant mixtures after exposure to vac­
uum. All flammability tests were conducted in 14.7 psia oxygen. 
RESULTS 
(1) Fifty drops of C/M coolant spread onto a 3-inch x 3-inch glass plate and a 1/8-inch 
x 3-inch x 3-inch aluminum plate would not propagate a flame in 14.7 psia O2 when ignited 
by a 1/2-inch diameter 1-1/2-inch long paper cylinder. Burning of the coolan't immediately 
adjacent to the paper produced small flashes and sparks for about a one-inch radius around the 
fire. 
(2) The same test using C/M coolant fluid was perlormed using stainless steel plate with a 
1/16-inch deep "V" groove. Ten drops of coolant were placed in the groove and five drops 
on the paper cylinder. The paper burned for 90 seconds and there was some progression along 
the groove as the plate heated. 
(3) A test similar to (2) but using pure ethylene glycol took 3 to 5 seconds to propagate 
along the groove. 
(4) The same test using C/M coolant fluid was perlormed on aluminum and stainless steel 
plates after 18, 24, 46, and 48-hour storage in room air. The fire burned out in both cases 
in about 10 seconds leaving about two thirds of the coolant on the plate. There was some 
sparking around the flame in all cases. 
(5) When the 50 drops of standard coolant fluid on an aluminum plate was held under 
reduced pressure about 80 hours and then ignited the fire spread to the residue and was 
visible over the entire surface. The residue burned completely within 15 seconds after ignition. 
The same test on a stainless steel plate with a coolant exposed to dynamic vacuum for 9-1/2 
hours shows partial burning of the coolant film. 
(6) Tests performed by Raychem Corporation also showed that the evaporation residue 
from water/glycol will propagate a flame (Ref. 8-1(0). 
(7) A test was conducted to determine if Teflon insulated wire soaked with water/glycol 
would propagate a flame. This test simulated the wiring in the SCS junction box which was 
burned in SIC 012. None of the samples would propagate a flame when ignited (Ref. 8-40 
and 8-77). 
SUMMARY 

In 14.7 psia oxygen: 

(1) A pure ethylene glycol film on a stainless steel plate will propagate a flame at room 
temperature . 
(2) Water content in the C/M coolant will prevent flame propagation on thin films. Air 
drying for 48 hours does not produce a combustible mixture. 
(3) Films of C/M coolant placed on horizontal stainless steel or aluminum plates and ex­
posed to vacuum for extended periods at room temperature will propagate a flame if ignited. 
(4) Residues from previous C/M coolant spills in SIC 012 could have provided a fuel. 
(5) Single wires and three-wire bundles were soaked with water-glycol and either air-dried 
or vacuum-dried and did not propagate a flame. 
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d . TEMPERATURE MAPPING OF SIC 012 
OBJECTIVE 
A study was initiated to detennine the major heat zones In SI C 012. Samples of nylon Velcro 
were used which had been heated to various temperatures . As part of this study the materials in 
the SI C , ore evaluated to dctemline which ones would allow ready comparison of hot and cool 
zones m the spacecraft. 
PROCEDURE 
Combustible materials were used throughout the spacecraft including nylon Raschel Knit and 
some plastic buttons or knobs on panels . Some of these were damaged but not entirely consumed. 
The reference material selected was Velcro. Samples of nylon Velcro were heated in an oxygen 
atmosphere at 16 psi a at the White Sands Test Facility Laboratories. Each specimen was stopped 
at its assigned temperature, preserved, and photographed for degree of damage and color . Speci­
ments were obtained for each 50"F increment between 300"F and 600"F. 
RESULTS 
The evidence that the fire was more intense on the left side than on the right side is summar­
ized as follows: 
Type/Degree of Damage
Material 
Left Side Right Side 
Aluminum Panels Blistered and whitened No blistering. Some panels almost 
undamaged. 
Velcro Mostly burned off. Some 
of the patches are only 
partially burned. 
Largely surface burning. Patches 
melted and dripped more than they 
burned. 
Teflon Insulation Extensive damage. On some 
wires the insulation is com­
pletely burned. 
Mostly surface damage. 
In general combustible materials were burned throughout the spacecraft particularly on the 
floor and around the sides. The materials listed subsequently which were in the SI C at the time 
of the fire were evaluated and an estimate of their role in the fire is as follows: 
DEBRIS NETS - Virtually consumed or melted . These were probably instrumental in 
propagating the fire around the SIC . 
VELCRO - This was another major material for flame propagation. Combustion varied 
from complete burning to only surface burning. 
VELOSTAT PLASTIC SHEETS - These were consumed in nearly all areas . The material 
was a fuel but did not appear to be instrumental in spreading the fire. 
FOAMS - A · major fuel in the fire. The foam on the floor and on the ECU was nearly 
consumed. 
COUCH MATERIALS - These pads and cover materials were partially consumed In the 
fire . 
TEFLON WIRE INSULATION - It did not appear to act as a fuel for the fire by it­
self and was intact in most areas of the spacecraft. The wire insulation was damaged by .he 
fire in those areas where flame impinged directly on the insulation . Areas where the wires 
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were bare of Teflon reached temperatures in excess of 800°F. 
The data from the above summary were combined with the condition of the Velcro observed 
III the SI C to obtain the temperature chart presented in Enclosures 8-4 and 8-5 .(Ref. 8-43). It 
was observed that the number of conditions in the SIC fire were not all reproduced in the test 
plan. As a result the temperature ranges in the diagram are approximate (Ref. 8-34, 8-35, 8-36, 
8-37, 8-43, and 8-44). 
SUMMARY 
An estimate was made of temperatures attained at various locations in SIC 012. This was 
based on burning, melting, and other effects observed on aluminum alloys, Velcro and Teflon wire 
insulation coupled with calibration type exposures of Velcro materials to various temperatures and 
times. The most intense heat was in the lower left front area. Over lOOooF was attained on surfaces 
on the left side. However, in some isolated pockets temperatures did not exceed 400°F. 
e. 	CORRELATION OF CIM MOCKUP TESTS 
OBJECTIVE 
These tests were made to (1) evaluate the integrated combustibility of materials as they inter­
act in a fire representative of the SIC 012 accident, (2) to correlate test results with observations 
made on materials in SIC 012 after the accident, and (3) to compare the observation of (1) with 
tests at lower partial pressures of 02. 
RESULTS 
Test Description 	 Status 
1 Engineering Simulation 
16.5 psia 02 
of SIC 012 Complete Feb . 26, 1967 
2 All-Up Simulation of 
16 .5 psia 02 
SIC 012 Complete Mar. 4, 1967 
3 SIC 012 Materials 
5 psia 02 
Configuration Complete Mar. 8, 1967 
4 New Materials Configuration 
14.7 psia Air 
Scheduled Mar., 1967 
5 New Materials Configuration 
5 psia 02 
Scheduled Mar., 1967 
(Ref. 8-98) 
Comparison of the measured rate of pressure rise and the minimum rate calculated from mater­
ials characteristics is discussed in the subsequent section 7 g. "Thermochemical Adiabatic Analysis 
of Fire Development". The test results are available in documented form. A test report covering 
material usage and placement forms a portion of the backup data for this report (Ref. 8-11 through 
8-17 and 8-28), and in the form of motion picture films (Ref. 8-87 and 8-88). Additional informa­
tion is contained in film (Ref. 8-99). 
The 5 psia tests utilized approximately the same nonmetallic materials configuration except that 
Velostat-covered foam and nylon coverings on the suit hose were not included. Also, no oxygen 
was added during the 5 psia tests as was done in the 16.5 psia tests. 
SUMMARY 
Judging from an initial review of test results and comparing the external appearances of mater­
ials from SIC 012 and the mockup tests an effective reproduction of the SIC 012 accident was 
accomplished. 
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Review of the films of the 16.5 psi a test indicates that after about a lO-second period the 
fire was propagated very rapidly by the Rasche! Knit. Velcro and Uralane foam also were major 
fuels in the conflagration. 
Fire simulation mockup tests at 5 .0 psia resulted in a much lower fire propagation rate, less 
extensive fire damage before 02 supply exhaustion and a cabin pressure rise from the fire that was 
limited by the cabin pressure relief valve . The intensity of the fire in 5 psia 02 although less than 
at 16.5 psia was still incompatible with crew safety and could be fatal to an unsuited crewman. 
The results of additional tests applicable to. this section of the report will be contained in Ap­
pendix G. 
f. 	FIRE PROPAGATION TEST OF RASCHEL KNIT AS INSTALLED. 
OBJECTIVE 
Determine fire propagation rate for Raschel Knit material in a configuration as installed In 
C I M 012 along the floor and side wall intersection near the ECU. 
PROCEDURE 
Raschel Knit was installed in the test chamber with the long dimension (about 2 feet) hori­
zontal and the narrow dimension (about 8 inches) aligned about 20 degrees from the vertical. Ig­
nition was accomplished by a Nichrome wire element touching the Raschel Knit at about the mid­
point of the vertical dimension and a measured distance from the end point. The chamber atmos­
phere was about 100 percent 02 and near ambient pressure. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary results from two tests, reference 8-106, obtained with a visual observation and stop 
watch technique gave average rates of about 2 inches per second. 
SUMMARY 
Horizontal flame propagation rates of fairly large pieces of Raschel Knit material as used in 
CI M 012 below the ECU in oxygen at ambient pressure have been measured at about 2 inches 
per second . This rate is about twice as fast as the downward rate obtained with small samples 
in nearly the same environment during materials screening tests. This large increase shows the 
importance of testing materials in the intended-use arrangement. 
g. 	THERMOCHEMICAL ADIABATIC ANALYSIS OF FIRE DEVELOPMENT 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analysis is to correlate SIC 012 and boilerplate temperature and press­
ure 	changes with time. This will establish energy balance correlations with the com~ustion char­
acteristics of materials . 
SUMMARY 
A supporting task showed that the total energy available from complete combustion of the 
Raschel Knit, Velcro, Trilock, and Uralane foam present in SI C 012 was over 300,000 Btu. Only 
about 3300 Btu (based on an adiabatic process) would be required to raise the interior pressure 
of the C IM from 16.5 psia to 36 psia. Thus many times more fuel was available than necessary 
to provide sufficient heat on burning to reach estimated burst pressure (approximately 20 psi posi­
tive differential). The minimum energy (approximately 3300 Btu) could be obtained from only 
about 4 ounces of Raschel Knit, Velcro, or polurethane foam, or 112 pint of Command Module 
water I glycol coolant (ref. 8-61). 
Limited theoretical calculations indicate that burning of either Rasche! Knit or Velcro alone 
would probably release a sufficient quantity of heat to raise the cabin pressure from 16.5 to esti­
mated burst pressure (36 psia) in less than fourteen seconds from initiation. By this time a quantity 
equivalent to a hole of over 14 in. radius would have been burnt in the Raschel Knit and ap­
proximately 11 in. in the Velcro .consuming at least 3.8 ounces of either material and less than 
2 percent of the available oxygen. 
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Based upon a number of known and estimated conditions and assumptions the mlOlmum rate 
of pressure rise as a function of time was calculated (enclosure 8·6). This curve is based primarily 
on the slowest rate of combustion of Raschel Knit, i.e., in the vertical downward direction and 
its heat of combustion. For reference purposes pressure measurement from SIC 012 and the esti· 
mated curve (from Panels 3, 5, and 10) are also shown for comparison on the same plot. Press· 
ure measurements during the 16.5 psia mockup test (SMD·2B) at MSC (normalized to a zero time 
base and 16.5 psia starting conditions) are also plotted. 
Fire development characteristics vary with initial starting conditions. Thus, similar theoretical 
analyses were made for space conditions, i.e., assuming external vacuum and internal 5 psia pure 
02 and using Teflon and Raschel Knit materials as limiting cases. The maximum or'most favorable 
conditions were assumed for the burning of the Teflon. 
The approach consisted of calculation of the minimum amount of heat necessary to raise the 
crew bay pressure from 5 psia to that under consideration. The amount of Teflon or nylon nec­
essary to produce this amount of heat and the times necessary to consume these amounts were 
then calculated. The baseline burning rate of Teflon (5 mil film) was taken as 0.38 in/sec mea­
sured in the upward direction and burning in a semicircular fashion in 1 g. Admittedly, such 
a favorable condition for Teflon burning probably will never occur. However, even under such 
conditions at least 80 seconds would be required to reach the estimated burst pressure. I n this 
time frame normal adiabatic expansion of the gas would not occur because the heat sink capa· 
bility of the structure would be utilized partially. This heat sink capability would give additional 
time to take corrective action. For example, it would take in excess of 25 seconds to heat the 
cabin gas to 160°F (assuming that the ECS was inoperative). Thus, the burning of Teflon sheets 
is not likely to cause overpressurization and structural failure of the Apollo CI M. (Ref. 8·56, 
8·59 and 8·47). However, as indicated proviously Teflon can propagate a flame so that its use 
over wide areas of the SIC should be limited . 
h. 	THEORETICAL COMBUSTION ANALYSIS 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this investigation is to evaluate combustion processes and data from other fire 
incidents to acquire further insight into initiation and propagation of fire in spacecraft. A second 
objective is to evaluate proposed remedial approaches involving materials selection and placement. 
PROCEDURE 
These analyses are being carried out by the Atlantic Research Corporation . 
RESULTS 
In preparation. 
SUMMARY 
Test results applicable to this section of the report will be contained in Appendix G. 
8. RESULTS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TEST· DESIGN AND INSTALLATION 
CRITERIA AND CONTROLS OVER MATERIALS 
This action presents investigations undertaken to evaluate design and installation criteria and con· 
trois over materials used in SIC 012. 
a. 	NAA CRITERIA AND MATERIALS PROCEDURES 

OBJECTIVE 

The objective of this investigation was to evaluate existing criteria and controls covering flam· 
mability of materials in effect by the prime contractor. 
SUMMARY 
-With respect to the SIC 012 fire, the NAA Specification MC999·0058 (Ref. 8·84) and MAO 
155·008 covering the selection and usage of nometallic materials for flight had the following in· 
adequacies: 
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(1) The criteria did not require any combustion rate testing . 
(2) There were no restrictions on total quantities of combustibles which could be placed 
in the cabin. 
(3) The criteria did not require any restriction on quantities or location of particular 
materials. 
(4) Material selection flammability criteria were not stringent enough. 
(5) Requirements for flammability control of nonflight materials, including the usage of 
flammable solvents, were not established. 
With respect to the implementation of controls, the following inadequacies, were determined: 
(1) The existing system for controlling installation and usage of materials to the established 
criteria was not effective. 
(2) Controls were design-oriented but were not restrictive . 
(3) Control and. documentation of subcontractor materials usage was not adequate (Ref. 
8-71,8-72,8-89,8-55 & 8-63). 
b. NASAIMSC CRITERIA AND MATERIALS CONTROL PROCEDURES COVERING THE 
SELECTION AND USAGE OF NONMETALLIC MATERIALS FOR FLIGHT OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this investigaton was to evaluate existing criteria and controls in effect for 
government furnished equipment. 
SUMMARY 
With respect to the SIC 012 fire, the NASA MSC-A-D-66-3 and MSC-A-D-66-4 criteria had 
the following inadequacies: 
(1) The criteria did not require evaluation of ignition and combustion rate at 16.5 psi a 
oxygen. The criteria were oriented toward flight conditions of zero g and 5 psia oxygen. 
(2) The criteria which specified combustion rate tests (downward) yielded results at the 
lowest rate possible in a one-g environment. 
(3) The total quantity of combustible materials which could be used in the cabin was not 
limited. 
(4) The materials selection flammability criteria and restrictions on individual quantities 
and locations were not stringent enough (Ref. 8-85 and 8-86). 
(5) Requirements for flammability control of nonflight materials, including usage of flam­
mable solvents were not established. 
With respect to the implementation of controls, the following inadequacies were deter­
mined: 
(1) Many materials used were qualified only by successful usage on prior programs. 
(2) The existing system for controlling installation and usage bf materials to the established 
criteria was not effective . 
(3) Control of flammable materials installation was exercised by several organizations which 
tended to act independently. 
(4) Control and documentation of contractor materials usage was not adequate. (Ref. 8-8, 
8-9,8-73 & 8-90) . 
(5) NASA criteria was not contractually imposed on the SIC contractor . 
A physical "walk-through" inspection of SIC 012 was conducted at Downey on August 20, 
1966 as part of the CARR activity. As a result of that inspection, nylon-Velcro chafe guards 
were removed from the electrical harness assemblies on the SIC floor and those around the sides 
and beneath the crew insertion hatch . 
Subsequent to that inspection and after delivery the materials identified in tables 3 and 4 
were added. Materials added included Raschel Knit debris nets, a large amount of Velcro, and 
Velostat plastic sheets and foam pads. 
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A "walk-through" inspection for SI C 012 was schedule for January 29, 1967 to review the 
arrangements of the large usage materials in the crew bay. (Ref. 8-89). While the results of this 
planned but not accomplished inspection can only be speculated, it is anticipated that the team 
made up of the same experienced people who had previously inspected SIC 012 at the factory 
and SIC 008 at MSC would have been concerned with the extensive use of Velcro and Raschel 
net (Ref. 8-60) . 
A similar insp~ction was made of the SIC 008 crew bay area before the altitude chamber 
tests were conducted in the Space Environment Simulation Laboratory at MSC . This inspection 
resulted in a number of changes including removal of the nylon-Velcro chafe guards, polyvinyl 
ba'gs, a wooden wire bundle stiffener and the rework and qualification testing of a sealed Teflon 
and beta cloth for the polyurethane floor pads. 
"Walk-through" inspections of spacecraft with NASAI NAA personnel have been utilized to 
perform a check of the installation of the nonmetallic materials visible in the cabins. During such 
inspections it has been possible for the team to judge on the basis of the NAA criteria and NASA 
criteria. 
As noted the NASA effort to update the existing NAA Nonmetallic Materials criteria and 
control procedures had not been completed prior to January 27, 1967. Some of the more significant 
milestones on the updating efforts are listed in Ref. 8-101. Many of the contractor responses to 
NASA requests were in the form of status reports presented at regular NASA I NAA management 
meetings. The NAA responses culminated in a January 10, 1967 letter (Ref. 8-102) which was not 
acceptable to the NASA. Later, agreement was reached as confirmed in NASA TWX's of January 
17, 1967 in item 15 and 18 of Ref. 8-101. This resulted in the January 27th revision of MC999­
0058(E) which reflected the adoption of NASA criteria (Ref. 8-50 and 8-51) . 
The adoption of the NASA criteria through change to the contractor's nonmetallic materials 
criteria (MC999-0058) would not necessarily have prevented this accident because the cause has not 
been identified and because the NASA criteria also had some shortcomings as noted. However, the 
relative effectiveness of these two criteria is shown in Enclosure 8-27 by a comparison of the status 
of the major flammable materials attached to the spacecraft relative to these criteria . The two most 
significant differences were the restrictions given to the application of Velcro and the Uralane foam 
in the NASA criteria. Such restrictions would have prevented the installation of these materials 
any closer than 12 inches to electrical leads . This would have made a significant difference in the 
amount of both of these materials installed in the spacecraft at the time of the accident. The differ­
ence in the amount of permissible Velcro on and by the hatch and on the floor is shown by com­
paring the Velcro installation in Enclosures 8-17, 8-8 and 8-9. Only the Velcro shown in red in 
Enclosures 8-8 and 8-9 would have remained . Much of the Velcro used to support the Raschel 
would have been prohibited . Under the same enforceme;l t assumption, most of the foam would 
have been removed . 
c. 	REVIEW OF WIRE BUNDLE TESTING 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analysis was to review the results of government and industry tests on 
the subject of ignition and flammability of spacecraft wires. 
PROCEDURE 
Available test and evaluation data on spacecraft wire bundles were reviewed (Ref. 8-95). 
SUMMARY 
Although flammability by itself may not be in every case the deciding factor , silicone rubber 
and polyolefin are so flammable that they appear to have limited usefulness at least in an oxygen 
atmosphere. On the other hand, H-film appears to be relatively fire resistant. Teflon insulation on 
electrical wiring propagates a flame in high concentrations of oxygen only when heated. 
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d. 	AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATE MATERIALS 
OBJECTIVE 
The more prevalent flammable materials in the cabin are nylon debris netting, nylon Velcro, 
polyolefin couch padding, polyurethane foam and suit material. The objective of this task was to 
determine if nonflammable or less flammable alternate materials are available for replacement of 
combustible materials in the spacecraft. 
RESULTS 
The following materials are suitable for strengthening, insulating, cushioning and filling to re­
duce combustion rate of a bonded product. They are documented in various government, industry 
and manufacturers' reports as being nonflammable: 
Fiberglass Potassium Titanate 

Beta Fabric Eccospheres 

jM Microfibers Asbestos 

Q felt Silica 

Min-K Cabosil 

Government and industry documents present a great deal of data concluding that fluorinated 
plastics and elastomers have a very slow burning rate and are difficult to ignite in 5 psia oxygen. 
It is known that fluorinated polymers will produce harmful gases when subjected to temperatures 
over 600°F. Gases produced during flaming are not as harmful. The following are candidate fluor­
inated plastic and elastomeric matrix materials: 
Teflon (TFE) Kynar 

Teflon (FEP) Fluorel 

Kel-F (CTFE) Viton A 

Fluorosilicones 

Typical commercial materials with low burning rates comparable to Teflon or which are non­
flammable are presented in the following table (Ref. 8-58, 8-59, and 8-69) . 
Material 
Kel-F 
Aluminum Screen 
Metal Net 
Fluorocarbon 
Elastomers 
Fiberglass 
Armalon Felt 
(PBX-7700B) 
j .M . Microfiber Felt 
Min-K Felt 
H-Film 
Selley 
Inorganic Paper 
Crystal M, MP, or MG 
Sauereisen 
Cement No .'s 28, 29 
or 51 
Type 
n-CF2-CFCI 
Silicate coated 
n-CF2-CF2CI-n 
Teflon 
Ceramic 
Aromatic 
Polyimide 
Ceramic 
Ceramic 
(Cold Set) 
Displays of available materials are shown in Enclosures 8-18 and 8-19. Attachment methods as 
replacements for Velcro are shown in Enclosure 8-20. 
SUMMARY 
Nonflammable (or significantly less flammable) materials which probably will meet the use re­
quirern~nts for most of the flammable materials used in SI C 012 were determined to be available 
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from commercial sources (Ref. 8-59). For example, fiberglass screens or fabrics are essentially non­
flammable items which probably can serve as debris traps. Ceramic fiber batts in nonflammable 
covers are available for use as cushions, insulations, etc. Final choices of materials should be verified 
by test approximating their applied configurations. 
e. 	CREW COMPARTMENT PROCESSING AND ENVIRONMENT TIME LINE 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analysis was to determine the history of the materials processes and envir­
onment time line for SIC 012 crew compartment during january 1967. 
PROCEDURE 
A detailed review of certain CIM related documentation, including DR's, DRS's, and TPS's, 
was undertaken to define those nonmetallic materials, which were installed or utilized within the 
crew compartment of the CIM since its receipt at KSC. Interviews with personnel who were in 
attendance during the performance of OCP FO-K-0021-1 (Plugs-Out Test) were undertaken to fur­
ther describe the actual CIM nonmetallic configuration at the time of the accident. Cabin environ­
ment conditions, i.e., 02 partial pressure, temperature, flow rate of circulating air were determined 
and plotted to display a profile of these parameters from the end of OCP FO-K0034a (Manned 
Sea Level Test) December 30, 1966 to 6:31 pm EST on january 27, 1967 . 
RESULTS 
The tabulation of materials added by DR, DRS, and TPS action in january 1967 (Ref. 8-45, 
8-62, 8-63 & 8-64) is shown below: 
Water Iglycol (leakage) 
Pressure-sensitive adhesive-backed aluminum foil 
Freon (cleaning) 
RTV 560 (potting) 
Methyl-ethyl-ketone (cleaning) 
Sealing Compound (MBO 130-019) and primer (MBO 125-038) 
Napthalene - Carbon tetrachloride mixture (cleaning) 
White Paint (MBO 125-019) 
Epon 828 .with Versamid 125 (potting) 
Glass fabric tape 
Epon 954 (bonding) 
Teflon tape 
Naptha (cleaning) 
PRC 1538 (potting) 
Teflon heat shrink sleeving 
RTV 577 (potting) 
Loctite Grade HV, primer (sealing) 
Isopropyl alcohol (cleaning) 
Leak check soap solution 
Acid paste 
Review of these materials against the NAA control specification MC999-0058 showed that 6 
were accepted, 4 were rejected but waived, and 10 did not appear (Ref. 8~55). 
Solvent usage in SIC 012 is estimated as follows for this time period: 

methy1-ethyl-ketone 2 quarts a 

1 quart
Freon 
Leak check soap solution 1 pint 
tsopropyl alcohol 1 quart a 
Acid Paste 0.1 pint 
a Used as a basis for analysis reported in Section 6 .a. 
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A graphic time line on solvent usage was prepared based on the preceding data. Pertinent ex­
cerpts are included in Enclosure 8-7, which depicts the last utilization of solvents, the detection of 
odors and the basic environmental parameters in the spacecraft cabin. (See "Materials Odor Evalua­
tion", 6.5 .). Although etchants were not used in the crew compartment a summary study of the 
potential effects of various etchants was compiled and is presented in References 8-52 and 8-53. 
Evaluation of the results reveals that many process materials were added in January, 1967. The pro­
cess materials noted were either installed in such a manner or in such minute amounts that their 
contribution to the fire intiation even though possible is considered remote. 
Approximately 4.5 quarts of solvent were used in the spacecraft through January, 1967. How­
ever, results of a cabin environment air sample taken at 10: 15 pm EST on January 26, 1967, indi­
cated less than 1 ppm total hydrocarbons. This result tends to reduce concern that solvent vapors 
could have been a fuel for the fire. 
9. RESULTS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TESTS -TECHNICAL DATA AND INFOR­
MATION AVAILABILITY 
This section deals with investigations of the feasibility of methods for improving technical informa­
tion availability to primary activities having materials selection, installation and control responsibilities. 
a. MATERIALS MAPPING AND CREW BAY DISPLAY OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this analysis was to develop SIC 012 materials usage displays and to evaluate 
the feasibility of maintaining displays of nonmetallic materials usage with the LM and C/M crew 
bay. The purpose of this display was to locate the nonmetallic materials that may become flamm­
ability hazards due to their close proximity to ignition sources. The intent of this display was to 
graphically illustrate the individual materials, location, approximate amounts, identity of · the 
materials and their status. 
RESULTS 
The types of displays that were considered are as follows: 

(1). Photographs for schematics. 

(2). Overlay on schematic . 

(3). Display board of actual material samples. 

(4). Scale model of crew compartment interior. 

A system that worked well during the Apollo 204 accident investigation has been to photo­
graph the interior of the crew bay exhibiting by color photographs the location of the various 
pieces of associated equipment. This system involved one overall crew bay enlargement with indivi­
dual "closeup" color photos of pieces of equipment and localized areas (Ref. 8-65 and 8-68). 
SUMMARY 

Maintenance of spacecraft nonmetallic materials usage displays is feasible and useful. 

Preparation of the full-scale mockup of SIC 012 revealed the continuous fire propagation 
path presented by the placement of Raschel Knit and/or Velcro in the crew bay. 
b. MATERIALS INFORMATION CENTER 

Objective _ 

The activities of the Materials Panel illustrated the need for: 

(1) The rapid availability of materials information including usage and property data. 
(2) The availability in graphic form of location and usage of nonmetallic materials in manned 
spacecraft. 
(3) Increased awareness of personnel at all levels of characteristics of nonmetallic materials. 
(4) Provide test data and means for getting new materials tested to appropriate criteria. 
The objective of this study was to evaluate the feasibility of implementing a more active information 
interchange system. 
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RESULTS 
An objective review of the materials information program has resulted in a plan for its reorien­
tation toward a more active role in acquiring and distributing vital materials information. The 
targets for receipt of this information are program management, contractors, and field sites. 
Displays covering materials usage in SIC 012 have been prepared. A feasibility study of 
maintaining individual spacecraft usage data in graphical form has also been prepared. 
The existing computerized materials file maintained at MSC was reviewed. The expansion 
of this system to accommodate test data, usage locations and spacecraft effectivity and material 
status, including waivers is feasible and is being implemented. The target date is June 1, 1967 
(Ref. 8-68, 8-81 & 8-82). 
SUMMARY 
The results of this study indicate the feasibility of a central data source for acquisition, storage, 
display and distribution of materials information. 
Materials configuration can be maintained in a centralized document. This can be accom­
plished on each vehicle and reviewed during each Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR), 
and Flight Readiness Review (FRR). During fabrication and test of each vehicle, configuration 
control and status can be maintained. Materials information on the use and applications of 
hazardous materials can be distributed to Program Management, Apollo contractors and field 
sites. This can be accomplished through workshops, film strips and formal presentations. 
10. UNFINISHED BUSINESS 

The following items of unfinished business are open. 

ITEM 
Routine Materials Testing 
Electrostatic Spark Ignition ­
Suited Man in Spacecraft Tests 
Effect of Water/Glycol on Wire Bundles 
Effect of Water/Glycol on Connector 
Assemblies 
Effect of Burning Foam Insulation on 
02 Lines 
Command Module Mockup Tests 
Theoretical Combustion Analysis 
SECTION 
5 
6.c 
6.g 
6.h 
7.a 
7.e 
7.h 
EST. COMPo DATE 
May 26 
April 15 
June 23 
April 21 
April 15 
April 15 
April 7 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. MATERIALS CONFIGURATION 
a. FINDING: 
Complete documentation which identified potentially combustible nonmetallic materials used 
in SIC 012 is not available in a single readily usable format. A total of 2,528 different potentially 
combustible nonmetallic materials which were probably used on SIC 012 were found by a review 
of available documentation. 
DETERMINATION: 
The program for identification and documentation of nonmetallic materials used in the SIC, 
including 	their weights and surface areas, was not adequate. 
There is no system in effect through which nonmetallic materials configuration changes are 
tracked, reported, evaluated, and controlled in an integrated manner. 
b. FINDING: 
Test data providing individual combustion properties in environments of 5 psia to 21 psia 
oxygen were available for 550 of the potentially combustible nonmetallic materials identified as 
possibly being used. Data on higher pressure testing were available only on suit materials, Velcro 
and K-10 flight paper. 
DETERMINATION: 
Flammability test requirements were not standardized at the time the referenced tests were 
accomplished. 
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Large numbers of potentially combustible nonmetallic materials were used in the fabrication 
of SIC 012 without specific correlated combustibility test data. Test data were available at high 
O 2 pressures (to 21 psia) to define the combustion characteristics of some of the major materials 
which contributed heavily to the fire. 
c. FINDING: 

Installation records including photographs and redlined drawings were· maintained at KSC 

which contained descriptions of materials added to SIC 012. 
DETERMINATION: 
Methods for identifying configuration changes related to materials were operational at KSC. 
2. 	ROUTINE MATERIALS TEST 
FINDING: 
Raschel Knit, Velcro, Trilock and polyurethane foams burn about twice as fast (in the down­
ward direction) in 16.5 psia as in 5 psia 02. 
DETERMINATION 
The primary fuels for the fire burned over twice as fast in the early stages of the fire in 
accident conditions (16.5 psi a) than in space flight atmosphere for which they were evaluated 
(5 psia). 
3. FIRE INITIATION SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 
a. Retention of Solvents 

FINDING: 

Laboratory analyses indicated that solvent retention by test specimens was significant. The 
analyses also indicate that the evaporation characteristics of the solvent is such that vapor con­
centration fell below the lean flammability limit after 11/2 hours. 
DETERMINATION: 
The presence of significant volumes of concentrated vapor in the spacecraft is unlikely. How­
ever, the retention of solvents in the surface layers of solid flammable materials could possibly 
contribute to their ignitability . 
b. Materials Odor Evaluation 
FINDING: 
Odors similar to that of sour milk and methyl-ethyl-ketone were reported before the fire during 
suit and cabin purge operations. 
Thresholds of methyl-ethyl-ketone and isopropyl alcohol detection by smell are approximately 
.01 percent to .03 percent by volume and concentrations described as strong, irritating or sickening 
range from 1 percent to 4 percent by volume. 
DETERMINATION: 
There is no evidence that significant concentrations of organic vapors were present In SIC 012 
at the time of the fire. 
c. ELECTROSTATIC SPARK IGNITION 
FINDING: 
The maximum electrostatic spark energy generated and measured on a man suited m a space 
suit was about 4 millijoules. 
FINDING: 
Ignition of the more flammable SIC 012 solid materials tested required spark energies of 
190 millijoules or greater. 
FINDING:· 
Ignition of solvent vapors m oxygen can take place at spark discharge energies as low as 
0.002 millijoules . Ignition of methane vapors in oxygen can take pla.ce at spark discharge energies 
as low as 0.004 millijoules. Ignition of solid materials damp with solvents can take place at spark 
discharge energies as low as 40 millijoules. 
DETERMINATION: 

Ignition of solid materials by electrostatic discharge is not a probable cause of the SIC 012 fire. 

DETERMINATION: 

It is possible from an energy consideration that methane and solvent vapor can be ignited 

by electrostatic discharge. Nevertheless, this is not believed to be a possible cause of the fire. 
d. COBRA CABLE SPARK IGNITION 
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FINDING: 
Connecting and disconnecting of spacecraft Qualified Cobra connectors at nonnal loads did 
not create sufficient energy to ignite concentrations up to saturation (approximately 12 percent) of 
methyl-ethyl-ketone in 16.4 psia oxygen. An increase in loading to 2.5 times operating amperage 
in 4.0 percent of MEK yielded no ignition. 
DETERMINATION: 

Ignition of flammable concentrations of solvent vapors by connecting and disconnecting 

Cobra connectors is an unlikely ignition source for the SIC 012 fire. 

e. IMPACT SENSITIVITY OF MATERIALS IN GOX 
FINDING: 
Preliminary high energy impact tests on Velcro and Raschel Knit III 16.5 psia oxygen produced 
ignition and burning. 
FINDING: 
A survey of similar spacecraft and mockup failed to disclose the possibility of any high impact 
conditions. 
f. SPONTANEOUS IGNITION OF SIC 012 MATERIALS 
FINDING: 
Results of tests on SIC 012 materials considered to be most flammable with and without 
solvents (methyl-ethyl-ketone, isopropyl alcohol) and coolants (waterIglycol) did not result in spon­
taneous ignition at or below 400°F in any case. 

DETERMINATION: 

Spontaneous ignition is an unlikely ignition source for the SIC 012 fire. 

g. EFFECT OF WATER/GLYCOL ON WIRE BUNDLES 

FINDING: 

Conditions required for wet-wire fire ignition through electrolytic action are damaged wire 
insulation, presence of an electrolyte and electric potential between damaged wires and a flammable 
substance in the proximity. A test has shown that ECS coolant applied to a purposely damaged 
wire of a type used in the C/M caused a fire. 
DETERMINATION: 

The required conditions could have been present in SIC 012. 

h. REVIEW OF KSC CONNECTOR TEST WITH WATER/GLYCOL 
FINDING: 
An unpotted connector with some unused pin channels subjected to water/glycol and placed 
under DC stress developed a short circuit. 
DETERMINATION: 
Water/glycol electro-corrosion products and residue are conductive and capable of acting as 
an electrolyte. 
4 . FIRE PROPAGATION SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 
a. WATER/GLYCOL LEAKAGE IN SPACECRAFT 
FINDING: 
There have been 35 instances of water / glycol leakage on Block I Spacecraft involving approx­
imately 320 ounces . 
DETERMINATION: 
The water / glycol distribution system requires corrective action to eliminate leakage. 
FINDING: 
Prior to the accident there had been no electrical system failures attributable to the water I glycol 
leaks. 
DETERMINATION : 
The electrical system has some tolerance to water / glycol spillage. 
FINDING: 
There is no standard cleaning procedure in effect to remove water/glycol spills or residue . 
DETERMINATION: 
There is a probability that water / glycol residue is present in areas of all Block I Spacecraft. 
FINDING: 
Six instances of water/glycol leakage were recorded for SIC 012. Of these, one soaked several 
SCS connectors and wire bundles. Some corrective action was taken to clean all known spills in 
SIC 012. 
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DETERMINATION: 
Water/glycol residues may have been present in areas of SIC 012 including on wire bundles 
and connectors. 
b. FLAMMABILITY OF WATER/GLYCOL RESIDUES 

FINDING: 

Tests in a 14.7 psia oxygen atmosphere on horizontal surface show films of C/M coolant 
will not propagate a flame before or after air drying for up to 48 hours. Films of coolant will 
propagate a flame after exposure to reduced pressure for periods of 60 to 80 hours. Pure ethylene 
glycol will propagate a flame in a similar atmosphere. 
DETERMINATION: 
Residues from previous standard coolant fluid spills in SIC 012 might have provided a path 
for flame propagation on materials that were wetted. Spills or leaks in the early stages of the fire 
would burn when heated. 
c. TEMPERATURE MAPPING OF SIC 012 

FINDING: . 

Surface and bulk damage of materials in SIC 012 varied from melting and blistering of 
aluminum alloys, combustion of Velcro and melting and burning of Teflon wire insulation to 
slight surface damage and melting of nylon fabrics . 
DETERMINATION: 
The fire filled the SIC interior. The most intense heat was in the lower left front area around 
the ECU. Surface temperatures in excess of 1000°F were reached in areas such as the front and 
left side of the spacecraft. Surface temperatures were less than 4000F in isolated pockets above 
the right· hand couch. 
d . CORRELATION OF C/M MOCKUP TESTS 
FINDING: 
The condition and appearance of individual materials after the 16.5 psia oxygen boilerplate 
test approximatep materials conditions observed in SIC 012. The pressure rise measured in the 
boilerplate test approximated that in the SIC 012. 
DETERMINATION: 
A reasonable simulation of the SIC 012 accident was achieved by the boilerplate tests. 
FINDING: 
The rate of flame propagation, the rate of pressure increase and the maximum pressures 
achieved and the extent of conflagration in 5 psia oxygen boilerplate tests was much less severe 
than observed in the 16.5 psia oxygen boilerplate tests. Burning or charring was limited to ap­
proximately 29 percent of the nonmetallic materials by oxygen depletion. 
DETERMINATION: 
The conflagration which occurred in SIC 012 at 16.5 psia would be far less severe and slower 
in a spacecraft operating with an environment of 5 psia 9xygen if additional large quantities 
of oxygen are not fed into the fire . 
DETERMINATION: 
A fire in a spacecraft configured as SIC 012 operating with a 5 psia oxygen environment 
could be fatal. 
FINDING: 
The early stages of fire propagation in the boilerplate tests were. observed to be dependent 
upon the combustion rate and location of the materials. The observed rates appeared to have 
been much greater than the factor of two increase measured downward in the laboratory tests 
when the. oxygen pressure is increased from 5 psia to 16.5 psia. The additional increase in rate 
in the boilerplate tests most likely occurs because of the combined effect of burning upward and 
along the continuous paths provided by flammable materials . This is substantiated by preliminary 
results referenced in 8-106. 
DETERMINATION: 
The spread of fire at 16.5 psia operating pressures is too rapid for effective remedial action 
in spacecraft with combustible materials arranged as in CIM 012. The spread of fire at 5 psia 
operating pressures is probably too rapid for effective remedial action by an unsuited crewman. 
e. THERMO-CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF FIRE DEVELOPMENT 

FINDING: 
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The energy available from about four ounces of Raschel Knit or Velcro could raise the pressure 
in a closed CIM from 16.5 psia to 36 psia in less than 14 seconds after ignition. (Calculations 
assume complete combustion and adiabatic conditions). 
FINDING: 
Teflon materials did not burn appreciably in SIC 012. Calculations based on laboratory data 
indicate that Teflon could not have contributed appreciably to the rate of pressure rise. The 
total energy available from the Rasche! Knit, Velcro, foam, Trilock and polyurethane materials 
was much greater than necessary to raise the cabin pressure from 16.5 psi a to 36 psia. 
DETERMINATION: 
Teflon provides an insignificant fire risk. 
DETERMINATION: 
There was considerable excess combustible material available with which to raise the CIM 
p"ressure to the estimated burst pressure. 
5. MATERIALS INSTALLATION CRITERIA AND CONTROLS 
a. NAA CRITERIA AND MATERIALS CONTROL PROCEDURE 
FINDING: 
The NAA materials selection specification MAO 155-008 requires only that a material pass 
a 400"F spark ignition test in 14.7 psia oxygen. 
DETERMINATION: 
The NAA criteria for materials flammability control were inadequate. 
FINDING: 
A system for control of nonmetallic materials usage existed at NAA during the design, fabrica­
tion and assembly of CIM 012. The NAA materials control system is design oriented. 
DETERMINATION: 
The system is permissive to the extent that controls over the installation or use of flammable 
materials are not adequate. 
FINDING: • 
There were nonflight items containing combustible materials in CIM 012 during this test. 
FINDING: 
No flammability criteria or control existed covering nonflight items installed in CIM 012 
for test. 

DETERMINATION: 

Lack of control of nonflightmaterial could have contributed to the fire. 

b . NASA-MSC CRITERIA AND MATERIALS CONTROL PROCEDURES 
FINDI_NG: 
The NASA materials selection criteria MSC-A-D-63 and MSC-A-D-66-4 requires that a material 
pass a 400"F spark ignition test and a 0.5 inlsec combustion rate (measure downward in 5 psia 
02). Raschel Knit and Velcro (hook) pass this test. 
DETERMINATION: 
The NASA criteria for materials flammability control are not sufficiently stringent. 
FINDING: 
The system for control of nonmetallic materials usage at MSC during the design and develop­
ment of government furnished equipment used in CIM 012 depended on identification of non­
compliance with criteria by the development engineers. 
DETERMINATION: 
The NASA materials control system is permissive to the extent that installation or use of 
flammable materials were not adequately reviewed by a second party. 
FINDING: 
The NASA criteria were intended to limit the use of Velcro and Uralane foam to distances 
greater than 12 inches from wire bundles. 
FINDING: 
Nonmetallic materials selection criteria utilized by NAA and NASA are not consistent. The 
NASA criteria, although more stringent, were not contractually imposed on the SIC contractor. 
DETERMINATION: 
Materials were evaluated and selected for usage in CIM 012 using different criteria. Applica­
tion of the NASA criteria to the CIM would have reduced the amount of the more flammable 
D-8-34 

4 
materials (Velcro and Uralane fO:IIIl). 

FINDING: 

Visual "walk-through" inspections had resulted in removal of combustibles in the proximity 
of wire bundles on C/M 012 before delivery and on C/M 008 before manned testing. Such in­
spection had not been made before OCP FO-K·0021-1. 
DETERMINATION: 
Visual inspections have resulted in removal of combustible materials from potential ignition 
sources ( wire bundles). 
c. AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATE MATERIALS 
FINDING: 
Alternate materials which are nonflammable or significantly less flammable than those used 
on C/M 012 are available for many applications. 
DETERMINATION: 

The amount of combustible material used in Command Modules can be limited. 

6. 	TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY 

MATERIALS INFORMATION CENTER 

FINDING: 

Current information and displays of the potentially flammable materials configuration of SIC 
012 was not available prior to the fire. 
FINDING: 

A centralized source for materials data was established for the Board Panel 8 (Materials Review). 

DETERMINATION: 
Maintenance of data and displays at central locations and test sites for management visibility 
and control of flammable materials is feasible and useful. 
E . SUPPORTING DATA 
This section contains references to supporting data in the form of reports, lists and other 
documents. Also included are photographs, tables and graphs essential to provide completeness of 
this final report. 
Items are numbered 8-1, et. seq., for those displays enclosed in this section. Supporting reports 
and references not included in this report are numbered consecutively. 
Supporting data included are listed below: 
Enclosure Description 
8-1 Not used 
8-2 Sample page from C / 1\1 012 Materials Configuration, March 6, 1967 
8-3 C/M 012 Temperature Mapping and Materials Usage Display Prior to Fire (Neg. 
No. 166-238C-2) 
8-4 CI M 012 Temperature Mapping and Materials Usage Display After Fire (Neg. No. 
166-238C-3) 
8-5 C/M 012 Temperature Mapping Overlay (Neg. No. 283-498C-1) 
8-6 C/M 012 pPressure vs Burning Time - Velcro or Raschel Knit 
8-7 C / !vl 01~ Materials Time Line 
8-8 Exposed Nonmetallic Materials Location - Velcro and Wire Bundles 12 Inches Apart 
on Floor (Neg. No. 329-713C-3) 
8-9 Exposed Nonmetallic Materials Location - Velcro and Wire Bundles 12 inches Apart 
on Aft Bulkhead % Hatch (Neg. No . 329-713C-1) 
8-10 Major Exposed Nonmetallic Materials in C/M 012 (Neg. No. 166-238C-1) 
8-11 Exposed Nonmetallic Materials Location- Command Module Outline (Neg. No. 216­
468C-1) 
8-12 Exposed Nonmetallic Materials Location­ - Velcro (Neg. No. 216-468C-4) 
8-13 Exposed Nonmetallic Materials Location - Velcro and Uralane Foam (Neg, No. 216­
467C-6) 
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~-14 Exposed Nonm~tallic l\ {al( I ials Location Velcro and Uralane Foam and Raschel Knit 
(Neg. No. 216-467C-3) 
~-15 Exposed Nonmetallic Materiab Location Velcro and Uralane Foam and Raschel Knit 
and Trilock / Raschel Covering (Neg. No . 216-467C-2) 
R-lli Exposed Nonmetallic l\ bterials Location - Suits Added (N(',~ . 010. 2Hi-4G6C-5) 
H I':" Exposed Nonmetallil Ma teri"b I I ( Ilion - Aft Bulkhead .\dued (Neg. No . 21n-466C-l) 
~-l~ Candidate Nonflammable l\blcrials - Cushions Insulalion, Velcro, Debris Net and Mis­
cellaneous (Neg. No. :):t~-4H5C-3) 
H III Candidate Nonflammable M:lleria ls - Felts, Coatings, Lubricants, Adhesives and Coolants 
(;\Jcg. No. 238-4~7C - :~) 
H-:,W Possible Equipment ,\ltaChIl1Cllt Sll hs!illlliollS (Neg . No ' .~ :-4HSC-2) 
H-li Candidate Nonflammable Materials - Comm:1 nd ;\lodule Outline (Neg_ No . 221-470C-3) 
H-:!:2 Candidate Nonflammal>k \1atcrials - Velcro Substitutes (Neg. No . 221-470C-4) 
H·:,!:} Candidate Nonflammable ;\Lle"ials - Substitutes for V( lcro, F" 1m, and Triloek / Raschel 
Covering (Neg. No . 221-47LlC-!» 
~-24 Candidate Nonflammahle l\faterials - Substitute! lor Raschel Knit and Suits Added (01eg. 
No . 221-470C-2) 
~-2S Candidate Nonflammable Materials - Substitutes on Aft Bulkhead (Neg. No . 221-470C-l) 
8-26 List of Refennccs 
8-27 Status of Major Nonmetallic l\blc;iab USf·d in C/r>.1 012 
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489 MEK TPS DRS 
I I I Inner Hatch 893 
531 Washed 
Ink/ Paint 469 Dawn With Freon 
Removed MEK 
DRS 869 479 Lactite 
MEK TPS (Outside 
, SI C) I Acid Water 
DRO 993 
Cabin 
Sample 
HC as CH4 
- lppm 
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~ Cobin Closed Out 
Cobin Fan On ~I I 110 Min ~ . 17.62.:!'sia Commander's Faceplate Open 
Facility Air 011 - P 5 d !. t 
urge tarte. ,15.95: : 15.95 psia 16.4 psia 
443C"FM 
.,Suit Purge Started 
ngress ommander ~ 14.7 psia :··1 ;......, ...................,.: 15.1 psia I Of C J. j 16.03 pSla psta :r1~"" 15.5 psia .................................. 
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", -", -", _._", -", _.­ .-. -", -", _._", -", -.- -", -",...,.. .-~~~!.z:::".,:",:r. -", _. -", -", -", - -.1 
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MF MEK MEK
,,-"!ttl 
H4 I TPS TPS 
469 368 
Cobin 1Sampl e 
HC as CH4 
2ppm 
Polyester 
Po int MBO 
125019 
DRS 865 
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5id I Inner Hatch 893 Washed 
1'.'1'-'.' 469 Down With FreonRemoved 
479 MEK Loc:titeDRS 869 
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- lppm 
I I I I r­ 5pace Vehicle Plugs ~ In Integrated Test 0100Z II I I I I II II_LLL1....LJ.1h1 /}EDSLt 
MCC-H Interface Test 
0700Z 0900Z 
I . .! 
MEK Used To Frean TF Used To Clean 
Clean Inside Hatch Fingerprints Off MDAS 
1100Z 
MEK Used Just 
Inside Hatch 
(Wi re Bundle Mod) 
TPS 469 
1300Z 1500Z 1600Z 
! 
Commander Smelled Sour Odor 
.. 
Took Suit Loop Watermellon Sample 
C02 ~ 730ppm C2H2 ,05ppm 
Ethyane<lppm HC as Ethyane < lppm. 
HC as Methane ~ 400ppm Methane ~ 300 
ppm GN~ 76.8% C2H4~.64ppm N20~ 
3.lppm 02~ 23% HIC < 5ppm Odor­
Human Origin. 
.. 
All Mirrors Cleaned With Isopropyl 
Alcohol And Sponged Off With H20 
Just Prior To Crew Ingress 
Odor D~tected L Decreased Odor Detected At Hatch Bleed 
At Notch Bleed 
Port At BeckmanI 02 Analyzer 
Port At Beckman Analyzer 
UNOFFICIAL 1. Analyzer (1st) Results 
Reflect Only Air Contained (Expec'ed· 
If Sameone Squeezed Bulb Afterwords). 
Calibration SI N 4 Afterwards Shows 
Actual %02 90.8. If Bulb Squeezed 
Sufficiently To Draw In Pure Sample 
Reading' Was 75% 02' I 
UNOFFICIAL - Analyzer (2) Results 
Reflect On Iy Air Contained (Expected­
If Someone Squeezed Bul...b Afterwards). 
Calibration SI N 3 Afterwards Shows 
Correct At All Points. Actual % 02 92 
- 94 If Bulb Squeezed Sufficiently To 
Draw In Pure Sample. 
UNOFFICIAL - Analyzer Results Reflect Only Air Contained. 
Expected If Someone 'Squeezed Bulb Afterwards 
.. 
Calibration SI N 4 Afterwords Shows Actual % 02 94.3 If 
Bulb Squeezed Sufficiently To Draw In Pure Sample Reading 
Was 78% 02 • 
NAA Electrical Engineer Felt Lightheaded 
At SIC Exterior And Smelled Fumes, More 
Like Ether Than Alcohal. 
I ~ 
I~ 
Possible Time For Solvent Vapors To 
Reach Critical Proportions (2 Hrs. 13 
Mins.) Assuming Cabin Purge Remove ~Il Previous Vapors 
Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test 
1700Z 1800Z 1900Z 2000i 2100Z 2200Z 2300Z 2330Z 2330: 30Z 2331Z 2331:30Z 2332Z 2332: 30·Z 
SI C In Hold Condition. No Movement 
Expected For Next Few Minutes 
Sounds In SI C 012 As Of A Mike In I I I I I I 
A Helmet 0, Other Movement. (Over An Open Mike) 
Gimbal Signals From SI C 012. 
Are Moving Around 
Crew 12 
I 
Gas Chromatograph Signol. Sensor 
Was Moved Or Exposed To Flame. 
I I 
4' 
VH F- FM Carrier Dropaut. (Invert.... 15 
Current Swi tch.) 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
10 :::~~~'r:crTi trSI,nl Stl 
11, ~ T,C?m~re,ss?r ,Inl,et ,Su,its Incr. 
12 Increose WI G Pump Rote I 
I I I I I I , I I I I 
1'3 WI G Rote To Upper Limit 
1 
14 Cobin' FI'oo~ Ru~tu;e I I 
I I I I I I I t I 
. 15 SI C Power Off (To Data) 
I I I I I I I I I I I I 
6 C02 Flow Jumps To Over 3 Cu . 'Ft.1 
ISec. (Flow Rate Is On.'y.~ .Of. Tho~. F.ar.O~en. Visodl 116 LVP?w~r Off 
Gimbal Signals (More Movement) 
, I I I I I I I I I 
8 Launch Vehicle Gimbal Signal. 
Stronger Movements In SI C I 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 I 
9 Cabin Press. Increase (> Smm) 
I I I I I I I II II I I 
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MAJOR · 
NON-METALLIC MATERIALS 
IN SIC 012 
VELCRO 
(NYLOII) 
RASCt£L KNIT 
ON) 
POINT ., 
PlR POINT.,
COMB. :rE (lNIlEC
AlITo IGN ITION ., 
COUCH PAD 
RASCHEL KNIT I .Ll'II:::a.Y­
PILE 
!2!l 
480 
480 
.47 
MAJOR EXPOSED NON-METALLIC MATERIALS IN SPACECRAFT 012 
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8-1 
LIST OF REFERE:'\CES 
TITLE IDE:"\TIFIC,\TJO:'\ SOURCE 
8-2 

8-3 

8-4 

8-5 

8·6 
8-7 

8-8 

8-9 

8-10 

8-11 

8-12 

8-13 

8-14 

8-15 

8-16 

8-17 

8-19 

8-18 

8-20 

8-21 

8-22 

8-23 

8-24 

8-25 

8-26 

8-27 

8-28 

8-29 

8-30 

8·31 
8-32 

8-33 

8-34 

8-35 

:'\onmetallic !\Iatcrials L'scd in the In­
terior of the Apollo Command Module, 
September I. 1%6 
Subcontractor :'\Iatcrial L'se List 
Updated Tab Run of :'\onmetallic 
;\Iaterials 
Stabilization and Control System, 
Honeywell Inc .. Material List. 
October 25. 19M 
Partial List of :'\Iaterials on SI C 
012 by Drawing :'\umber 
!\Iaterial Usage G&:'\ 12 j 5O, 
February 5, 1967 
Apollo Materials Master File Index, 
December 28, 1967 
GFE Equipment - :'\onmetallic mat­
erials (Addendum to TRIS 020580) 
GFE - Flight Crew Support Division 
Hardware Onboard, January 'fl, 1967 
.\cceptable S, C 012 GFE !\1aterials 
List - Tab Run, February 6, 1967 
BiIls of Ma terials, Space Sui t 
Assembly S987 -000 Pan I 
Bills of Materials. Space Suit 
Assembly, S978-000 Pan II 
Bills of l\1aterials, Helmet Assembly, 
:\1920-000 
Collins Test Dat a 
Hamilton Std. Test Da ta 
KSC Data 
MSC Data 
MSC Data 
MSC Data 
WSTF Data 
CAEC Data 
S. A . M . Data 
MIT G&T'\ Data 
NAA j Hughes Data 
NAA j Hughes Data 
:,,\AA j Hughes Data 
:'\ .\A j Hughes Data 
S j C 012, Materials Configuration 
Spark - Ignition Tests 
Determination of Impact Sensitivity 

of Materials to COX 

Material Cataloging and Routine 

Testing 

Electrostatic Spark Generation in 

Selected Nonmetallic Materials 

Flammability of Materials in O 2 
(Preliminary) 

Temperature Mapping in S j C 012 

Preliminary Tempera ture Survey 
of S j C 012 
Unidentified (30 pgs . 881 materials) 
Unidentified (53 pgs) 

:'\0 ID !"umber 

A64769A (2) 
Unidentified (48 pgs) 

Unidentified (86 materials plus hand-wrillen 

update of KSC added) 

RPT-XSO-98-915 

TRIS 020583 

Unidentified (Survey of cognizant FCSD 

personnel) 

TRIS 020585 

TRIS 020590 

TRIS 020591 

TRIS 020592 

:\R-5H! -I, January 1965 

SVHSER 4024,3886 

February 14. 1967 

February 2-9, 1967 

Tech . Note S136, 1966 

February 7-8, 1967 

February 2, 1967 

LED -.'>20-3A, January 1%6 

TR-65-78.1965 

Not published , 1967 

PM-53, June 1964 

P66-06 , January 1966 

P67-32 , Fcbruary 1967 

Z748, 06; 56, February 20, 1967 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 Materials 

Review l\1 1'. rch 6. 1967 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 Materials 

Task 2.1 . 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 Materials 

Task 2.29 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 

:'\1aterials. Tasks. 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 

.\pollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 

Materials, March 8. 1967 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 

Materials Task 2.3 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 

Materials Task 2.4 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 10, 

February 28, 1967 

ENCLOSURE 8-26 

0-8-85 
8-36 
8-37 
8-38 
8-39 
8-40 
8-41 
8-42 
8-43 
8-44 
8-45 
8-46 
8-47 
8-48 
8-49 
8-50 
8-51 
8-52 
8-53 
8-54 
8-55 
8-56 
8-57 
8·58 
8-59 
8-60 
8-6\· 
8-62 
8-63 
8-64 
Temperature Changes in SIC 012 
Temperature Changes in S I C 012 
Wire Bundle Insulation Test Exposed 
to Water/Glycol 
Studies Underway on Water/Glycol 
Solutions 
Flammability of Type II Water Glycol 
Coolant 
Absorption - Evaporati.on Tests 
Data on Flammabiiity Limits and 
Ignition Energies for Certain 
Substances 
Development ,of ,the Maximum Temp­
erature Pl"ofHe.of C / M 'O'l2 Inner Cabin 
SI C 012 Temperature ,Profile 
Concentrations of MEKin SIC 012 
Autogenous Testing of Nonmetallic 
Materials in the C/M 
Updating 'of Thermochemical Plots 
of Pressures vs. Time for S I C 012 
Final Report - Preliminary Cobra Cable 
Spark Test, TPS-MA-014 
Investigation Report . Preliminary 
Cobra Cable Spark Test (TPS-MA-014) 
Approved Nonmetallic Materials 
for CI M Interior 
Materials Comparison and Recon­
cilliation Between NAA Spec. 0058 
and MSC Spec, 66-4, March I, 1967 
Deleterious Effects of Etchants in 
SIC and Wire Bundles 
MSFC Tests of Teflon Etchant 
Material Odor Evaluation for SIC 012 
(Ref. Action I tern no. 78) 
SIC 012 Crew Bay Configurations 
Time of Delivery to Time of Accident 
Thermochemical Analysis of Fire 
Development in SI C 012 Based on 
Materials Characteristics 
Estimates of the \Iass of \l<Herials In 
SIC 012 at Time of .\ecident 
Flammable \Iaterials Substitution 
Program 
Alternates for the \lore Prevalent 
;-';onmetallic in the Cabin, \1areh 1, 
1967 
Comparison of :\ollmetallie Distributioll 
in S: C OOH and 012. 
Calorimeter Bomb Tests of Sckcted 
;\laterials to Detcrmine Fuel Energy 
.\vailablc 
SIC 012 Materials Oriented Timeline 

Backup l\laterial 

Summary of Solvents, Bonding Agents, 

Etchants, etc , Usage in SI C 012 

Quantities of :-':onmetallie Materials 

Installed in CS;\l 012 at KSC 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 3, Feb­

ruary 28, 1967 . 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 1, 

February 20, 1967 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 

Materials Task 2.5 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 

Dr. A.A. Slaklis 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8: 

W . A. Riehl 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
Materials Task 2.6 
Dalafax 10 A. Busch from W. T. Olson, 
Lewis Research Center February 2, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 10, 
February 22, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 10, 
February 18, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
February 18, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
Materials Task 2.7 
Memo to W. M. Bland, Panel '8, from 
W. A. Riehl March 10, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board , Panel 8 
March 7, 1967 
Submitted to Panel 8 :by 
J. C. Van Hooser, March 1, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board, Panel 8 
Fel:.ruary 22, 1967 
Apollo 204 Review Board, Panel 8 
Materials Task 2.11 
Apollo 204 Review Board, Panel 8 
Materials Task 2.13 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
February IS, 1967 W. A. Riehl 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
March 7, 1967, Materials Task 2.15 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
Materials Task 2.16 
Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 
March 9, 1967 
Apollo 204 :2(l4 Review Board Panel 8, 

\latcrials Task 2. HI 

Apollo 204 Rc·.iew Board Panel 8. 

L'nissued 

.\pollo 204 Revi<:w Board Panel 8, 

,\1aterials Task 2.19 

.\pollo 204 Review Board Panel 8 . 

\lalC'rials Task 2.21 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 

Materials Task 2.23 

Apollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 

Materials Task 2.31 

.-\pollo 204 Review Board Panel 8, 

Materials Task 2.32 

1\1emo to \V, 1\1, Bland, Panel 8, 

fram A, Lorenz, March 9, 1967, re : 

Task 2.16 

D-8-86 
8-65 
8-66 
8-67 
8-68 
Reconciliation of Materials Usage 
Geometry in PIB I\lockup and Panel 8 
Display 
:\ Special Assessment on Materials 
Analysis Branch Report of 12/ 2/ 66 
on Hughes Co. Connector A!Igembly 
Materials Evaluation, Connector 
Assembly Hughes Aircraft Co. Pi N 
1004250 and PIN 1004251 - MAB-1392-66 
Materials Information Service Plan 
8-69 Alternate Materials Follow-up 
Information Display 
8-70 Water/Glycol Leakage History of SI C 
009, Oil, and 012 
8-71 NAA's C~iteria and Materials Control 
Procedures Prior to Jan . 'Z1, 1!!67 
8-72 Contractor Nonmetallic l\laterials 
Waiver Status 
8-73 GFE :'>ion metallic I\laterials Waiver Status 
8-74 Imerim Summary Report 
8-75 
8-76 
8-77 
Responsibility and Schedule for 
.-\ccomplishment of Panel 8 l\laterials 
Tasks, Rev . A 
Responsibility and Schedule for 
Accomplishment of Panel 8 , 
Materials Tasks, Rev. B. 
Study of Flammability Properties. of 
Wa ter/Glycol :"-.lixtures 
8-78 Testiogs of the Effect of \\'ater / Glycol 
on Apollo S IC \\'ire Insulation 
8-?!! Activity Report <IS of February 27. 1%7, 
Spark Ignition Tcsts pcr Fcbruary (i. 
I !!h7. Lellcr by . \ . Busch 
X-/«) I nput to Pancl X - :-"Iatcrials Final 
Rcport. Routinc :"-.I<ltcrials Tcst Slatus 
and Boilerplatc Tcst Status 
X-XI 
8-X2 
Sclection , COlltrol of :\onmct:dlic 
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STATUS OF MAJOR NONMETALLIC MATERIALS USED IN 
SIC 012 CREW BAY 
Introduction 
The objective of this evaluation was to determine the status of the major combustible materials used in 
the SI C 012 crew bay. 
Results 
The table below lists materials status as determined from a review of NAA MC 999-0058 and 
MSC·A·D·66·4 documents which list acceptable and unacceptable materials. 
TABLE 

STA11JS OF MAJOR NONMETALLIC MATERIALS USED IN 

SI C 012 CREW BAY 

MATERIAL 
DESIGNA TION 
MATERIAL 
TYPE 
STATUS PER 
NAA·MC·999·0058 
Rev . D 
STA11JS PER 
MSC·A·I)..66·4 
Rev . F 
Nylon Rachel Knit Polyamide Acceptable Acceptable 
Nylon Velcro Polyamide Acceptable Restricted - 12 
inches from 
electrical leads 
Trilock 
Cushions 
Woven 
Cushion. 
Rubber 
Based 
Thread. 
Acceptable Unacceptable 
Uralane 577·1 Polyurethene 
FOam 
Acceptable Restricted - Not 
to exceed 18 
inches lengths 
or closer than 
12 inches from 
electrical leads 
ENCLOSURE 8·27 
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DESIGN REVIEW PANEL REPORT 
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Design Review Panel, 9. The task assigned for 
accomplishment by Panel 9 was prescribed as follows: 
Conduct critical design reviews of systems or subsystems that may be potential ignition sources 
within cockpit or which might provide a combustible condition in either normal or failed condi­
tions. Consider areas such as glycol plumbing configuration, electrical wiring and its protection, 
physical and electrical, as well as other potential ignition sources such as motors, relays, and co­
rona discharge. Other areas of review include egress augmentation and basic cabin atmosphere 
concept (one versus two-gas). Document where applicable pro's and con's of design decisions made. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following members of the Design Review Panel: 

Mr. R. W. Williams, Manned Spacecrft Center (MSC), NASA, Chairman· 

Mr. J. J anokaitis, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 

Mr. Aaron Cohen, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 

Dr. John F. McCarthy, North American Aviation (NAA), Downey, California 

Mr. R. Pyle, North American Aviation 

Mr. F. Sanders, McDonnell Company, St. Louis, Missouri 

2. 	COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. G. White, NASA Headquarters, Board Member, was assigned to monitor the Design Re­
view Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
1. 	APPROACH: 
Panel 9 effort has encompassed the four major sub-divisions as follows: 
a. Review of subsystems for sources of ignition or flammable materials. 
b. Review of the selection of the cabin atmosphere. 
c. Review of the egress process. 
d. Review of the flight and ground voice communications. 

The object of the review was to: 

a. Identify problems and potential problem areas that may provide guidance in determining the 
cause of the fire. 
b. Identify potential problem areas in the design for which design changes may be required. 
The review process has been expedited by informal assignment of sub tasks to knowledgeable groups 
of people (Reference 1). 
It must be noted that the contemplated spacecraft configuration for the next manned flight (Space­
craft 101, Block II) is different to a significant extent from spacecraft (SIC) 012 (Block I) in which the 
fire occurred. As a consequence both configurations are involved in the design reviews; the Block I 
configuration as an aid to determining possible sources for the fire, and the Block II to evaluate the 
system design characteristics and potential design change requirements to prevent recurrence of fire. 
2. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION 
A description of the process leading to the results of the detailed analyses of each of the four 
major subdivisions listed in Item 1 is presented herein. 
a. Ignition and Flammability · 
(1) SUMMARY 
A team of NASA and NAA Subsystem Managers and Systems Engineers conducted a 
thorough review of the subsystems housed in Block I and II Command Module (C/M) crew 
compartments. The purpose of the review was (1) to ascertain if any of the subsystems con­
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tained ignition sources that might have contributed to the Apollo 204 incident and (2) to 
identify similar anomalies that might exist in the Block II SIC and document them for input 
to the overall spacecraft design review activity. 
This extensive review culminated in the compilation of a final report (Reference 2) to 
the Chairman ' of Panel 9 substantiated by the Design Review summary sheets (Reference 
3). Results of the review delineate ignition sources (Blocks I and II) and contiguous non­
metallic materials (Block II) for each subsystem. The type of packaging and qualification 
history was examined and is listed for each component (Block II) . A summary of this review 
is included as Enclosure 9-1 to this report. 
(2) CRITERIA FOR REVIEW 
(a) 	IGNITION SOURCES 
Search for and identify possible ignition sources of the following types: 
Corona discharge 
Electrical arcs or sparks from damaged insulation, motor brushes, exposed relay con­
tacts, switches, etc. 
Overheating caused by circuit failures 
Overheating due to inadequate or improper lubrication 
Chemical sources 
Miscellaneous (impact, etc.) 
(b) COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS 
Identification and location by subsystem of all flammable materials within the 
crew compartment. 
(3) SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEMS FOR REVIEW 
(a) Cuidance and Navigation (G&N) (including Block II rendezvous radar) 
(b) Stabilization and Control System (SCS) 
(c) Electrical Power System (EPS) and Sequential Events Control System (SECS) 
(d) Controls and Displays 
(e) 	Caution and Warning System (C&WS) 
(f) Environmental Control System (ECS) 
(g) Emergency Detection System (EDS) 
(h) Telecommunications (T/C) 

Operational instrumentation 

Spacecraft communication 

Crew communication 

Television (TV) 

System instrumentation 

(i) Experiments and Scientific Equipment 

U) Crew Personal Equipment 

(4) METHOD OF OPERATION 
The task was executed in two phases. The first phase consisted of concurrent independ­
ent reviews of the C/ M subsystems by Subsystem Managers and Systems Engineers at Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC) and by contractor personnel at the North American Aviation (NAA) 
plant in Downey, California. These independent reviews were conducted in the time pe­
riod February 6-16, 1967. The second phase consisted of working sessions, involving both 
MSC and NAA personnel, conducted at MSC during the period February 17-20, 1967. Dur­
ing these sessions, the MSC and NAA inputs were combined to constitute the subpanel re­
port. The two-phase method of task execution was used for many reasons, the principal 
being optimum utilization of personnel and facilities at both the congractor's and MSC plants, 
and thoroughness afforded by two independent reviews of the subsystems which separately 
reflect the contractor and customer rationale. 
(5) SPECIAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The configurations of both Block I and Block II vehicles were examined with a view 
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toward identifying deficiencies in design and compatibility of design with criteria (specified 
requirements). Many deficiencies in the design could be traced to criteria which changed 
in the course of the program. The deficiencies can be categorized into those affecting wiring 
and ECS plumbing. 
A number of criticisms of the wlflng and ECS plumbing joints for Block I vehicles have 
resulted from examination of SIC 012, 014, and 017. The criticisms include instances of: 
Interference with access for maintenance 
Insufficient physical protection 
Undesirable routing and terminating 
Lack of flexibility for change 
Frequent leakage of waterIglycol joints 
Poor workmanship 
Lack of neatness and craftsmanship 
The process of spacecraft manufacture, test, and maintenance, which results In the above 
criticisms, derives from the designs to which the spacecraft are built. The criteria establish 
the requirements for the design. These criteria continued to evolve after the design had been 
started and in some instances changed after release of design to manufacturing. Some sig­
nificant examples follow: 
(a) WIRING 
(1) Unmanned flights were introduced which required retrofit of the Mission Con­
trol Programmer and associated wiring, and interconnecting with CI M flight control 
and other subsystem circuits. This additional complexity applies to SIC 017 but not 
to SIC 012 and 014. 
(2) Because of the experience of water condensing on electrical equipment during 
the flight of a Mercury spacecraft, the electrical and electronic components were required 
to be qualified in a combined environment of water, oxygen and salt instead of oxygen 
alone. As a result, the environmental-seal concept was introduced which changed the 
packaging design of the electronic equipment. 
(3) The in-flight maintenance concept, on which the initial design was based, was 
dropped in favor of built-in redundancy after design completion on Block I but prior 
to the initiation of the design of Block II. 
(4) The requirements for in-flight scientific experiments were added after designs were 
released to manufacture or test. 
(5) Additional development and operational instrumentation requirements were in­
troduced after the wiring design was released and in manufacture or test. 
(6) The design of displays and controls was based on requirements established by a 
flight-crew group. Subsequently, minor changes were made to meet the requirements 
of the assigned flight crew. 
(7) The audio communication control equipment on SIC 012 suffered from a series 
of changes in performance requirements resulting in a number of fixes. The final con­
figuration contained many changed and interrelated switch functions which resulted in 
a complex matrix of switch positions for proper selection of the different modes. 
The initial design for the Block I vehicles failed to accommodate growth and changes 
typically experienced in research and development programs. The result was that the flex­
ibility for change was quickly saturated, and it was necessary to imp~ovise at the expense of 
the factors exposed by the criticisms above. (However, the initial design of Block II allowed 
for a 50 percent growth in wiring.) The Block I wiring runs were laid out without the use 
of an engineering mockup and wire harnesses were fabricated in two-dimensional rather than 
three-dimensional fixtures. 
Post-fire inspection of SIC 012 revealed deficiencies in the wire installation demonstrat­
ing poor practices in design, manufacturing and quality control. The wiring in the space­
craft survived the fire with a small degree of damage overall. The Teflon insulation was found 
to be damaged only in localized hot spots. The majority of the damage consisted of insula­
tion loss due to heat; however, in practically all instances there remained sufficient insula­
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tion or distance between the affected wires, that shorting was not apparent. All enclosures 
pertaining to this section are photos of SIC 012 after the accident. 
During the wire inspection, the following design deficiencies were noted: 
(1) The wiring in the Lower Equipment Bay (LEB) was routed through narrow chan­
nels having many 90 degree bends. This could cause mechanical stress on the Teflon 
insulation. Some wiring in these areas was found with damage to the sleeve which cov­
ers the shielded wire (Enclosure 9 -4) . 
(2) Wire color coding practices were not always adhered to as evidenced by Enclos· 
ure 9-5. 
(3) Some areas of wiring exhibited what would be referred to as "rats nests" be­
cause of the dense, disordered array of wiring. In some instances excessive lengths of 
wires were looped back and forth to take up the slack. Also, there were instances where 
wires appeared to have been threaded through bundles which added to the disorder (En­
closures 9·6, 9-7, 9-8, 9-9 and 9-10). 
(4) A circuit breaker panel was pressed so close to a wire harness, that wiring in­
dentions were left in the circuit-breaker potting (Enclosure 9-11). 
(5) There were wires routed across and along oxygen and water/glycol lines. 
(6) The floor wiring and some connectors in the LEB were not completely protected 
from damage by test personnel and the astronauts. This is evidenced by mashed 22­
gauge wires found in some of the wire harnesses. 
The following Manufacturing and Quality Control deficiencies were noted: 
(1) Lack of attention during manufacture and/or rework is evidenced by foreign 
objects found in the spacecraft harnesses. Enclosure 9-12 shows a wrench socket in one 
of the connector chanQels, and Enclosure 9-13 shows a metal washer inside a wire bundle. 
(2) Some wiring did not have identification tags . 
(3) A Hughes connector on communications equipment was broken prior to the fire 
as evidenced by soot in the crack, Enclosure 9-14. 
(4) A chipped Hughes connector was found in a condition exposing female inserts 
(Enclosure 9-15). 
(b) ECS PLUMBING JOINTS 
(1) The ECS design criteria, emphasizing mlOlmum weight, resulted in the selection 
of aluminum piping with soldered joints (Enclosure 9-3). The design approach utilized 
accounted for the normal operatil1g stresses but failed to account for the loads and stresses 
introduced by handling and installation. 
(2) The proper fabrication of joints requires that the initial alignment of the tubes 
to be soldered must be established without stress and without benefit of a holding tool. 
The tool provides support to the joint only during the heat-up and cool-down phase. 
(3) The couplings were made too short to provide the joint with strength greater than 
the tubing. As a result, unanticipated axial, bending or torsional loads cause the joint 
to develop leak paths. 
(4) The installation design does not permit adequate inspection and does not protect 
the plumbing and the joint from accidental damage, or from use as hand holds. In 
some areas access of tools is difficult without stressing or springing joints already made. 
The development and qualification testing of the ECS extended beyond the original schedule. 
Units were produced and installed in spacecraft which required modification to eliminate 
problems later identified during qualification tests. The design failed to provide easy access 
for removal and replacement of components in the assembled condition. Consequently, the 
process of rework is difficult, and the design criteria for soldered joints is violated under re­
work conditions. The leakage of soldered joints in the C/M cabin is traceable primarily to 
these conditions. 
b. CABIN ATMOSPHERE 
(1) INTRODUCTION: 
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The process of selection of the cabin atmosphere has been reviewed and a comprehen­
sive bibliography (Reference 4) of all material leading to the ?ecision to use Loxygen 02 
in space and at the pad has been compiled. . A summary of this material is contained in En­
closure 9-2 to this report. The references contain a retracing of all the steps and considera­
tions leading to the choice of the cabin atmosphere for the spacecraft. Pertinent data are in­
cluded from cognizant NASA organizations, other government agencies, Mercury, Gemini, 
and Apollo contractors and subcontractors, other aerospace companies, the medical communi­
ty, universities, and other research organizations. 
(2) DISCUSSION; 
Selection of a spacecraft cabin atmosphere involves human physiology constraints, space­
craft and space suit design considerations, flammability characteristics of materials, ground 
consideratio~, and considerations of fire extinguishing and suppression. 
(a) HUMAN PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 
Htlman physiology imposes a requirement for a minimum partial pressure of oxygen 
for respiration, a minimum absolute-pressure environment for respiration and control of 
body water-vapor partial pressure, and limits to the rate of depressurization to prevent 
bends from gases emanating from solution in the body. A one h).mdred percent oxygen 
atmosphere is physiologically acceptable for continuous use up to thirty days. 
NASA physiologists specify that a minimum oxygen partial pressure of 3.5 psia and 
a minimum absolute pressure of 5 psia be maintained as spacecraft cabin atmosphere. 
Reduced levels are acceptable for short periods of time (up to eight hours) . One hun­
dred percent oxygen pre-breathing is specified for a minimum of three hours prior 
to launch. 
Dysbarism (bends) is avoided by a minimum partial pressure of diluent gas in the 
spacecraft. The desirable partial pressure of nitrogen in a mixed-gas spacecraft atmos­
phere has not been formally established. It has been established that the disadvantages 
will more likely exceed the advantages at nitrogen partial pressures greater than 3.5 psia. 
Oxygen toxicity is prevented by avoiding oxygen partial pressures significantly greater 
than those experienced at sea level (3.5 psia). 
Consequently, from the physiological standpoint, acceptable cabin atmosphere ranges 
from a 5 psia oxygen single-gas environment to a mixed-gas environment with 3.5 psia 
oxygen and 3.5 psia nitrogen partial-pressures. 
(b) SPACECRAFT AND SPACE SUIT DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
The design parameters for spacecraft involving cabin atmosphere are concerned with 
the strength of the structure to contain the cabin pressure and the varying complexities 
of atmosphere-control systems for one hundred percent oxygen or mixed gases. The de­
sign parameters for space suits are the same as for the spacecraft with the addition that 
the effort associated with movement increases with increasing differential pressure. 
The Apollo spacecraft atmosphere. control system design is based on providing a one 
hundred percent oxygen environment. Duplication of the atmosphere-control components 
as well as addition of a mechanism for oxygen partial-pressure control is required to pro­
vide diluent gases. These additions introduce additional crew-safety failure modes into 
the flight systems. 
The state-of-the-art in space ·suit .design establishes 3.8 psi as the desirable maximum 
differential pressure. Freedom of movement is constrained with further increases in dif­
ferential pressure. 
(c) FLAMMABILITY CHARACTERISTICS OF MATERIALS 
The flammabiiity characteristics of materials involve interrelationships with chemical 
and physical properties of the material, the total pressure of the atmosphere and partial 
pressure of atmospheric constituents, the temperatures of the material and the atmosphere, 
and the process of ignition utilized to initiate combustion. 
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There are three flammability characteristics that are generally measured to determine 
relative flammability of materials : 
(1) Linear burning rate in inches per second. 
(2) Temperature at which self-ignition occurs. 
(3) Temperature at which ignition by spark is achieved. 
The tests are performed in the atmospheres of particular interest. These have in­
cluded oxygen alone at various pressures and oxygen mixed with nitrogen at various 
pressures with various ratios of partial-pressure . 
The linear burning rates and auto-ignition temperatures measured in tests are shown 
in the tables below: 
Relative Propagation Rates (inches / sec. downward) 
Atrros phere Material 

psia / gas Cotton Ve lcro Nom ex Teflon 

3.5 / 02 .49 .4 .3 
5.0/ 02 .5 .48 .34 
16.0/ 02 .55 .7 .43 .003 
3.5/ 02I. 51N2 .4 .33 .22 
Air 
.1 .3 .1 
Auto· Ignition Temperature (OF) 
Atmosphere 

psia / gas Cotton 

3.5/ 02 1160 
5.0/ 02 1180 
16.0/ 02 1280 
3.5/ 02 1. 51N2 1040 
Air 1000 
Downward burning rates of the same material are shown to vary over a range of 
only 1.4 to 1 with atmosphere changes from 5 psi a oxygen to a 7 psia atmosphere of 
3.5 psia oxygen and 3.5 psia nitrogen. Downward burning rates in a particular atmos­
phere vary over a range of 1000 to 1 with material changes from cotton to Teflon. Con­
sequently, the potential for fire in the elM is much more strongly influenced by the 
selection of materials than by acceptable variations in atmosphere. 
It may be concluded that the selection of 5 psia oxygen as a cabin environment 
for space flight operations was a reasonable choice. The physiological requirements are 
totally fulfilled . The requirements on spacecraft structure and systems are minimized. 
Based on tests of downward-burning propagation, the difference in fire potential between 
various physically' acceptable atmospheres is not large, particularly if easily combustible 
materials are eliminated. 
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(d) GROUND CONSIDERATIONS 
At any pressure the suitloop must contain only oxygen to avoid the "bends". If 
cabin atmospheric constituents other than oxygen are used, they should be isolated from 
the suitloop and expelled from the cabin prior to crew emergency from the suited conditions 
to avoid anozia. These requirements were fulfilled for Apollo 204 by the use of oxygen 
without diluents. 
Downward burning rates of some materials vary by a factor of 1.3 to 1 for an at­
mosphere of 16 psia oxygen compared to a 5 psia oxygen atmosphere. If the decision 
had been made to use the extreme atmosphere for space operation of 3.5 psia oxygen 
and 3.5 psia nitrogen partial pressures, the burning-rate ratio between 16 psia oxygen 
and this environment would be only 1.8 to 1. 
Tests carried out subsequent to the Apollo 204 accident with full-scale mockups at 
both 16 psia and 5 psia, one hundred percent oxygen atmospheres have demonstrated 
that differences in downward burning rates of materials are not indicative of actual fire 
hazards. Propagation rates and overall fire damage were much greater at the higher 
pressure. Thus, it appears that the geometric arrangement of the combustibles in their 
actual installations are much more significant than tests on isolated samples. 
If air were used instead of oxygen on the ground (recognizing that spacecraft de­
sign changes would be required) a ratio of burning rates of 1 to 2 over 5 psia or 1 to 
4 over 16 psia oxygen would be achieved. This reduction in burning rate would provide 
a reduced hazard for ground operation over space operation, except within the suit loop 
where 15 psia oxygen is required. These relations are based on downward burning rates 
for isolated specimens under controlled conditions. The conclusions have not been veri­
fied by tests in air with full scale mock-ups. 
It must be concluded that burning rates of materials are significantly reduced only 
when large amounts of diluent are used. The limited quantity of diluent acceptable 
by physiological criteria contributes very little to the reduction of burning rate over that 
in pure oxygen. 
(e) FIRE EXTINGUISHING AND SUPPRESSION 
The established process for extinguishing a cabin fire in space is to evacuate the 
cabin of oxygen by venting to' space. Limited flammability tests indicate that burning 
generally ceases when oxygen pressure is reduced to a half (0 .5) psia. The cabin-venting 
mechanism design results in cabin pressure reducing from 5.0 psia to 0.5 psia in ap­
proximately one minute forty-five seconds. 
Cabin depressurization requires that the crew be in their space suits. The donning 
time is 10-15 minutes. 
Alternative extinguishing techniques have been examined, but no really satisfactory 
technique has so far been found. Effort in this area is continuing. Recent experiments 
have shown only water to be effective. A better understanding of the burning and ex­
tinguishing phenomena is required to properly assess the adequacy of the present and 
alternative extinguishing processes. 
Elimination of contaminants III the cabin by means such as suit purge and cabin 
venting must be provided. Prior to the venting process, crew protection should be pro­
vided by some means such as oxygen masks supplied by a separate fire-proof oxy­
gen supply. 
c. REVIEW OF THE EGRESS PROCESS 
(1) 	INTRODUCTION: 
A critical review of the egress situation investigated the elements of both Launch Com­
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plex (LC) 39 and Launch Complex 34, including the environmental chamber, access arm, 
elevator, personnel carrier (M-113) (Launch Complex 34 only), escape chute and hardened 
room (Launch Complex 39 only), lighting, communications, and fire suppression. This re­
view was supplemented by conferences and responsive written reports on suggested design 
criteria from the following permanent Apollo Saturn Inter-Center Coordination Panels: Apollo 
Launch Operations Committee (ALOC) Emergency Egress Working Group, Apollo Launch 
Operations Panel (ALOP) Emergency Egress Subpanel, and Crew Safety Panel, as well as 
the Ground Emergency Provisions Review Panel No. 13 of the Apollo 204 Review Board. 
The Panel No. 9 review and the reports of these associated organizations are contained 
in the supporting data which has been transmitted to the Apollo 204 Review Board files (Ref­
erence 6). This review utilized time lines, simulations, review of drawings, inspection of the 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and a methodical analysis of the egress process all the 
way from CIM exit to safety. 
(2) DISCUSSION: 
Based on tests in mock-up configurations, the following times for crew egress were meas­
ured. (Average times are used; best times are in parentheses.) Sixty (41) seconds are re­
quired for unaided crew egress from the Command Module. Ten (7) seconds are required 
for all three crewmen to disconnect and for the center crewman to turn around and face 
the hatch prior to opening. Forty (26) seconds are required for the center crewman to re­
lease and stow the inner hatch and release and open the outer ha~ch and boost-protective­
cover hatch. Ten (8) seconds are required for all three crewmen to exit. The hatch can­
not be opened with positive cabin pressure above approximately 0.25 psi .. 
The access arm to the Command Module contains flammable materials, and the doors 
are not designed to accommodate rapid emergency egress. Correction of these conditions 
would significantly improve emergency egress capabilities. 
Removal of the access arm to allow the escape mode changeover from crew egress to 
Launch Escape System (LES) pad abort is necessary for maximum flight-crew safety just prior 
to launch. In the event of a CIM fire in this time period, the access arm could be returned 
to the CIM in time for safe crew egress if reduced flammability characteristics of the Com­
mand Module would greatly increase the allowable time for the egress escape process. 
d. REVIEW OF THE FLIGHT AND GROUND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS 
(1) INTRODUCTION: 
Since the Operational Checkout Procedure (OCP) Plugs-Out Test during the Apollo 204 
accident (OCP FO-K-0021-1) experienced communications difficulties, an examination of the 
design and performance of the total communications network was undertaken. This effort 
included: a comprehensive review to establish the configuration and operating characteristics 
of the. Apollo 204 system; a system and circuit analysis, a test of the total ground system 
utilizing detailed measurements (February 21-24, 1967), and analyses of recordings made dur­
ing the OCP FO-K-0021-1 test. 
The supporting data (Reference 7) transmitted to the Apollo 204 Review Board files con­
tain: a description of the on-board system, its test performance, and a discussion of the prob· 
lems encountered; description and conclusions concerning the ground network; and detailed 
findings and determinations. 
(2) DISCUSSION: 
During the OCP FO-K-0021-1 test (Plugs-Out Test during Apollo 204 incident), diffi­
culties were experienced maintaining voice communications. These difficulties included 
the following : 
(a) Voice unintelligible due to very low levels at the listener's position. 
(b) Voice unintelligible due to distortion, or "garbling." 
(c) Syllables or words not received. 
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(d) Inability- to contact another individual. 
(e) Inability to communicate because of nOIse or other interference, including 
undesired voice. 
These problems did not occur at all stations, or at anyone station all the time; 
however, there were instances when several of the troubles occurred simultaneously. The 
source of the problems can be divided into two parts, viz., spacecraft and ground. 
SPACECRAFT: 
The spacecraft experienced a "live mike" situation, first noticed by the crew 
approximately one hour and five minutes before the accident. The .records indicate 
that the VHF and S·band RF downlinks (,exclusive of spacecraft audio and control 
circuit wiring) from spacecraft to ground operated satisfactorily during the OCP 
FO-K-002l-1 test. 
GROUND: 
The Communications Astronaut Console (CAST) on the ground was configured 
to patch the three voice links together (Astro 1 - Unified "s" Band, Astro 2 - VHF, 
and Astro 3 - Umbilical). With this configuration any downlink transmission is 
retransmitted back to the spacecraft on all three links. 
The Spacecraft Test Conductor (MSTC) in the Automatic Checkout Equipment 
(ACE) Control Room in the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building (MSOB) was 
unable to contact the Command Pilot, Senior Pilot or Pilot at one time because 
of the Voice Operated Relay (VOX) in the ground link. The back-to-back VOX 
{;ircuits lock out operation in the reverse direction when a signal appears in the unit. 
Any signal coming from the Cape Kennedy Air Force Communications Termi­
nal Building, Eastern Test Range, such as the MSTC or Superintendant of Range 
(AFETR) going into Launch Complex 34 has priority, with interrupt capability, 
over a signal originating in the Complex . However, even though it gets into the 
Complex Operational Intercommunication System (OIS) and the CAST console, 
it still has no priority to the spacecraft on any link. 
System and circuit analyses showed that the difficulties experienced were due 
to system design deficiencies in the ground communications system, unfamiliarity with 
the system limitations and unsatisfactory procedures. 
The ground communication system is one that has evolved during a series of 
modifications and additions. Rather than establishing an overall system design, hard­
ware was merely added as new requirements were identified. The result was an 
overloaded system, with different types of subsystems which were inadequately interfaced. 
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. A listing of findings and determinations from the information generated in the processes described In 
in Section C above are listed in Section D.2 . 
2. To be compatible with Section C above, the findi ngs and determinations are listed according to the ma­
jor classifications; viz., Ignition and Flammability, Cabin Atmosphere, Review of Egress Process, and 
Review of the Flight and Ground Voice Communications. 
a. IGNITION AND FLAMMABILITY 
(1) FINDING: 
Flammable, non·metallic materials are used throughout the spacecraft. In the Block 
I and Block II spacecraft design, combustible materials exist contiguous to potential ig­
nition sources. 
DETERMINATION: 
In the Block I and Block 11 spacecraft design, combustible materials are exposed in suf· 
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ficient quantities to constitute a fire hazard. 
(2) FINDING: 
Malfunctions and failures can produce ignition sources in the Command Module. 
DETERMINATION: 
An ignition source in the presence of a combustible in the cabin atmosphere constitutes 
a fire hazard. 
(3) FINDING: 
Packaging design for Block II components differs from Block I In that nearly all compo­
nents in Block II are hermetically or environmentally sealed. 
DETERMINATION: 
The Block II packaging design practice reduces the probability for the coexistence of 
~n ignition source and flammable material. 
(4) FINDING: 
The space suit contains power wiring to electronic circuits; also, the astronauts could 
be electrically insulated. 
DETERMINATION: 
Both the power wiring and potential for static discharge constitute possible ignition sources 
in the presence of combustible materials. The wiring in the suit could fail from working 
or bending. 
(5) FINDING: 
Eighteen electrical circuits in Spacecraft 012 did not adhere completely to wire size/ 
load/ circuit protection design criteria. 
DETERMINATION: 
The condition was examined from the standpoint of overheating, and no problem was 
found to exist. 
(6) FINDING: 
Residues of RS89 (inhibited ethylene glycol/water solution) after drying are both corro­
sive and combustible. RS89 is corrosive to wire bundles because of its inhibitor. 
DETERMINATION: 
Because of the corrosive and combustible properties of the residues, RS89 coolant could 
in itself provide all of the elements of a fire hazard if leakage occurs onto electrical equipment. 
(7) FINDING: 

Water/glycol is combustible, although not easily ignited. 

DETERMINATION: 

Leakage of water/glycol in the cabin increases the risk of fire. 

(8) FINDING: 
Deficiencies in design, manufacture and quality control were found In the post-fire in­
spection of the wire installation. 
DETERMINATION: 
There was an undesirable risk exposure which should have been prevented by both the 
Contractor and the Government. 

(9)'FINDING: 

The environmental control system is plumbed with aluminum tubing in both the water / 
glycol and oxygen Circuits. Joints in the plumbing are made by nickel plating the aluminum 
and joining the nickel-plated surfaces with a tin-lead solder. Leakage of ECS coolant from 
these joints has been experienced in the Apollo spacecraft. 
DETERMINATION: 
The design of the soldered joints is inadequate to cope with all the conditions experi­
enced in the spacecraft. 
b. CABIN ATMOSPHERE 
(1) FINDING: 
NASA physiologists specify that a ffilnImUm oxygen partial pressure of 3.5 psia and a 
minimum absolute pressure of 5 psia be maintained as spacecraft cabin atmosphere. 
DETERMINATION: 
Acceptable cabin atmosphere ranges from a 5 psia oxygen single-gas environment to a 
mixed-gas environment with 3.5 psia oxygen and 3.5 psia nitrogen partial pressure. 
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(2) FINDING: 
The spacecraft atmosphere control system design is based on providing a pure oxy­
gen environment. 
DETERMINATION: 
The complexity of the technology is such that, to provide diluent gases, duplication of 
the atmosphere-control components as well as addition of a mechanism for oxygen partial­
pressure control is required. These additions introduce additional crew-safety failure modes 
into the flight systems. 
'(3) :FINDING: 
Flammability characteristics of non-metallic materials are varied by only a factor of 3 
or 4 by diluents in atmospheres containing oxygen at 3 to 5 psi partial pressure. 
DETERMINATION: 
Previous analyses leading to the decision to use 5 psia pure oxygen cabin environment 
in space are still valid. / 
c. REVIEW OF THE EGRESS PROCESS 
(1) FINDING: 
Sixty seconds ·are required for unaided crew egress from the Command Module. The 
hatch cannot be opened with positive cabin pressure above approximately 0.25 psi. The 
vent capacity was insufficient to accommodate the pressure buildup in the Apollo 204 Spacecraft. 
DETERMINATION: 
Even under optimum conditions emergency crew egress from Apollo 204 Spacecraft could 
not have been accomplished in sufficient time. 
(2YFINDING: 
The access arms to the Command Module in Launch Complexes 34 and 39 contain flam­
mable materials, are removed thirty minutes prior to launch, and their doors open the wrong 
way for easy egress. 
DETERMINATION: 

The access arm could constitute a fire hazard and imposes delays to emergency crew egress. 

d. REVIEW OF THE FLIGHT AND GROUND VOICE COMMUNICATIONS 
(J) FINDING: 
The control circuit from the Command Pilot developed a condition of continuous keying 
during the test. 

DETERMINATION: 

An anomaly existed in the spacecraft communication system. 

0) FINDING: 
During the Apollo ·204 test, difficulty was experienced in communicating from ground 
to Spacecraft and among ground stations. 

DETERMINATION: 

The ground system design was not compatible with operational requirements. 

E. SUPPORTING DATA 
The following is a list of enclosures to this section of the report. . 
Enclosures 
9-1 Summary of Ignition and Flammability Review 
9-2 Spacecraft Atmospheres 
9-3 Examination of Soldered Joints for Aluminum Tubing 
9-4 Wiring Assessment 
9-5 Wiring Assessment 
9-6 Wiring Assessment 
9-7 Wiring Assessment 
9-8 Wiring Assessment 
9-9 Wiring Assessment 
9-10 Wiring Assessment 
9-11 Wiring Assessment 
9-12 Wiring Assessment 
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9-13 Wiring Assessment 
9-14 Wiring Assessment 
9-15 Wiring Assessment 
9-16 List of Reference Material 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF IGNITION 

AND FLAMMABILITY REVIEW 

This enclosure contains the significant findings of the Ignition Source Review Team for both Block I 
and Block II equipment installed in the Command Module interior. The possible ignition sources are 
grouped by subsystem. The information which follows was derived from a detailed review of the approx­
mately 2000 pages contained in the basic ignition source report. 
It is important to bring out the fact that neither the MSC, nor the NAA review teams nor the 
integration team were able to locate any possible sources of ignition in the subsystems under normal 
operating conditions. In all cases in order to have an ignition source, there must first be some type of 
failure of the component in question. 
When a single failure mode for each component was postulated, twenty-one and fourteen potential 
ignition souroes were identified for the Block I and Block II crew compartment subsystems, respective­
ly. The number of ignition sources noted above does riot represent a tally of total individual compan. 
ment . subsystems, respectively. The number of ignition sources noted above does not represent a tally 
of total individual components that are suspect because all identical components such as switches and 
indicators on the display and control panels, all electrical connectors, and all harnesses or cable runs, 
etc., were treated generically; i.e., each group of suspect items in a category was considered as one 
potential ignition source. Delineation of ignition sources identified in Block I and II subsystem follows . 
BLOCK I 
ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible sources of ignition under a 
failure condition: 
General Usage Connectors 
Special Purpose Connectors 
Modular Terminal Boards 
Electrical Wiring 
The above listed possible sources are generally generated by procedural and human error problems 
such as broken wires, damaged insulation, bent connector pins, damaged or lack of, conformal coating 
on terminal · boards, etc . Evaluation of the detailed data in the basic repan revealed that there were 
several cases on SIC 012 where there were deviations taken to the basic criteria for circuit-breaker 
compatability with wire size. The basic ignition source report contains an analysis of each 01 the cases 
of deviation, and evaluation of these analyses reveals a very low probability that these deviations could 
have been contributory to the SIC 012 accident. 
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS SUBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible sources of ignition under a fail­
ure condition: 
Main Display Console (MDC) Panels 
(Wiring and Terminal Strips) 
Lower Equipment Bay (LEB) Pands 
(Wiring and Terminal Strips) 
Excessive handling and human error problems associated with these components can lead to damage 
of wiring and conformally coated terminal strips. This da·mage could, in tum, lead to an arcing or 
shorting failure mode. 
CAUTION AND WARNING SUBSYSTEM 
The following component of this subsystem is considered a possible ignition source under a failure 
condition: 
Elapsed Time Indicator 
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This device is removed prior to night and is, therefore, only a potential ignition source during 
ground operations . The Block I program has experienced one problem with this indicator on S/C014 
during Downey checkout that could have led to it being an ignition source. Smoke was observed 
in this particular case when over-heating of a spike-suppression capacitor Occurred. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible ignition sources under a fail­
ure condition: 
Glycol Evaporator Back Pressure Controller 
Cable Assemblies 
"Vaste Management System Blower 
Valve Seats in Oxygen Lines 
The Controller was considered as a potential source only in that there is some probability that 
overheating of the controller under an internal failure condition could ignite the encapsulating material. 
It is not known, whether such a condition could result in ignition of the insulation, so it must be 
classified as suspect. 
The cable assemblies are listed since breakage or abrasion could provide a source of ignition in 
that some harnesses are in direct contact with the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) foam insula­
tion . The foam insulation was not covered with silicone rubber and thus did not meet the Apollo 
criteria for ignition temperature characteristics of nonmetallic materials. 
The Waste Management System Blower is considered suspect because failures of a shorting or 
arcing nature within the blower motor have been experienced during the program. 
Overheating of regulator and valve seats can occur in high-pressure oxygen lines due to compres­
sion waves. Because of this phenomenon, ignition of nanunable plastic seats is possible. 
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SUBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible ignition sources under a fail­
ure condition: 
Display and Keyboard (DSKY) Electroluminescent Panels 
Guidance and Navigation (G&:-.i) Interconnecting Harness 
Inertial Measuring Unit (IMU) Control Panel Switches 
F.~· epiecc Heaters 
A failure of the sealing for the Electroluminescent lights on the DSKY Panel could allow mois­
ture to provide a shorting path for 250 volts used to excite the luminescent material. These seals did 
experience failure in qualification testing during low-temperature storage. 
Breakage or abrasion of the G&:-.i harness could lead to a possible ignition source. 
The IMU Control Panel pushbutton lighted switches which contain bulbs do not constitute an 
hermetically or environmentally sealed device. These are possible ignition sources in the case of cracked 
bulbs or poor contact due to corrosion. 
An equipment or component is considered hermetically sealed if it is sealed, either via a bonded­
metal cover, or a gasketed cover (a molded-in-place elastomer gasket) which is designed to be capable 
of remaining pressurized or evacuated for the specification life of the equipment or component. 
An equipment or component is consideted environmentally sealed if it is not hermetically sealed, 
and is potted, foamed and/or conformally coated such that it will withstand the Apollo qualification 
environments, particularly with regard to the humidity and salt fog environments. This type of pack­
aging generally "breathes" and is normally enclosed in a metal package. 
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The Eyepieces contain resistance heaters which operate at 21! volts and 0.1 amps. These eye­
pieces are subject to much handling before and during flight and are therefore subject to a greater 
probability of damage than fixed electrical components. Such damage could result in arcing or shorting. 
STABILIZATION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible ignition sources under a fail­
ure condition: 

Rotational Control 

Velocity Change IndicatodDelta V) 

These two components of the Stabilization Control Subsystem contain non -hermetically sealed 
switches . If a failure occurs in the arc-suppression diodes, there could be a short to ground causing 
arcing of the contacts. 
SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible ignition sources under a fail­
ure condition : 
Radio Frequency (RF ) Connectors 
Overheating of Equipment due to Loss of Cooling 
Elapsed Time Indicators (See Caution and Warning Subsystem) 
Hughes Connectors 
Arcing of RF connectors and pin-to-pin shorting of the Hughes connectors are potential ignition 
sources under a failure condition . There is a general concern with regards to potential ignition source; 
if all communications system cooling should be lost. Whether or not ignition temperatures of adjacent 
non-metallics could be attained is not known . 
TELEVISION SUBSYSTEM 
The following components of this subsystem are considered possible ignition sources under a fail­
ure ( procedural) condition: 
Television Bulkhead Connectors and Cable Assemblies 
If the TV power switch is left in the "on" position during connection or disconnection of the 
TV power cable, arcing could occur thereby providing an ignition source. 
SUBSYSTEM CONTAINING NO PROBABLE IGNITION SOURCES 
Based on the ground rules established for this evaluation, the following subsystems are c.onsidered 
non-suspect from a probable ignition source standpoint: 

Sequential Events Controller 

Mission Control Programmer 

Crew Communications 

Instrumentation 

Experiments and Scientific Equipment 

BLOCK II 
The number of Block II components considered to be possible ignition sources under failure con­
ditions is fourteen . This is seven fewer components than were listed in the Block I subsystems. The 
reduction in number is due in all cases to either ' one of two conditions: 
(a) The Block I component is not used in Block II or 
. (b) The Block II components have been redesigned to eliminate the problem that existed 
in the Block I component. In many cases non-hermetically sealed components in Block I had 
been previously redesigned to incorporate hermetic seals due to concern over moisture penetration. 
The following is a listing by subsystem of the Block II components that are considered possible 
ignition sources under failure conditions. The reasons that these are suspect can be found under the 
previous Block I susystem discussion of the component. 
ELECfRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 

General Usage Connectors 
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Special Purpose Connectors 
Modular Terminal Boards 
Electrical Wiring 
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS SUBSYSTU1 
MDC and LEB Panels (Wiring and Terminal Strips) 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
Glycol Evaporator Back Pressure Controller 
Cable Assemblies 
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SUBSYSTEM 
G&::-'; Interconnecting Harness 
Eyepiece Heaters 
STABILIZATION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
Rotational Control 
SPACECRAFT COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM 
RF Connectors 
Overheating of Equipment due to Loss of Cooling 
TELEVISION SUBSYSTEM 
Television Bulkhead Connectors and Cable Assemblies 
The following lists subsystems in which there exists no probable source of ignition: 
Caution and Warning 
Sequential Events Controller 
Entry Monitor 
Crew Communications 
Instrumentation 
Experiments and Scientific Equipment 
Table I of this Enclosure is a convenient listing of the ignition sources and identifies changes from 
Block I to Block I I. 
Tne-- type of packaging and qualification history was examined for the components which were 
reviewed for possible ignition services. The components were treated categorically so the total number 
portrayed is greatly reduced from the total number actually reviewed ( i.e ., switches, circuit breakers, 
terminal boards, etc. ) 
Total number of components 188 
Number environmentally sealed 95 
Number hermetically sealed 78 
Number not protected by either 15 
hermetic or environmental packaging 
Table II of this Enclosure is a listing of all the Block II components which are neither hermeti­
cally nor environmentally sealed. 
Table II I of this Enclosure is a listing by subsystem of non-metallic materials contiguous to the 
components in Block II which have been identified as possible single-failure ignition sources. 
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TABLE I OF ENCLOSURE 
SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE SOURCES OF IGNITION UNDER A FAILURE CONDFTlON 
- BLOCK I & BLOCK" ­
BLOCK I ITEM DESCRIPTION STATUS IN BLOCK" 
General L'sage Connectors Cabling Same 
Special Purpose Connectors Cabling Same 
:\lodular Terminal Iloards Cab ling Same 
Electrical "'iring Cabling Same 
:\Iain Display Console ( :\ID(: ) Panels Cabling Same 
( Wiring and Terminal Strips) 
Lower Equipment Ilay (LEIl) Panels Cabling Same 
(Wiring and Terminal Strips) 
Elapsed Time Indicator Component Eliminated 
Glycol Evaporator Back Pressure Controller Component ;-';0 Change 
Cable Assemblies Cabling Same 
Waste Management System Blower Component Fixed 
Display and Keyboard (DSKY) Electroluminescent Panels Component Fixed 
Guidance and :"avigation (C& \ ) Interconnecting Harness Cabling Same 
Inertial :\Ieasuring Cnit ( 1:\IL' ) Control Panel Switches Component Fixed 
Eyepiece Heaters Component No Change 
Rotational Control Component No Change 
Velocity Change Indicator (Delta \') component Fixed 
Radio Frequency ( RF ) Connectors Cabling Same 
Overheating of Equipment due to Loss of Cooling Condition Same 
Elapse Time Indicators Component Eliminated 
Hughes Connectors Cabling Eliminated 
Television Bulkhead Connectors and Cable Assl'mblies Cabling Same 
TABLE" OF ENCLOSURE I 

BLOCK" COMPONENTS NOT HERMETICALLY OR ENVIRONMENTALLY SEALED 

COMPONENT SUBSYSTEM TYPE OF PACKAGING 	 REMARKS 
1):'...<' \';111(' I .\ss(,lIIbl ies Displa\'s So: Controls Conformal Coating Terminals are potted or con­
(Twenty-eight for Block I) (D&C) formally coated. All current­
(Fifteen for Block II) carrying contacts are within 
sealed enclosures. I ncandes­
cent filaments are doubly 
sealed within glass bulbs 
inside sealed envelopes. 
Eyepiece Stowage Guidance & Navigation Stowage 	 Qualified 
Video Coaxial Con­ Communications No seal 	 These assemblies have been 
nector/ Cable Assemblies 	 qualified . Voltage and power 
levels are not considered to 
be high enough to pose a 
threat of fire. There are no 
known failures which have 
indicated that a fire hazard 
exists in the video con­
nector / ca ble assemblies, 
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TABLE II OF ENCLOSURE I (Continued) 
COMPONENT SUBSYSTEM TYPE OF PACKAGING REMARKS 
Bulkhead Receptacle Communications !\1etal housing \\·ith The receptacle has been 
plastic dielectric tested in 100% 0 at 14 psia 
around terminals­ with simulated cameral load_ 
:'\0 scat ~o failure has occurred_ 
Stadimeter Experiments & Scien­ :'I1ot packaged :'\on-electrical component 
tific Equipment 
Data Reduction Tables Experiments &: Scien­ :-':ot packaged :-':on-electrical component 
tific Equipment 
0009 Container Experiments & Scien­ :'\ot packaged :'\on-electrical component 
tific Equipment 
U ltraviolet (UV) Stellar Experiments &- Scien- Not packaged ~on-electrical component 
Spectrograph Support tific Equipment 
Structure 
Lens Cover Experiments &: Sc ien­ :'\ot packaged !\:on-electrical component 
tific Equipment 
UVI X-Ray Solar Spec­ Experiments &: Scien­ Connectors POlled No history of failure 
trograph Cable tific Equipment 
Scientific Airlock Experiments & Scien­ :-':ot packaged; provides ~on-electrical component 
tific Equipment spacecraft seal 
Film Magazine for Experiments &: Scien­ Combustible film is No history of failure 
Camera tific Equipment totally enclosed, but 
not sealed, in metal 
magazine 
1.2 Litre Contingency Experiments &: Sciell- Not packaged Non-electrical component 
tific equipment 
Urine Receiver Experiments & Scien- Not packaged Non-electrical component 
tific Equipment 
Scientific Junction Experiments &: Scien- POlled internally No history of failure 
Box tific Equipment 
TABLE III OF ENCLOSURE 9-1 
BLOCK II NON-METALLIC MATERIALS CONTIGUOUS TO COMPONENTS 
IDENTIFIED AS POSSIBLE SINGLE-FAILURE IGNITION SOURCES 
SUBSYSTEM 	 NON-MET ALLIC MATERIALS 
Electrical Power 	 Teflon Tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) 
Silicone Rubber 
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TABLE III OF EHCLOSUR E 9-1 (Continued) 
SUBSYSTEM 
Stabilization & Control 
Sequclllial ['Tnls (:ontrol 
:\\iss ion COlllrol P ro~l'all\lncr 
Elllr\' :\\o nilOr 
(:onllllunica I ions 
Instrulllcmalion 
Expcriments "nd Scicnl ifi c 
Equifl lll('n l 
HOH-METALLIC MATERIALS 
Phenolic :\ \oldin~ (:olllflound 
[)iallylisoflhthalate (lHIP) 
:\\ o lding Compound 
Expoxy Primcr 
..\ erylic Ena lllel 
Efloxy-Synlalic Foam 
Polyurethanc \ 'arnish 
Silicone Lubr icanl 
Silicone !{ ubbcr 
:\0 I ~nilion .Sources 
:\01 ,\flfllicable 
:\0 Igni t ioll Sources 
(:lass .. \ Foallled Polyp roflylcnc 
I rradia led Pol ,"olefin 
Irradialed Poh'inylidcnl' Fluoridc 
Teflon 
'\0 Igni lion Sources 
:\0 l ~n it ion Sources 
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,SUBSYSTEM 
Displays & Controls 
Caution ~: Warning 
Environlllcnt a l Control 
Guidanc e 3.: :\a\igation 
T ABL E III OF ENC LaSURE 9·1 (Continued) 
NON·MET ALLIC MATERIALS 
Teflon Tetrafluoroethylcl1e I 

Fluoro Ethdcnc Propylene (TFE FEP) 

I'oh-yinylicicnc Fluofidc 
:"OIllCX ,\crylic CO;lIcci 
:" y Ion 
EI'0X' Pol,alllici" Rc,in 
Silicone Ruhher Crollllllcts 
Room Telllpcraturc \'ulranilcci (R 'IY ), 
Confoflll;1i Coating 
Tcflon 
Poh-Yim'licic huoridc 
:"ollle" , ,\rrdic Coatcd 
:"don 
POI\'ltfCt h:lIle 
Fiberglas, 
:"coprcnc 
Epox\' Polyamidc Resin 
:"0 Ignit ion Sourcc, 
Compounds, ,\irescarch 

SPEC :"os , 219 · ()RI,~()01. 

21 ~,()4~,90()1, 

SR4TI E22, 

SR~:,2 , 20-~-O()R 
2:.n022-904T 
21 ~ - l ()~-9001 
Poh-urethan(" Foam 

\ ' itoll 
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SPACECRAFT ATMOSPHERES 
BACKGROUND 
The use of 100% oxygen for spacecraft atmosphere in the U. S. manned space program has been 
based on extensive research and development in both the fields of biomedical science and engineering. 
The selection of a pure oxygen atmosphere at a pressure of 5 psia for the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
Programs resulted from careful consideration of the physiological, safety, and reliability requirements 
of manned space flight. 
The engineering, medical, and safety aspects of the one-gas (100% oxygen) atmosphere have been 
the subject of widespread investigation in the United States and abroad, by government, university, 
and industrial research. While the bulk of the research has been over 'the past ten years, consider· 
able work relating to the use of 100% oxygen in aircraft was done much earlier. Probably one of 
the most authoritative compilations of this research is contained in a four-part series on "The Selec­
tion of Space-Cabin Atmospheres," prepared for NASA by Dr. E.. Roth of the Lovelace Foundation 
for Medical Education and Research, Albuquerque, New Mexico., The series, which was prepared 
under NASA contract, is comprised of four volumes: (1) "Oxygen Toxicity," (2) "Fire and Blast 
Hazards," (3) "The Physiological Factors of Inert Gases," and (4) "Engineering Trade-offs of One­
Versus-Two·Gas Systems." Volumes (1) and (2) have been published; Volumes (3) and (4) are in the 
publication process. These studies have been further expanded by the work of the Douglas Company 
for NASA contained in, "Engineering Criteria for Spacecraft Cabin Atmosphere Selection," Douglas 
Missile and Space Systems Division, Douglas Report DAC-59169" November 1966. 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SELECTION OF SPACECRAFT ATMOSPHERE 
Before discussing the specific aspects of the spacecraft atmospheres used in Mercury, Gemini, and 
Apollo, the general considerations relating to spacecraft atmosphere should be reviewed. Selection 
of the atmosphere must consider at least the following factors: 
1. Sufficient oxygen content to support life. This requires a minimum partial pressure of oxygen 
equal to or greater than 3.5 psia . 
2. Dysbarism (bends) caused by pressure decreases in a multi-gas system, or in transitions from 
normal atmosphere to pure oxygen environment at reduced pressures. 
3. Total operating pressure, which affects spacecraft structural design as well as dysbarism poten­
tial in event of spacecraft decompression in normal or emergency operations. 
4. Space suit operating pressure (gauge) which has significant effects on suit design, crew mobility 
in unpressurized cabin and extra-vehicular activity (EVA) physiological stress levels. In general, suit 
pressure levels exceeding 3.5 psia result in increasingly severe space suit rigidity. 
5. Difference in cabin atmosphere constituents and suit atmosphere constituents which affect the 
possibility of dysbarism in decompression, or would dictate extended time for crew purging for EVA 
activities as well as potential leakage problems between suit and cabin atmospheres in redundant op­
erating modes . 
6. Pulmonary atelectasis (collapse of lung tissue) . which could be caused by inhalation of pure ox­
ygen for extended periods of time which is a function of absolute oxygen pressure level. 
7. Differences between cabin atmosphere and suit atmosphere constituents which could produce 
the possibility' of, hypoxia! lack of sufficient oxygen! in the event of minor system malfunction 
or interaction . 
8. The hardware complexity of the environmental control system design which is a function of 
its atmosphere constituents. This extends to consideration of oxygen uses for purposes other than life 
its atmosphere constituents. This extends to consideration of oxygen uses for purposes other than 
life support. 
9. The reliability of measuring and controlling the partial pressures of constituent elements of a 
multigas system. In general, more complex measurement and control systems must be used for a 
two-gas atmosphere as compared to simply controlling the pressure of an oxygen atmosphere. 
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10. Crew comfort on a long miSSion which is significantly affected by continued suit operation in 
either a pressurized or an unpressurized cabin. This consideration is also a function of confidence 
in cabin integrity and expected emergency decompression rates. 
11. Effect of the atmosphere chosen on ignition temperatures of cabin materials . In general, the 
ignition temperatures for solids vary only slightly with oxygen partial pressure. 
12. Effect of the atmosphere on combustion propagation rates after ignition has begun. Again, 
in general, the propagation rate is affected by oxygen partial pressure. However, at the relatively low 
pressures used in spacecraft, this effect .appears to be of no significance. 
MERCURY AND GEMINI FLIGHT ATMOSPHERES 
The guideline for the selection of the atmosphere used in the Mercury Spacecraft was to employ 
the least complex and lightest approach consistent with reasonable safety. The 5 psia , 100% oxygen 
environment was selected as the best compromise to preclude anoxia and oxygen tOXICIty. Another 
consideration was the selection of a pressure level which, in the event of a cabin decompression, would 
result in a minimum decrease to the suit pressure, and therefore, the least incidence of dysbarism 
[bends!. It should be noted that prior to the inception of the Mercury Program, aviators flying high­
performance aircraft were breathing 100% oxygen. This aircraft experience was the natural prede­
cessor to the Mercury environment; in effect it constituted the "state of the art" within the aerospace 
medical community. 
Early in the Mercury Program, a NASA Life Sciences Committee, chaired by Dr. W. R. Love­
lace, II, reviewed the medical requirements and approved the approach taken by the program. 
As a part of the development of the Mercury Environmental Control System (ECS) manned al­
titude chamber tests were conducted in a boilerplate spacecraft. The first of these manned tests was 
conducted at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation on April 21, 1960, with Mr. G. B. North, a McDonnell 
test pilot, as the test crewman. 
Mr. North was prepared for the test by pre-breathing oxygen before ingress to the test vessel. 
The pressure suit circuit had already been purged with oxygen. After the ingress operation was com­
pleted, the suit circuit was again purged with oxygen for a time period and rate previously deter­
mined to assure an essentially pure oxygen environment in the suit circuit. The hatch was closed and 
sealed. No oxygen purge of the cabin was conducted, since the space suit was isolated and the En­
vironmental Control System design provided an 80% cabin purge during spacecraft ascent by adding 
oxygen to the cabin as the cabin relief valve permitted total pressure to reduce from one atmosphere 
to space operating level. 
The altitude chamber was evacuated to 27,000 feet equivalent altitude, and the Environmental 
Control System operation during the chamber pump down (simulating launch ascent) was as planned. 
After approximately forty (40) minutes of operation at 5 psia, the test was aborted because Mr. 
North became unconscious. This condition was attributed to hypoxia I (lack of sufficient oxygen). 
Subsequent investigations revealed that leakage of nitorgen from the spacecraft air into the pres­
sure suit circuit .had gradually decreased the partial pressure of oxygen below physiologically ac.cept­
able limits. This decrease in oxygen partial pressure could occur since certain portions of the suit 
circuit were at negative pressures relative to the cabin pressure. 
Three additional manned tests were conducted on June 2, 2, and 6, 1960. All three tests were 
aborted because of rapid decreases in the suit circuit oxygen levels. 
As a result of these incidents, the prelaunch procedure for all Mercury spacecraft, both astronaut 
and chimpanzee, was changed to require that the cabin be purged with oxygen prior to launch. This 
change eliminated the possibility of nitrogen concentration in the suit circuit. 
The requirement for purging the cabin with pure oxygen at approximately 15 psia during the 
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prelaunch period of several hours has been continued for all manned spacecraft launched in this coun­
try. This same procedure has been used also on all manned spacecraft vacuum chamber tests in the 
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo Programs . 
The Gemini spacecraft atmosphere was selected to be the same as Mercury (5 psia, 100% oxygen). 
This selection allowed the Gemini program to develop an environmental control system largely based 
on the Mercury design, and to benefit from the years of previous experience in procedures, specifi­
cations, and standards. The Gemini system proved extremely reliable, and performed successfully 
in 10 manned flights , and in a large number of manned and unmanned altitude chamber tests and 
prelaunch operations. 
APOLLO FLIGHT ATMOSPHERE 
Early studies based on NASA's own research and also on a large b09Y of other experimentation 
on artificial atmospheres, e.g., aircraft and submarine, resulted in a recommendation for a 7 psia oxy­
gen-nitrogen atmosphere for Apollo. This first recommendation was in 1961. The primary reason 
for this recommendation was concern by physiologists that two-week Apollo missions in a 5 psia 100% 
oxygen environment (used in the Mercury Program) could cause pulmonary atelectasis (collapse of 
lung tissue). This condition had been observed after extended inhalation of pure oxygen prior to that 
time. However, a counter-balancing physiological question concerned dysbarism (bends) in the recom­
mended two-gas system if a rapid cabin decompression should occur. 
An extensive test program was, therefore, initiated to resolve these physiological questions for both 
the Apollo and Gemini atmosphere selections. (5 psia, 100% oxygen) atmosphere was planned for the 
Gemini spacecraft). The tests showed that a preoxygenation period of at least three hours was required 
to prevent bends in the event of cabin decompression during, or immediately following launch. Test­
ing in the 5 psia 100% oxygen atmosphere indicated that atelectasis would not be a problem in the two­
week Apollo or Gemini missions. (Satisfactory crew performance has not been demonstrated for 30­
day periods in 5 psia 100% oxygen atmosphere, including dynamic and static conditions). Based on 
the results of this test program, NASA decided in 1962 that the Apollo spacecraft would also use the 
5 psia 100% oxygen atmosphere used in the Mercury and Gemini Programs . This selection of cabin 
atmosphere in space has enabled: 
1. Continuation of the Mercury and Gemini experience. 
2. Avoidance of potential dysbarism problems in avrious modes of space operation. 
3. Relatively simple environmental control system hardware with attendant high reliability . 
4. A "shirt-sleeve" cabin environment ·which has enhanced crew comfort and effectiveness. 
5 . Minimum operational restraints to EVA initiation. 
6. Maximum crew mobility within the constraints of present space suit design by utilizing lowest 
practical absolute pressure. 
FLIGHT ATMOSPHERE FOR THE APOLLO APPLICATION PROGRAM 
The Apollo Applications Program (AAP) presently plans to use a S psia two-gas atmosphere (60% 
oxygen; 31% nitorgen) only in the airlock module (S-IVBspent stage workshop) for planned mission 
durations in excess of 30 days . The 5 psia pressure level selected for the long duration mIssIons was 
dictated by present Apollo pressure vessel capability and system compatibility considerations. 
Present program plans continue the utilization of the standard Apollo pure oxygen environment 
in the Command/Service Module and Lunar Modules, which may be associated with AAP missions. 
While the airlock module will have the capability for a two-gas system on the first AAP mission, 
present plans are to utilize the two-gas system for the second mission (4S days). Pure oxygen atmosphere 
would be used on the first mission (30 days). 
The primary consideration in utilization of the two-gas system for long d'lration mIssIons IS a 
desire to avoid physiological uncertainties and the possibility of atelectasis. 
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FIRE HAZARDS IN THE SPACECRAFT ATMOSPHERE 
The possibility that fire could occur in any atmosphere capable of life support has been under­
stood throughout the program_ In general, neither ignition temperature nor combustion rate is a strong 
function of oxygen partial pressure in the range from 3_5 psia to perhaps 7 psi a . Mixed gas systems 
operating with a minimum of 3.5 psia oxygen partial pressure apparently do not have significantly 
different fire hazard potentials as compared to a pure oxygen atmosphere at the same pressure. 
Limited zero-G aircraft testing has indicated that there is a tendency for combustion in a low­
pressure pure-oxygen environment at zero-G to be self-limiting. This may occur because of the lack 
of natural convection to remove products of combustion which no longer contain oxygen from the vici­
ity of the flame source. However, forced convection in the cabin could nullify this effect. 
In orbit, fire on board the spacecraft could be extinguished by venting the cabin to space. This 
mode of operation would require the crew to be suited prior to the d'ecompression period because 
physiological constraints dictate that a minimum body pressure of 3 .5 psia be maintained. Suit-donning 
times are on the order of 10-15 minutes. Since the probability of fire was considered sufficiently re­
mote , this mode was not given strong consideration because crew comfort and crew effectiveness in 
long-duration missions require that the suits be off for extended periods. 
Attempts to design fire extinguishers for cabin deluge systems have not been particulary success­
ful. The "fire pockets" between instrument panels and structures compl;cate the design of any effec­
tive fire-extinguishing system for spacecraft use. In addition, there is the potential interaction with 
crew safety, e.g., toxic fumes. The difficulty of timely detection of a fire and reliable operation of 
an extinguishing system must be carefully weighed against the potential dangers when considering 
such a system for spacecraft use. 
SUMMARY REMARKS 
I n summary, the selection of a 100% oxygen · atmosphere for manned spacecraft has resulted from 
the careful consideration of all factors relating to crew safety and mission success . This choice has 
been based on extensive research, which has included single and multi-gas atmospheres with their at­
tendant advantages and disadvantages. 
The 100% oxygen atmosphere has been used successfully m all U.S . manned flights to date, and 
is considered suitable for missions of 30 days or less. 
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EXAMINATION OF SOLDERED JOINTS 

FOR ALUMINUM TUBING 

A. Design Selection Rationale 
The decision to use aluminum tubing in the Environmental Control System (ECS) for both the 
water / glycol and oxygen circuits was made on the basis of stringent mission requirements and design 
limitations (weight, vibration , fluid compatibility, preSsure, ect.). These required that: 
(1) All joints were to be essentially leak free. The maximum leak rate allowed was 5.6 x 10-6 
std. cc of helium/ sec. 
(2). The joints were to be compatible with the various spacecraft fluids without a loss in strength, 
particulate formation, or fluid degradation. 
(3). The joints, and the lines, were to withstand an acoustic environment sustained at a sound 
pressure level above 143 decibels for 150 seconds. 
(4) . The joints were to sustain a dynamic in-flight environmental stress of 17,000 psi for 5,000 
cycles. 
(5). The maximum design pressure was not to exceed 900 psi in the ECS aluminum lines. 
Another consideration was that the plumbing system be of minimum weight. The aluminum 
tube wall thickness was established at .035 inch for strength and to facilitate handling, 304L stain­
less steel lines would also require 0.035 inch tube wall. On this basis, assuming the various joint con­
figurations would be similar for both steel and aluminum, (he steel system would weigh approximately 
3 times the aluminum system, a weight penalty of approximately 103 pounds. 
Welding of the aluminum joints was also considered, but early in the program it was evident 
that an extensive and costly development program would be necessary. Therefore, aluminum tube 
welding was limited to manual welding on the bench and in readily accessible areas on the spacecraft. 
Mech:mical fittings were utilized, but limited in number for obvious reasons. Mechanical fittings 
are susceptible to loosening under vibration, and generate the greatest amount of particulate matter 
during tightening. Therefore, these joints (B-nuts and quick disconnect fittings) were limited to dis­
similar metal joining, closeout lines, equipment connectors, etc. 
Based upon these considerations, a metallurgical joint was indicated and a soldered union for 
joining aluminum tubing was considered. The soldered tube-union joint permits the assembly of a 
plumbing system of minimum weight generates the minimum contamination, has adequate strength 
to withstand system pressures, is compatible with system fluids, and will sustain spacecraft environments. 
When the decision to. use solder joints was made in 1962, a program was immediately initiated 
to select a soldering alloy. This alloy was required to be compatible with the spacecraft fluids, readily 
available, and applicable to existing processing techniques. This phase of the program involved an 
intensive literature search, mechanical property determinations, flow and compatibility testing. 
The literature survey resulted in 31 candidate alloys from which twenty were selected for fluid 
compatibility testing. These tests screened out all but two potential alloys. These two alloys were 
subjected to the following tests: 
[1!. Compatibility with N204 
[2!. Alloy wetting and flow characteristics 
[3!. Optimem plate thickness (nickel base for solder) 
[4!. Optimum gap for capillary flow 
[5!. Peel resistance 
[6!. Metallurgical analysis (diffusion, erosion of tube) 
[7!. Mechanical properties (shear, stress rupture) 
[8!. Effects of reheating 
Subsequent to these tests, containment of N204 was not required by the aluminum tubing. This 
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necessitated a re-evaluation of the soldering alloy. Based upon prior development testing, production 
experience, strength, availability and exceptionally good corrosion resistance, it was decided to test 
and use the 60 Sn - 40 Pb solder alloy. This solder conformed to Federal Specification QQ-S-571, 
Type SN 60 RARP2 (activated rosin cored flux). This alloy was subjected to the following tests: 
[l!. System and Material Compatibility Tests 
a. Exposure and weight loss 
b . Metallographic examination 
c. Salt spray - 240 hours at 95°F in 20% NaCL 
d. Humidity· 240 hours at 120°F in 95% humidity 
e. Simulated system exposure to water-glycol for periods up to 8 months 
f. Leak tests prior to and subsequent to exposure 
g. Joint strength change prior to (control specimen) and subsequent to exposure. 

[2!. Mechanical Property Tests 

a. Joint shear strength 
b. Stress rupture under tensile loading (38% to 90% of joint shear strength). 
c .Creep (35% to 95% of joint shear strength) 

d.Burst pressure (Hydrostatic) 

e.Flexure· Impulse fatigue - Impulse fatigue (pressure 40-60 PSI, 17,000 psi fiber stress for ' 5,000' 

cycles minimum) . 

[3!. Structural Environmental Tests 

a.Acoustic vibration (143 decibels minImum for 150 seconds) . 
b.Vibration-flow (Sinusoidal and random vibration - time 5 minutes, Orientation: Both or­
thogonal axis perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the tube). 
[4! . Leak Testing 
a. Mass Spectrometer 
1. Internally pressurized joints 
2. Evacuated lines and joints 
[5!. Effect of Resoldering Joints 
PROCEDURE 
a.Solder up to 3 times Uoints pulled apart between each resolder operation). 

b.Check joint by X-Ray for presence of voids. 

c.Leak rate with mass spectrometer 

d.Determine change in joint strength. 

[6!. Alignment 
Where required, a tube alignment fixture shall be attached in such manner that the tubes are 
held together with a maximum allowable gap of 0 .060 inch. The maximum premissible axial 
misalignment shall be three degrees , and displacement of either tube end from the center of 
the union shall not exceed 0.060 inch. 
TEST RESULT SUMMARY 
[I!. Corrosion and Compatibility Testing 
a.No evidence of deleterious corrosion or corrosion products were noted in simulated partial ECS 
systems with inhibited water / glycol after eight months exposure . Aluminum soldered joints 
removed from SC 011 after flight and recovery revealed only a slight white deposit· in 
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the joint area , but no evidence of tube or solder alloy corrosion . The white deposit is 
believed to be an anhydrous Al (OH)e, but is not considered detrimental in an active 
syste~ as it is present as a gel and does not clog the system. 
b.No deleterious corrosion was evident due to the salt spray and humidity testing. The leak 
integrity of the joint was maintained with no appreciable loss of strength as measured 
by the burst tests. 
[2! . Mechanical Property and Environmenta l Stress Testing 
a.The joint shear strenght (tensile) is more than adequate for the low pressures used on the 
Apollo. The tensile load applied by the system pressure is only a fraction of the joint 
, , strength. Avg joint strength [1 / 4 dia.! - 681 pounds Axial load due to pressure [900 
psi! - 36 pounds 
b. 	The vibration, flexure-impulse, and burst-test results indicate that the joints do withstand 
the environmental stresses by at least a factor of 10. 
(3). Structural Environmental Testing (Spacecraft Test Sections) 
Several test sections of the service module containing numerious soldered joints of all sizes 
and configuration were acoustically tested with only one leak (out of 51 joints) in a water/ 
glycol tube tee assembly. This test was part of the auxiliary plumbing and not a test 
item This joint was repaired and the test repeated successfully . 
[4! . Leak Testing 
The leak tests were performed with a mass spectrometer sensIt Ive to 10-6 std . cc of helium/ 
second using helium as the detectable gas. The leak checks were performed prior to and 
subsequent to vibration, f1exture -impulse, and resoldering tests. Out of 47 joints tested, 
five leaks were observed. Two of the leaks were in the tubes at the fixture, two did 
not exceed the allowable limits (3.54 x 10-7 and l.27 x 10-7 st. cc of helium/sec.) and 
the fifth had a leak rate of 8 .9 x 10-6 std. cc of He / sec . 
(5). Burst Testing 
The average hydraulic fluid pressure required to burst the aluminum soldered joints ranged 
from 13,000 psi for the 1/4 inch lines to 5,300 psi for 5 / 8 inch lines. These f1uid pressures 
are more than adequate for the maximum system pressure of 900 psi. Based on these re­
sults the factor of safety at operating pressure is at least six. 
(6) . The selection of solder for joining aluminum tubes was evaluated further by establishing the 
magnitude of the midspan def1ection of a simply-supported tube specimen stressed in bend­
ing to 17,000 psi. This stress was considered to be a minimum safe allowable value. 
The span was selected by assuring that the natural frequency would be greater than 120 
cps. Based on the outer fiber stress of 17,000 psi achieved during the test, the following 
midspan def1ections were obtained. 
Tube Diameter (In.) Span (In .) Midspan Deflection (In .) 
1/ 4 13.5 	 0.239 
3/ 8 16.5 	 0 .226 
5/8 22.0 	 0.232 
I t was assumed that in normal manufacturing and assembly handling these deflections would 
permit assembly without any undue problems in tube alignment and line movement during 
equipment installation and removal. These def1ections were substantiated by the vibration 
test which imposed a fiber stress of 17,000 psi for a minimum of 61,200 cycles. 
Based upon the foregoing data, the implementation of soldering for joining aluminum 
tubing is considered to a sound decision provided the procedures for alignment are met, good 
design practice is exercised, and appropriate criteria for system installation and field main­
tenance are generated. 
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B. Program Experience 
(1). Union on coupling design . 
The union, as presently used in the program, has been designed to mInimize weight. 
In practical use and especially in conjunction with the use of the 6061-T6 hardened alu­
minum tubing, these unions have proven to be unsatisfactory. Considerable number of 
leaking joints have been found on all spacecraft. Substantial improvement of this union 
is required in order to accept normal handling associated with spacecraft checkout and 
field repairs. 
(2). Joint Assembly 
Initially, considerable difficulty was experienced in the nickel plating process; however , 
this problem has apparently been resolved by establishing and maintaining rigid cleaning 
process specifications. 
The present specification a llows an additional heat if the joint is unsatisfactory. Criteria 
for a satisfactory joint has been reduced to leakage only. Joints not meeting the other 
criteria are often accepted as a result of engineering action if they meet the leakage re­
quirements. 
In spite of the allowable reheat and reduced criteria, a ten percent rejection rate 
still exists. 
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A. TASK ASSIGNMENT 
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Analysis of Fracture Areas Panel, 10. The task assign­
ed for accomplishment by Panel 10 was prescribed as follows: 
Inspect spacecraft for structural failures resulting from the fire. Analyze these failures from 
standpoint of local pressure, temperature levels, direction of gas flow, etc. 
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION 
1. 	MEMBERSHIP: 
The assigned task was accomplished by the following meinbers of the Analysis of Fracture Areas 
Panel: 
Mr. P. C. Glynn, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. N. Koenig, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA 
Mr. R. E. Johnson, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. S. Glorioso, Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), NASA 
Mr. L. J. Korb, North American Aviation,Inc. (NAA) 
Mr. D. Root, North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA) 
Technical support was provided by the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Structures and Mechanics 
Division (SMD) and North American Aviation structural analysis personnel. The major portion of the 
on-site task consisted of detailed metallurgical inspection and laboratory analysis. Metallurgists Korb, 
Glorioso, Root, and Johnson performed the majority of the inspection while Koenig monitored or per­
formed all the laboratory analyses. 
2. COGNIZANT BOARD MEMBER: 
Mr. E.B. Geer, Langley Research Center (LaRC), NASA, Board Member, was assigned to monitor 
the NAnalysis of Fracture Areas Panel. 
C. PROCEEDINGS 
In response to the direction of the Apollo 204 Review Board, the Panel derived detailed objectives. 
These objectives were: 
Inspect the spacecraft structures to determine the extent, origin, mode, and failure sequence 
of significant structural damage. 
Estimate the cabin environment during the fire. Analyze all applicable data and examme the 
spacecraft for evidence of local temperature and pressure extremes. 
Provide metallurgical support to the systems engineers during spacecraft disassembly. Define 
metallurgical test requirements to determine the cause of system damage. 
1. PANEL ACTIVITY 
The inspection of the spacecraft structures was conducted in a systematic manner starting with the 
Command Module (C/M) and Service Module (S/M) while located at Launch Complex 34 and con­
tinued through CIM heat shield removal. Structural damage reports were made coincident with the 
spacecraft disassembly phases. As major sub·systems were removed from the spacecraft, they were vis­
ually inspected. Buckles, fractures, cracks, melted areas, localized arcing or pitting in metal components, 
and obvious direct wire shorts were noted and documented. Those items which required laboratory 
analyses were identified and detailed test requirements were defined. Equipment removed from the 
spacecraft following heat shield removal was inspected in detail at the request of the applicable system 
engineer. Analyses of results of the monitored laboratory work were provided to Panel 18 Integration 
Analysis. Metal degradation due to extreme structural temperatures was documented and analyzed. An 
estimate of the temperature attained in local areas as determined from: examination of the metallic 
components was provided to Panel 8 Materials Review. Support concerning the spacecraft strength 
and structural configuration was provided to Panel 4, Disassembly Activities Panel. Structural and mech­
anical subsystem support was provided to the Equipment Screening Committee. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The crew compartment of C/M 012 was a pressurized shell fabricated of bonded aluminum honey­
comb sandwich structure. The cabin structure was pressurized to a positive pressure of approximately 
2 pounds per square inch differential (psid) pressure at the time of the fire. As a result of the fire, 
portions of the interior and exterior were burned and the primary cabin structure was ruptured. 
At the time of the accident, all components of the structural and mechanical subsystem were in­
active. No evidence was found which would support a hypothesis of mechanically induced ignition of 
combustibles within the C / M. The crew equipment subsystem contained combustible material which 
burned. Examination of film and data from the SMD-2B boilerplate fire simulation test (Reference 
10-1) verified that the rupture of the C I M cabin accelerated the propagation of the fire by inducing 
forced convection. 
3. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES 
a. CABIN RUPTURE 
(l) TIME OF RUPTURE 
The time of cabin rupture was concluded to be between 6:31: 19.3 pm EST (23:31: 19.3GMT) 
and 6:31: 19.5 pm EST. This conclusion is supported by analysis of aft heat shield thermo­
couple data and Stabilization and Control System (SCS) spacecraft angular rate data. The therm­
ocouple data indicated an open circuit at approximately 23:31:19.5 GMT. Inspection of the meas· 
urement wire leads near the origin of cabin rupture verified that the leads had been burned 
through. The indiced structural motions at rupture, indicated at 23:31: 19.3 GMT by the SCS 
rate measurements, were analyzed and correlated with the origin of the fracture. 
(2) CABIN PRESSURE HISTORY 
Atmospheric pressure at the time of the accident was 14.68 pounds per square inch absolute 
(psia). Direct measurement of the cabin pressure was valid until approximately 6:31:16 pm EST at 
which time the cabin pressure measurement indicated full scale. However, the Guidance and Navi­
gation System did respond to cabin pressure as discussed in Reference 10-2. AC Electronics Di­
vision analyzed the applicable data from OCP FO·K·0021·1 as well as data from a previous C /M 
012 cabin pressure test. This and supporting test data obtained by simulation using Spacecraft 
008 (Reference 10-3) verified the cabin pressure measurement and provided the additional data 
points shown in Enclosure 10-2. 
An estimate of the minimum cabin pressure history for the time period 6:31 :16 
to 6 :31:19.4 pm EST was calculated. The heat absorbed by the cabin gas was calculated up to the 
time of pressure transducer saturation. The rate of heat absorbed by the cabin gas was linearly 
extrapolated and the resulting pressures and average gas temperatures were calculated. Venting 
of the cabin pressure relief valve and the addition of oxygen to the cabin were included in the 
analysis (Reference 10·4 and 10-5). Operation of the cabin pressure relief valve was shown to have 
negligible effect upon the time until cabin rupture . The method of analysis used was judged to 
yield a minimum pressure history. The estimated minimum pressure at rupture was 29 psia. 
Enclosure 10-2 presents the estimated cabin pressure from 6:31:06 to 6:31:22 pm EST. 
Pressure values plotted for the time of rupture are: 

Design ultimate pressure 12.9 psi differential (27.6 psia) 

Estimated minimum pressure at rupture 14 .3 psi differential (29 psia) 

Estimated maximum pressure at rupture (discussed in Section C3c (1)) 

23 psi differential (37 .7 psia) 
Average gas temperature at the time of rupture was estimated to be in excess of 700 
degrees Fahrenheit (OF) . The SMD·2B fire simulation test data (Reference 10-1) and analyses es­
timate a structural temperature at the time of rupture in the vicinity of the origin of fracture of 
less than 130° F. 
D-1O-4 
b. CIM PRIMARY STRUCTURAL DAMAGE 
(1) C I M EXTERIOR 
Inspection of the CIM exterior indicated extensive primary structural damage to the +Y, 
·Z quadrant exterior structure. Evidence of degradation of the external thermal control coating 
was most severe ' in this region. Evidence of CI M crew compartment exterior structural damage 
was noted in the region between access panels 15 and 17, (Enclosure 10-3)an~ of the helium 
pressurization panel bracketry as illustrated in Enclosures 10-4 and 10-5. Inspection following heat 
shield removal indicated burned and melted secondary structure in this region. 
(2) C I M CREW COMPARTMENT 
Inspection of the interior of the CIM cabin determined that the primary structure was 
damaged in several locations. Burned penetrations of the bonded aluminum honeycomb sandwich 
cabin structure were observed in the aft bulkhead beneath the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) 
and Water Control Panel and in the aft sidewall behind the Water Control Panel. Rupture of 
the aft bulkhead was observed as illustrated in Enclosures 10-6 and 10-7. Melting and erosion of 
the fracture surfaces was evident and is illustrated in Enclosure 10-8. 
Much of the fracture surface was not initially visible from the interior of the CIM due to 
equipment and secondary structure installations. The fracture surfaces are defined in detail in En­
closures 10-9 and 10-10. Exterior definition of the fracture is illustrated in Enclosure 10-11a, 10-11b, 
and 1O-11e. 
(3) C I M AFT HEAT SHIELD 
The aft heat shield brazed stainless steel honeycomb sandwich structure was melted and 
eroded in the +Y, -Z quadrant as shown in Enclosures 10-12a, 10-12b, and 1O-12c. Evidence of 
high temperatures and high velocity gas flow is further illustrated by the charred and missing in­
sulation which is installed between the aft heat shield and cabin aft bulkhead . Evidence of im­
pinging hot gas through penetrations in the cabin aft bulkhead in the +Z quadrant was observed . 
Little evidence of impinging gas was observed at the location of the burned-through area beneath 
the ECU and Water Control Panel. 
c . ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY FAILURES 
(1) BACKGROUND 
Nondestructive pressure testing of the CIM crew compartment structure performed during 
the qualification tests of the Apollo Spacecraft structure predicted the observed mode of aft bulk­
head rupture. The aluminum sheets forming the inner surface of the cabin are welded to form a 
pressure tight compartment. Thicker chemically milled sections at the circumferential joint of the 
aft bulkhead (Enclosure 10-7) are provided to facilitate the welding process and allow for the 
reduced unit strength of the weld . The junction of the aft sidewall aft bulkhead forms a discon­
tinuity in the shell surface. The critical region of the cabin structure for internal pressure loading 
occurs in the aft bulkhead inner face sheet at the transition of the weld land to the thinner inner 
face sheet near this discontinuity . 
The predicted failure mode is rupture due to meridional tensile stress of the inner face 
sheet. Calculation, using strain gage data from the qualification test, yields an estimated upper limit 
of burst pressure of 37 .7 psi a . 
(2) ORIGIN 
Detailed inspection of the bulkhead was correlated with the observed aft heat shield and 
cabin exterior structural damage. The motion of the structure due to cabin rupture, deduced from 
the Stabilization and Control System rate data , was consistent with the observed evidence. It was 
concluded that the cabin ruptured at point A shown in Enclosures 10-9 and 10-10 '!t the junction 
of the weld land to the inner face sheet. Enclosures 10-8 , 10-9, 10-10, lO-11a, 10-11b, and lO-11c 
define the total fracture. Most of the fracture surfaces were burned and melted; little metallurgical 
analysis was attempted. 
(3) FAILURE SEQUENCE 
It was concluded that the tensile failure of the inner face sheet at point A (Enclosure 
10-9) was followed immediately by tensile failure of the outer face sheet at point A (Enclosure 
D-10-5 
10-10). Rupture then propagated to points Band C. Failure of the inner face sheet to point H 
and failure of the outer face sheet along lines IjKL and CIj were deduced from inspection and 
structural analysis to have occurred following the initial rupture and to have been of secondary 
significance. The bonded doubler at point K was added as a result of manufacturing process control 
testing perlormed· during structural assembly. Failure of the inner face sheet along DEFG and 
delamination of the outer face sheet from the core with burn-through holes in the -Y,. +Z quadrant 
occurred subsequent to the initial rupture at a pressure-structural-temperature combination less than 
that required to cause failure of the outer face sheet. Burn-through in the area beneath the ECU 
did not occur until the late stages of the fire at a time when cabin pressure was approximately 
ambient. Face sheet defects adjacent to this area are a result of the structural temperatures attained 
in this vicinity. The penetration in the aft sidewall, shown in Enclosure lO-13b, was concluded 
to be a result of locally impinging hot gas behind the Water Control Panel, occurring in the late 
stages of the fire . 
(4) SECONDARY DAMAGE 
Detailed inspection of the CI M inner secondary structure revealed buckled aluminum panels 
and burned and delaminated aluminum honeycomb sandwich panels. Typical damage is illustrated 
in Enclosure 10-14 and 10-15. 
Aluminum melts at approximately 1200°F . With the exception of the aft bulkhead fracture, 
melting of aluminum was confined to the left hand (-Y) side of the inner cabin. Melted aluminum 
was observed in close proximity to plastic which was unmelted, indicating local flame impingement 
in specific areas. 
Damage to the inner face sheet of the aft sidewall adjacent to the melted and deformed 
C02 Absorbers is shown in Enclosure 10-16. The structure shown is located in the -Y, +Z quadrant 
of the C/M. Significant structural damage was noted to plumbing beneath the ECU and in back 
of the Water Control Panel. The lines are identified and shown in Enclosures 10-13a, 10-13b, 
lO-13c, and lO-13d. Aluminum and stainless steel lines were melted in this area. It was also ob­
served that soldered joints at couplings on the aluminum lines had parted. 
Melted nickel-plated copper wire was observed in the vicinity of the ECU. Copper melts 
at approximately 1980°F whereas stainless steel and nickel melt at approximately 2600"F. These 
materials are distributed throughout the spacecraft and are unmelted at other locations. 
d. SERVICE MODULE DAMAGE 
The Service Module (S/M) structure was inspected for evidence of structural damage. No 
evidence of structural failure was observed. Nondestructive tests were defined to determine any 
degradation in design strength. It was recommended that these tests be accomplished within the 
normal Apollo program activity. 
D. 	 FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS 
1. 	FINDING 
The structural and mechanical subsystem was inactive at the time of the fire. 
DETERMINATION 

The structural and mechanical subsystem did not cause the fire. 

2. 	FINDING 
Visual inspection of the Service Module structure revealed no structural failures. 
DETERMINATION 
Verification of the structural adequacy for the design loads would require non-destructive 
testing. 
D-IO-6 
3. 	FINDING 
The crew compartment structure was a pressurized shell structure during the fire. 
a. The resulting fire environment initiated the following sequence of major structural damage: 
(1) Rupture of the C/M cabin aft bulkhead. 

(~) Melting and erosion of C/M cabin and heat shield honeycomb sandwich face sheets adjacent 

to 	the origin. 

,(3) Penetration of the cabin structure beneath and adjacent to the ECU. 

b. Minor structural damage resulting from the fire included: 
(1) Honeycomb sandwich delamination 
(2) Panel buckling 
(3) Melting of metallic components 
4. FINDING 
Spacecraft data acquired during the OCP-FO-K-0021-1 test gave indications from which a spacecraft 
cabin pressure history could be estimated. 
DETERMINATION 
a. The C/M cabin structure ruptured at 6:31:19.4 (±O.l) pm EST at an estimated minimun cabin 
pressure of 29 psia. 
b. The C/M cabin structure sustained cabin pressure in excess of its design ultimate pressure of 
12.9 psi differential (27.6 psia). It is probable that the cabin pressure at rupture reached a range 
of 29 to 37.7 psia. 
c. The estimated average gas temperature at rupture exceeded 700"F. 
5. 	FINDING 
The C/M cabin ruptured in the aft bulkhead adjacent to its juncture with the aft sidewall. 
DETERMINATION 
The failure occurred due to excessive meridional tensile stress in the inner face sheet at the weld 
land to thinner face sheet junction. The fracture was determined to have originated on the right-hand 
side of the C/M in the vicinity of coordinates Y=+45 inches Z=-30 inches. 
6. FINDING 
Penetrations of the C/M cabin structure occurred in the aft bulkhead beneath the ECU and in 
the aft sidewall. 
DETERMINATION 

a., The loss of structural integrity at these penetrations occurred after the primary rupture. 

b. Failure of the water glycol and oxygen lines in the vicinity of the ECU resulted in local burning 
and melting of the adjacent structure. 
7. 	FINDING 
The aft heat shield stainless steel face sheets were melted and eroded. 
DETERMINATION 

The flame and gas temperature exiting from the fracture origin exceeded 2500°F. 

8. FINDING 
With the exception of the aft bulkhead fracture surfaces, melting of aluminum was confined to ' 
the left-hand side of the C/M. Melting of copper wire, stainless steel and aluminum occurred in the 
vicinity of the ECU and Water Control Panel on the left side and at the foot of the left-hand couch. 
These materials are distributed throughout the spacecraft and (excluding aluminum) are unmelted at 
other locations. 
0-10-7 
DETERMINATION 
a . The left-hand side of the inner cabin attained the maximum temperatures . 
b . The hottest part of the C/M cabin occurred in the vicinity of the ECU and Water Control 
Panel. 
9. FINDING 
Melted aluminum was observed on the left-hand side of the C/M inner cabin in very close prox­
imity to plastic which was unmelted, although the plastic had a much lower melting point than the 
aluminum. 
DETERMINATION 
A " blow torch" effect occurred where narrow " tongues of flame" impinged on certain areas at 
the same time as the general burning. 
10. FINDING 
Several aluminum tubes were parted at soldered joints at couplings. 
DETERMINATION 
The soldered aluminum Jomts at unions will fail if the solder is raised to its melting point of 
approximately 360"F. The soldered aluminum joints at couplings were not adequate for the temperatures 
attained during the fire . 
D - 10-8 
E. SUPPORTING DATA 
LIST OF ENCLOSURES 
10-1 Not Used 
10-2 Cabin Pressure 
10-3 Heat Shield Access Panels 
10-4 Helium Access Panel Number 15, +Y, Axis 
10-5 Crew Compartment Structure, +Y Axis 
10-6 Location of Cabin Fracture 
10-7 Origin of Cabin Failure 
10-8 Inner Fracture of Crew Compartment in Vicinity of Point B 
10-9 Inner Face Sheet of Aft Bulkhead 
10-10 Outer Face Sheet of Aft Bulkhead 
1O-11a Aft Bulkhead of 'Crew Compartment, +Y View 
10-11b Aft Bulkhead of Crew Compartment, +Y Axis 
10-11c Aft Bulkhead of Crew Compartment, -Y Axis 
10-12a Aft Heatshield Damage, View I 
1O-12b Aft Heatshield Damage, View I I 
10-12c Aft Heatshield Damage, View I I I 
1O-13a Tubing Codes for Use with Enclosures 10-13b, 1O-13c; and 10-13d 
1O-13b Inner Sidewall Penetration Behind Water Control Panel 
1O-13c Tubing Beneath ECU 
1O-13d Melted Tubing Beneath CO2 Absorbers 
10-14 Buckled Food Storage Compartment Doors 
10-15 Damaged Food and Garment Storage Locker Doors 
10-16 Damaged Inner Sidewall Below C02 Absorbers 
10-17 List of References 
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CREW COMPARTMENT STRUCTURE t Y AXIS 
ENCLOSURE 10-5 
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INNER FRACTURE OF CREW COMPARTMENT IN VICINITY OF POINT B 
ENCLOSURE 10-8 
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AFT BULKHEAD OF CREW COMPARTMENT +X VIEW 
ENCLOSURE lO-l1A 

AFT BULKHEAD OF CREW COMPARTMENT t Y AXIS 
ENCLOSURE 10-11B 

AFT BULKHEAD OF CREW COMPARTMENT -Y AXIS 
ENCLOSURE lO-llC 

AFT HEATSHIELD DAMAGE VIEW 1 

ENCLOSURE 10-12A 

AFT HEATSHIELD DAMAGE VIEW II 
ENCLOSURE 10-126 

AFT HEATSHIELD DAMAGE VIEW III 

ENCLOSURE lO-12C 
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,. 
CODE GAS OR FLUID CONTAINED PRESSURE 
A 
B 
C 
0 
E 
F 
G 
H 
J 
K 
OXYGEN SAME AS CABIN 
OXYGEN SAME AS CABIN 
AIR AMBIENT 
AIR AMBIENT 
NITROGEN AMBIENT 
OXYGEN 700 PSI 
OXYGEN 700 PSI 
OXYGEN 100 PSI 
NITROGEN AMBIENT 
WATER GLYCOL 50 PSIG 
OXYGEN 20 PSIG 
NOTE: RED ARROWS ON ENCLOSURES 10- 13b, 10- 13c, AND 10- 13d INDICATE 
DIRECTION OF FLOW IN TUBE 
TUBING CODES FOR USE WITH ENCLOSURES 10-138, 10-13C, & 10-130 
261-1080 - 67 - 24 ' ENCLOSURE 10-13A 

INNER SIDEWALL PENETRATION BEHIND WATER CONTROL PANEL 
ENCLOSURE 10-13B 
TUBING BENEATH ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT 
ENCLOSURE lO-13C 

MELTED TUBING BENEATH CO 2 ABSORBERS 
ENCLOSUR E 10-130 


BUCKLED FOOD STORAGE COMPARTMENT DOORS 
ENCLOSURE 10-14 


DAMAGED FOOD AND GARMENT STORAGE LOCKER DOORS 
ENCLOSURE 10-15 


DAMAGED INNER SIDEWALL BELOW C02 ABSORBERS 

ENCLOSURE 10-16 
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